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Thesis Summary
This research examined theoretical and emotional interrelations among social 
values, emotion, and action. Data from nine experiments revealed some novel and 
important findings. Experiments 1 to 3 examined the motivational dynamics of values by 
observing the effects of priming motivationally opposing values on judgment and 
behaviour. The results showed that priming tradition values reduced the better-than- 
average effect, but priming stimulation values increased it. Also, priming security values 
increased cleanliness behaviour, but priming self-direction values decreased it. Similarly, 
security values decreased curiosity behaviours, but priming self-direction values 
increased it. These findings supported the circular model’s assumption about 
motivational interconnections between values.
Experiments 4-9 examined the motivational dynamics of values by observing the 
effects of priming emotion on the importance of motivationally opposing values. Three 
types of negative emotion were primed: sadness, disgust, and shame. The results revealed 
that the context of the emotions determined their effect on values. Experiments 4 and 5 
found that death-related sadness (e.g., passing away of a family member), but not failure- 
related sadness, led to increased importance of self-transcendence values (e.g., 
helpfulness) and decreased importance of self-enhancement values (e.g., self-success). 
Experiments 6 and 7 found that moral disgust (e.g., terrorists), but not hygiene disgust, 
led to increased importance of self-transcendence values and decreased importance of 
self-enhancement values. Experiment 8 found that moral shame, but not performance 
shame, led to increased importance of conservation values (e.g., conformity) and 
decreased importance of openness to change values (e.g., independence). Experiment 9 
found that the context of shame interacts with prior individual differences to shape values 
and that these effects extend to value-relevant behaviour.
Together, these findings provide novel support for important assumptions about 
motivational interconnections between values, while connecting these assumptions to 
extant evidence regarding the effects of goal and value priming on action and to evidence 
regarding the effects of emotion on social judgment and action. In addition, the results 
provide novel evidence in support of the importance of emotion appraisal processes in 
value-relevant judgment and behaviour.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Chapter Overview
“It is preoccupation with possessions, more than anything else, that prevents 
us from living freely and nobly.”
(Henry David Thoreau, b. 1817)
Henry David Thoreau, an American leading writer and transcendentalist in the 
nineteenth century (see Figure 1), posited that most o f the luxuries and many of the 
comforts of life are not only overrated, dispensable, but more important, are also 
positive hindrances to the elevation of mankind. His ideas highlighted the conflict 
between greed, self-indulgence, and the development of an altruistic, humanistic 
society. His thoughts are parallel to one of the most famous contributions of Chinese 
culture to the world: Tao. The symbol of Tao has become a global icon representing 
the idea that balance is a part of nature and that we must strive for balance in our 
everyday life (see Figure 2). For instance, we must strike a balance between fulfilling 
self-interest and considering the well-being of the others. We may want to be a 
generous person, but it is not realistic to give away everything we own to help others. 
Similarly, as much as we may want to be wealthy and self-sufficient, we are social 
animals who need to engage with people, partly through offering help to others. These 
examples illustrate the core theme of the current research: the dynamic among 
competing values and its impact on judgment and behaviour.
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Figure 1: The sketch of Henry Figure 2: The symbol o f Tao
David Thoreau, together with 
one o f his famous quotes.
Specific patterns o f motivation interconnection have been described in an 
influential model of social values (Schwartz, 1992) and a more recent model of 
personal goals (Grouzet et al., 2005). The model of values focuses on abstract ideals 
that people regard as important guiding principles, such as freedom, equality, 
helpfulness, and enjoying life. The model of personal goals focuses on aims and 
aspirations the person has, such as self-acceptance, affiliation, physical health, and 
popularity. Despite their slightly different foci, the models both propose that there are 
“four occasionally overlapping but sometimes conflictual motivational systems that 
people must negotiate as they make their way through life” (pg.813, Grouzet et al., 
2005). The motivational dynamics among goals have important implications for 
judgment and actions, but the focus o f this thesis is the model of values proposed by 
Schwartz (1992) model o f values. This model is the only one to focus on values per 
se, and it has received far more direct tests thus far.
In this chapter, I will review important properties o f values, including the 
motivational dynamics proposed by Schwartz’s model. I will describe mechanisms
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involved in the activation of values. I will also highlight how these properties and 
mechanisms are relevant to understanding the effects of values on behaviour and the 
effects of emotions on values -  the two topics that are the focus of this thesis. Finally, 
I will provide an overview of the structure of this thesis.
1.2 Values: The Power Field for Behaviour
Values are an important guiding force of behaviour (G. W. Allport, 1961; Bardi 
& Schwartz, 2003; Rokeach, 1973). The effect of values on behaviour can be 
explained in terms of cognitive processing and goal activation (see Rohan, 2000). In 
cognitive terms, the activation of values is a process of recollection and organization 
of previous evaluations of stimuli (Bargh, Chaiken, Go vender, & Pratto, 1992). The 
organized information forms an analogical principle for further reference when 
encountering a similar stimulus or situation. Lewin (1952, p.41) compared value 
endorsement to goal activation:
“values influence behaviour but have not the character of a goal (i.e., of a 
force field). For example, the individual does not try to “reach” the value of 
fairness, but fairness is “guiding” his behaviour. It is probably correct to say 
that values determine which types of activity have a positive valence and 
which types of activity have a negative valence for an individual in a given 
situation. In other words, values are not force fields, but they ‘induce’ force 
fields. That means values are constructs that have the same psychological 
dimension as power fields.”
From this perspective, values create a framework after recollecting and 
evaluating previous experiences. This framework then further guides an individual as 
to what is important and what is not. This notion is consistent with the view that, 
when a previously encountered incident occurs, motivational goals make the
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corresponding behaviours desirable (Aarts, Custers, & Holland, 2007; Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh, 1990; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & 
Trotschel, 2001; A. W Kruglanski et al., 2002).
Values are conceptually related to goals and there are important distinctions 
between them. As noted by Grouzet et al. (2005), values and goals are “closely related 
but distinct” (p. 800). Recent models of goals serve to illustrate important links 
between values and goals. For example, Kruglanski et al.’s (2002) theory of goal 
systems suggests that goals are represented in complex cognitive structures, which 
may entail representations of sub-goals and means to achieve goals. In this theory, 
the highest-order goals are often more abstract and similar to the notion of a social 
value (e.g., success, religiosity). Similarly, Grouzet et al.’s (2005) recent cross- 
cultural model of goals indicates that values are higher-order ideals that organize 
diverse goals (e.g., equality entails consideration of others), although values are more 
prescriptive in nature. In fact, Grouzet et al. used Schwartz’s (1992) model of values 
to help identify some of the goals that they examined.
In addition, research that has purported to prime goals has, coincidentally, 
been priming social values. For example, Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, 
and Trotschel (2001) found that priming goals such as “compete”, “succeed”, and 
“achieve” caused participants to better succeed at a subsequent word search task than 
priming with neutral terms. A cursory glance at Table 1.1 shows that these goals can 
also be labeled as values (e.g., achievement, success). Similarly, Macrae and 
Johnston (1998) found that participants who were primed with the goal of 
“helpfulness” were more likely to offer aid, as long as the aid was easy to perform. 
Again, this goal can be labeled as a social value (see Table 1.1). Thus, these
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important experiments may have revealed something important about goals and 
values.
This also fits evidence that the motivational and affective consequences of 
values can be modeled using the same approach as in research on self-regulation to 
other types of goals. In particular, Rees and Maio (2007) drew from Higgins’s (1987; 
1997; 2004) theory of self-regulation to predict that some values (such as those 
central to the self) are held as “ideals,” which causes people to pursue them with a 
promotion-focused orientation and to experience dejection when the values are 
violated. In contrast, other values (such as those peripheral to the self) are held as 
“oughts,” which causes people to pursue them with a prevention-focused orientation 
and to experience agitation when the values are violated (but only in a public context). 
Results of seven experiments supported these predictions, showing that values 
function in the same way as other goals that have been studied using Higgins’s theory.
So what are the differences between values and goals? Although I have 
described how any value can function as a goal, values are typically more prescriptive 
from a normative, moral standpoint (Feather, 1990; Grouzet et al., 2005) and more 
strongly connected to a person’s sense of self (Rokeach, 1973; Verplanken &
Holland, 2002). Goals can possess these characteristics, but often do not. For 
instance, a person may not necessarily view it as immoral fail to live up to a goal to 
“go shopping”, and this goal may have little connection to the person’s sense of self. 
In contrast, perceived failure to live up to a personal value, such as helpfulness, does 
carry normative weight and has implications for the self concept.
1.3 Value Priming: Via a Cognitive Route or an Affective Route
What factors influence the activation of values? People usually attach at least 
some importance to diverse values. However, according to the values-as-truisms
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hypothesis, people do not always have reasons readily accessible to support the 
importance of their personal values (Maio & Olson, 1998). People may even act 
consistently with their values without consciously thinking about them (Bardi & 
Schwartz, 2003).
This idea is consistent with the auto-motive model put forward by Bargh and 
Barndollar (1996). This model suggests that environmental cues can trigger a 
person’s chronic motivations and goals through the retrieval from memory without 
conscious awareness. The activated goals then lead to relevant behaviours (Hertel & 
Kerr, 2001; Macrae & Johnston, 1998). For instance, participants playing the role of a 
fishing company who received an unobtrusive activation of the goal of cooperation 
voluntarily gave up their own profits and put more fish into a lake to maintain 
sufficient fish population than did participants in a control condition (Bargh et al., 
2001).
1.3.1 Value Priming: The Cognitive Route
This process of activating a motive related concept from memory is called 
priming. Priming enhances the accessibility of the representation of the motive­
relevant concept in memory (Aarts, Custers, & Holland, 2007; Feather, 1999), and 
further influences interpretations of a situation (Fazio, 1990; Fazio, Powell, & Herr, 
1983). Priming can occur in diverse ways. For instance, a motive can be induced by 
recollection of a life incident (Fishbach & Labroo, 2007), environmental cues (Rydell 
& McConnell, 2006), and subliminal presentation of a goal concept (Aarts, Custers, & 
Holland, 2007). Similarly, if an experimenter wishes to prime a motive, he or she can 
ask participants to complete sentences that contain words referring to the motive. 
Experiments have found that such techniques can increase people’s subsequent 
behaviour in pursuit of the motive (e.g., Bargh et al., 2001; Hertel & Kerr, 2001;
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Macrae & Johnston, 1998). For example, Bargh et al. found that priming “compete”, 
“succeed”, and “achieve” caused participants to better succeed at a subsequent word 
search task than priming with neutral terms. Similarly, Macrae and Johnston (1998) 
found that participants who were primed with “helpfulness” were more likely to offer 
aid to an experimenter following a minor lab accident, as long as the aid was easy to 
perform. In both experiments, the behaviours were examined on the assumption that 
they would affirm the primed constructs, which also happen to be values described in 
Schwartz’s (1992) model.
1.3.2 Value Priming: The Affective Route
Although judgments of value importance can be influenced by the presence of 
motive-related concepts, we are also strongly guided by our emotions and gut 
reactions to prioritize things that are worth attending to and act on (Damasio, 1996; 
Schwarz & Clore, 1996). For instance, people’s affective responses to values predict 
their importance more strongly than their cognitive arguments for them (Maio, 2010; 
Maio & Olson, 1998). Hence, priming can operate through the affective route by 
promoting the desirability of the goals (Aarts, Custers, & Holland, 2007; Feather, 
1999).
Before I proceed to discuss how emotions activate values, it will be useful to 
state how I use the term emotion. First, in line with the appraisal theory of emotion, I 
define emotion as processes that initiate adaptive behavioural reactions, depending on 
the individual’s appraisal of the circumstances (Roseman, 2001; Scherer, 1984; 
Scherer, Scherr, & Johnstone, 2001; C. A. Smith & Scott, 1997). Secondly, consistent 
with the utilitarian view of emotion, I cpnsider emotion as a state of synchronised 
response of organismic subsystems which occur when an internal or external event is 
evaluated to be of major significance for personal goals and needs (Scherer, 2004).
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Specifically, there are several components of emotion involved in each appraisal or 
evaluation, which include cognitive processing, motor expression, and physiological 
responding (Scherer, 2005). During an appraisal episode, each of the components 
formulates a response and these processes are integrated cumulatively to generate a 
response tendency suitable for the corresponding goals and needs. Considering the 
limited capacity in consciousness, the synchronized processes and the response 
preparation are likely to occur largely through automatic regulation. At the same time, 
in order to maintain a higher level regulation and control, at least part o f these 
processes is to emerge into consciousness (Scherer, 2005).
Scherer (2004) modelled these overlapping unconscious and conscious 
processes underlying emotional regulations using a Venn diagram (see Figure 3). 
There are three overlapping circles in this diagram, and each circle represents a 
different aspect of emotion monitoring (Kaiser & Scherer, 1997; Scherer, 1994). The 
first circle (A) represents the unconscious reflection and regulation, which monitors 
the representation of changes in all the synchronized processes, and integrates the 
representation o f the central processing and somatosensory feedback (Iwamura,
1998). The integrated process representation occurs mainly unconsciously. It is 
essential for response preparation and hence behavioural adaptation.
The second circle (B) represents the conscious representation and regulation.
The overlapping part between the first and the second circle stands for the part of the 
integrated process representation that enters awareness, which may be prompted by a 
high level of controlled regulation, or social communication. This circle also 
represents the subjective conscious feeling state generated by the eliciting event.
The third circle (C) represents the verbalization and communication of 
emotional experiences. This circle only overlaps partially with the conscious feeling
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circle because we can only verbalize a small part of our conscious experience. Also, 
the ability to verbalize subjective experience varies across individuals.
In essence, during an emotional episode, the cognitive appraisal, the regulatory 
processes, and the response preparation may not be fully conscious to an individual. 
However, the individual can be aware of the conscious representation of the feeling 
and the outcome of the regulation.
Figure 3: Three modes of the representation of changes in emotion 
components: unconsciousness, consciousness, and verbalization.
This representation of the conscious and unconscious emotion components 
matches the proposition that emotions can influence value-activation on a 
nonconscious level, while being aware of the feeling attached to the emotion episode. 
Indeed, Aarts, Custers, and Veltkamp (2008) found evidence supporting an “affective- 
motivational route” to nonconscious goal pursuit, and they posited that affect attached 
to the goal guides mental processes, perception, and behaviour. Their experiments
— — ---------  Motor
Physiological expression
Cognitive
appraisal
Unconscious reflection 
and regulation
Zone of valid self-report 
measurement
symptoms Action
tendencies
Conscious representation 
and regulation
Verbalization and communication 
of emotional experience
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indicated that positive affect coactivated with the cognitive representation of a goal 
enhances the motivation to pursue the goal, while negative affect demotivates pursuit 
of the goal (Aarts, Custers, & Holland, 2007; Aarts, Custers, & Marien, 2008; Aarts, 
Custers, & Veltkamp, 2008). Fishbach and Labroo (2007) also found that compared to 
unhappy participants, happy participants are more likely to exercise self-control when 
a self-improvement goal is made accessible, and more likely to reduce self-control 
efforts when a mood-maintenance goal is made accessible. That is, happy participants 
more readily adjust themselves to attain a goal that is made salient to them, but the 
same adjustment does not occur among unhappy participants.
The expectancy-value perspective explains the effect of emotion on the 
activation o f motives by focusing on how affect changes the desirability of the motive 
(Feather, 1990, 1995). According to this perspective, the mind evaluates the expected 
utilities o f the outcome of behaviour. Behaviours that are consistent with a more 
important value would be considered as yielding more attractive outcomes. Hence, 
people sometimes act consistently with their values because the perceived 
attractiveness of the outcomes increases the likelihood of carrying out the behaviour.
The idea that emotions influence value endorsement and goal pursuit is 
consistent with findings in environmental. Emotions like indignation about 
insufficient sustainable political decision-making (Kals & Maes, 2002), and positive 
emotional affinity towards nature (Kals, Schumacher, & Montada, 1999) are found to 
be powerful predictor o f sustainable and nature-protective behaviours.
Having described the “how” o f values activation (i.e., cognitive retrieval from 
memory and affective influence), I describe below how values are connected to each 
other systematically and what happens to the value system when one value is 
activated.
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1.4 Circular Patterns in Values
Schwartz’s (1996) cross-cultural model of values indicates that values are self- 
imposed criteria that balance between individual needs, the co-ordination of social 
interaction, and group survival. As values co-ordinate these concerns, they come to 
express and serve ten types of motivation: power, achievement, hedonism, 
stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and 
security (see Table 1.1 for more detail). More important, Schwartz (1992) suggested 
that these ten motives possess various conflicts and compatibilities. As shown in 
Figure 4, these motivational interconnections can be modelled in a circular structure. 
This structure plots values that express compatible motives adjacent to each other, 
whereas the structure plots values that express conflicting motives opposite each 
other. The structure yields two dimensions underlying four broad, higher-order types 
of values, which reflect motivational orientations that encompass the ten lower-order 
motives. One dimension contrasts self-enhancement values, which promote self 
interest (e.g., wealth, ambitious), with self-transcendence values, which transcend 
personal interest to consider the welfare of others (e.g., helpful, equality). The other 
dimension contrasts conservation values, which protect the status quo (e.g., family 
security, social order), with openness values, which follow intellectual and emotional 
pursuits in uncertain directions (e.g., creativity, curiosity).
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Table 1.1
Schwartz’s (1992) 10 Value Types and Their Principal Value Tables
Value type Definition Value labels
Power Social status and prestige, control or
dominance over people and 
resources
Achievement Personal success through
demonstrating competence 
according to social standards 
Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification
for oneself
Stimulation Excitement, novelty, and challenge
in life
Self- Independent thought and action-
direction choosing, creating, exploring
Universalism Understanding, appreciation,
tolerance and protection for the 
welfare of all
Benevolence Preservation and enhancement of the
welfare of people with whom one 
is in frequent personal contact 
Tradition Respect, commitment and acceptance
of the customs and ideas that 
traditional culture or religion 
provide the self 
Conformity Restraint of actions, inclinations, and
impulses likely to upset or harm 
others and violate social 
expectations or norms 
Security Safety, harmony and stability of
society, relationships, and self
social power, wealth, authority, 
preserving my public image
successful, ambitious, capable, 
influential
pleasure, enjoying life
varied life, daring, an exciting life
creativity, freedom, independent, curious, 
choosing own goals 
broadminded, wisdom, a world of 
beauty, equality, unity with nature, a 
world at peace, social justice, 
protecting the environment 
honest, loyal, helpful, forgiving, 
responsible
respect for tradition, humble, accepting 
my portion in life, devout, moderate
self-discipline, obedient, politeness, 
honouring of parents and elders
family security, national security, 
reciprocation of favours, social order, 
clean
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Figure 4: The Schwartz (1992) circumplex value structure.
The circular model has been supported in studies of over 200 samples from 
more than 70 countries (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005). Most of these studies analyzed 
participants’ responses to the Schwartz (1992) Value Survey, which asks respondents 
to rate the importance of 56 values (e.g., freedom) using a 9-point unipolar scale. 
Results revealed that the values cohered well within each of the ten motivation types 
(e.g., security, benevolence), forming reliable scales in aggregate measures of each 
motivational type. More important, patterns of correlations between individual values 
were consistent with the circular model. That is, adjacent values tended to be 
positively correlated, values at about 90 degrees tended to have less positive or null
O
penness
correlations, whereas ratings of opposing values tended to have null or negative 
relations, and the ordering of the values in a two-dimensional map of value 
interrelations was consistent with the model (Schwartz, 1992).
In addition, the model successfully predicts patterns in value-relevant reasoning 
(Bernard, Maio, & Olson, 2003a, 2003b), the speed of value rating (Pakizeh, Gebauer, 
& Maio, 2007), value-behaviour relations (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Garling, 1999; 
Judge & Bretz, 1992), and the relations between values and other constructs (Roccas, 
Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002; Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995; Schwartz, 1992). These 
correlations often follow a sinusoidal wave form across the ten values around the 
circle (e.g., Kasser, Koestner, & Lekes, 2002). For instance, Sagiv and Schwartz 
(1995) found that readiness for contact with a dominant out-group was positively 
related to self-direction and universalism values, and negatively related to opposing 
conformity, tradition, and security values. Similarly, Roccas et al. found that the 
pattern of correlations between values and several dimensions of personality was 
consistent with the circular model, such that opposing value domains tended to have 
opposite directions o f correlation with particular traits (e.g., extroversion).
Despite all o f this evidence for the motivational interrelations proposed by 
Schwartz (1992), it is vital to examine these interrelations further. From my 
perspective, the extant research has not fully come to grips with the notion that 
Schwartz proposes a motivational dynamic between values. Such dynamic may have 
important implication on behaviour through simultaneous excitatory and inhibitory 
processes. But before elaborating this implication, I need to first illustrate the 
excitatory and inhibitory processes underlying behaviour.
14
1.5 The Excitatory and Inhibitory Effects on Behaviours
As noted by Bargh (2006), every promoted or primed motive may have 
excitatory and inhibitory effects on diverse behaviours. There is ample amount of 
research examining the excitatory effect o f values on behaviour, and it refers to the 
promotion of behaviour that is consistent with the primed motive, as illustrated in 
section 1.3.
In contrast, the inhibitory effect has received less attention in research on goal 
pursuit. Hence, I turned to the research on working memory and information 
processing, which provides an explanation of the mechanism underlying the 
suppression of goal-irrelevant information. Inhibition occurs when the access of goal- 
irrelevant information to working memory is denied, suppressed, or removed (Hasher 
& Zacks, 1988). This phenomenon is often examined using the negative priming 
paradigm (D. A. Allport, Tipper, & Chmiel, 1985; Tipper & Cranston, 1985). This 
paradigm involves presenting pairs of a target stimulus and a distractor stimulus. The 
two stimuli in each pair are differentiated by their colour or location (see Grant & 
Dagenbach, 2000). In the priming trial, participants first attend to the target stimulus 
by naming it, giving its physical location, or classifying its semantic category. Then, 
in the probing trial, when the target stimulus has the same colour or is in the same 
position as the distractor stimulus in the preceding priming trial, participants took 
longer time to respond to it (Grant & Dagenbach, 2000; Hasher & Zacks, 1988). This 
result suggests that the previous priming condition has actively suppressed the 
representation of the ignored distractor stimulus. This process was identified as 
negative priming (Tipper & Milliken, 1996).
Another example is the multiple categorizations of stereotypes. When a target 
person possesses several social stereotypical categories (e.g., being both a female and
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ethics minority), only one category out of the many might be consciously processed 
by the perceiver (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995; Zarate & Smith, 1990). 
Similarly, the work on selective attention suggested that when there is a pool of 
available and relevant information or stimuli, only a part of the information is 
sufficiently activated to gain access to awareness (Broadbent, 1958; Dixon, 1987; 
Kahneman & Triesman, 1984; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990). The rest o f the stimuli fail 
to enter awareness. O f interest, these stimuli are not simply neglected, but are actively 
inhibited (Macrae et al.,Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995).
There are several ways to explain this inhibitory effect. The effect may 
economize mental effort (Bodenhausen, 1990; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; 
Macrae et al., 1995; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994), reserve attentional 
resources for differentiating relevant information as either a target or a distractor 
(Tipper & Driver, 1988), and ensure that the distractor attains a less activated mental 
state (Shallice, 1972). These findings have potential implications for the effects of 
values on behaviour. When one value is activated, several behaviours may become 
relevant. The excitation and inhibitory processes may operate by means of promoting 
behaviour consistent with the values, and suppressing behaviour consistent with 
opposing values.
This inhibition process may operate in different stages. The inhibition process 
may occur at the information level by blocking or suppressing information related to 
the values that are inconsistent to the current goal. Alternatively, it may operate at the 
behavioural level by impeding the tendencies leading to the behaviours that serve an 
opposing goal. There is reason to suggest that the inhibition process operate on the 
behavioural level. Pakizeh, Maio, and Gebauer (2007) found that, when participants 
rated the importance of values clustered in pairs, they took shorter time to rate the
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second value in each pair when the two values were motivationally congruent or 
opposing than when the two values were unrelated. In other words, the activation of 
one value does not block the processing of the concept of another value that serves an 
opposing goal. This evidence indicates that the inhibition effect of values is unlikely 
to operate on a conceptual level. Instead, the inhibition may operate through directly 
suppressing behaviours that serve an opposing goal. Hence, even when given the 
opportunity to carry out the “distracting” behaviour, the occurrence would become 
less likely.
The above evidence suggests that there is a need to examine both the 
motivational excitatory and inhibitory effects of values on behaviour. But which 
behaviours are relevant? Below, I outline some important behavioural consequences 
that will be probed in this thesis.
1.6 Motivational Tensions Between Values: Implications for Behaviour
There is a need to understand which behaviours will be affected by each motive. 
For example, we know that priming money can decrease helpfulness (Vohs,' Mead, & 
Goode, 2006). To this point, however, research on priming has not identified theory 
that can be used to give an a priori justification for treating different behaviours as 
outcomes that should be facilitated or inhibited by different primes. The application of 
the circular model can move researchers beyond intuitive guesses about how 
particular motives might affect attitudes and behaviour; instead, these models provide 
a strong theoretical grounding for predicting which behaviours and attitudes will be 
affected by which motives. Indeed, Burgoyne and Lea (2006) noted that the effects of 
money on (decreased) helping in the experiments by Vohs et al. is consistent with 
Grouzet et al.’s (2005) evidence that money and a sense of community are personal 
goals that serve opposing motives in their circular model. This finding also fits the
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contrasting positions between the values of wealth and helpfulness in Schwartz’s 
(1992) model of values.
According to the circular model, priming values should activate the 
compatibilities and conflicts within the whole system. The interconnections between 
motives expressed by values should cause the pursuit of values that serve the same 
motives to be enhanced, whereas the pursuit of values that serve opposing motives 
should be thwarted, and the pursuit o f values that serve orthogonal motives should be 
unaffected. For example, if a set of values (e.g., success, capable) expresses an 
achievement motive, as predicted by the circular model, then any intervention that 
activates these values should promote achievement behaviour (e.g., success at a 
puzzle), similar to past findings (Bargh et al., 2001). At the same time, such an 
intervention should decrease the performance of behaviour that serves opposing 
motives, such as benevolence toward others, because of the reciprocal latent 
connection between these motives predicted by the model (see Figure 4, p. 13). 
According to the model, the activation of achievement-promoting values would 
introduce a self-enhancing motivational focus that subtracts from the motivational 
orientation underlying the opposing, benevolent values (e.g., helpfulness), which 
instead rely on a motivational focus that transcends the self. This would make people 
more likely to construe a subsequent behavioural opportunity in terms of an 
achievement motive and less likely to construe the behaviour in terms of a benevolent 
motive.
There is evidence supporting these predictions (Maio et al., 2009). Specifically, 
Maio et al (2009, Experiment 5) conducted an experiment that primed either 
achievement values or benevolence values and then measured an achievement-related 
behaviour and a benevolent behaviour (see Maio et al., 2009, Experiment 5). The
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achievement-related behaviour was participants’ level of success at detecting hidden 
words in a word puzzle, whereas the benevolent behaviour was the amount of time 
that participants agreed to volunteer for future research (without payment or course 
credit). As expected, the effects of the value primes depended on which behaviour 
was analysed. Activating achievement and benevolence values increased the 
likelihood of behaviour affirming the motive expressed by the primed values (e.g., 
increased benevolence after benevolence primes), while decreasing the likelihood of 
behaviour affirming values that opposed the primed values (e.g., decreased 
achievement after benevolence primes).
These findings are provocative because they expand our understanding of the 
effects of motivational priming to include effects beyond those that occur merely for 
behaviour that is consistent with the primed motives. The findings provide a powerful 
basis for a priori predictions about the effects of priming specific values on behaviour 
consistent with values that serve opposing motives. However, the findings were 
limited by a focus on only one of the dimensions in the circular model of values: the 
dimension from self-transcendence values to self-enhancement values.
A complete test requires evidence of similar patterns on the second dimension in 
Schwartz’s model: the dimension from conservation values to openness to change 
values. The circular model suggests that priming a conservation or openness to 
change value should have consequences that go beyond the effects on the specific 
values that have been primed, because of the impact of these interventions on 
underlying motivational tensions that connect the values or personal goals. Priming 
conservation values should both increase the likelihood of action that supports these 
values and decrease the likelihood of action that supports openness to change values. 
Conversely, priming openness to change values should both increase the likelihood of
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action that supports these values and decrease the likelihood of action that supports 
conservation values. These predictions were tested in the first stream of research that I 
conducted for my doctoral thesis.
1.7 Motivational Tensions Between Values: Implications for Emotion
Just as the motivational interconnections between values have important 
ramifications for understanding value-relevant action, these interconnections have 
important ramifications for understanding the link between values and emotion. Thus, 
there is a need to map the common goal shared by emotions and values.
Many current theories on emotions emphasize the functions o f emotions on 
goal activation, both in terms of eliciting action tendencies and inducing subsequent 
behavioural consequences. For instance, several appraisal theories of emotions posit 
that the evaluation of a particular situation can be relevant to one’s personal goals or 
concerns (e.g., Frijda, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; Oatley & John son-Laird, 1987; see 
Scherer, 1999, for an overview). According to these theories, the elicitation of a 
particular emotional state signals the presence of opportunities or obstacles to the 
attainment of a goal. Also, the functional account of emotions put forward by Keltner 
and Gross (1999) is also consistent with the idea that emotions are connected to goals 
in guiding people’s actions and decisions. This account states that an emotional state 
induces a motivational tendency to attain or maintain a particular emotional-end-state. 
In other words, emotions motivate action that lead to goal attainment. Considering 
that both values and emotions can be regarded as motivational constructs, some 
values and emotions may share a common goal.
Nelissen, Dijker, and de Vries (2007) provided an important step toward this 
proposition by examining correlations between ratings of the importance of values 
and the frequency o f different emotions in daily life. Value importance was assessed
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using the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1994), and eleven types of emotions 
(e.g., shame, disgust, excitement and pride) were measured. Most of the values were 
significantly correlated with specific types of emotions. For instance, people who 
considered power values to be highly important experienced anger more frequently, 
and people who considered achievement values to be highly important experienced 
pride more; frequently. These findings supported the hypothesis that values and 
emotions have shared goals, such as striving for social dominance in the case of anger 
and self-fulfilment in the case of pride.
However, the correlations between emotions and values do not provide enough 
information to infer die causal effects of emotions on values and vice-versa. For 
instance, these correlations do not tell us whether or not motivationally opposing 
values have different effects on the emotions that people tend to experience. In 
addition, the correlations do not tell us whether or not the experience of specific 
emotions has different effects on values that serve opposing motives. Both of these 
questions have strong basic and applied importance.
Some basic issues in emotion theory and research led me to pursue the latter 
question (the effect of emotion on values) in this thesis. In other words, I wanted to 
discover how emotional experience shapes the values we hold. A key reason for this 
interest is found within appraisal theories of emotions (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, & ter 
Schure, 1989; Lazarus, 1991; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). The core-relational 
theory of emotions posits that emotion is a product of individuals’ appraisal of the 
environment, the involvement of the self, and individuals’ goals (Lazarus, 1991).
Goal relevance is crucial for any emotion to emerge. If the situation is goal congruent, 
the emergent emotion will be positive (e.g., happiness, pride). On the contrary, if the 
situation is goal incongruent, the emergent emotion will be negative (e.g., sadness,
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disgust). Furthermore, emotions sharing the same valence can be distinguished by 
their motivational functions (and core relational theme). The motivational functions 
can be understood as reactions to environmental conditions, which then trigger a 
compelling urge toward actions to achieve the relevant goal. Hence, negative 
emotions can lead to implicit mood-repair motives and guide goal-related behaviour 
(Baumann, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 1981; Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973). For 
instance, sadness is often induced by the sense of loss or absence of a reward 
(Lazarus, 1991). This feeling might then elicit reward acquisition goals and lead to a 
preference for high risk and high-reward options (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999).
Similarly, the feeling-as-doing theory conceptualizes emotions as motivational 
processes (Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008; Zeelenberg, Nelissen, 
& Pieters, 2007; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006). This theory proposes that emotions 
guide actions and decision making by providing a favoured heuristic for a 
corresponding action readiness. Action readiness involves a range of motivational 
states that are associated with goal priority, attentional focusing, arousal, action, and 
felt readiness (Zeelenberg et al., 2008). For example, when feeling angry, moving 
against the source o f the anger has priority over other goals or actions.
Taken together, these theories suggest that emotions activate specific 
motivations for related action tendencies (Nelissen, Dijker, & De Vries, 2007; 
Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). However, through their attention to effects of the 
situation, the theories also raise fundamental questions about the extent to which each 
emotion leads to the same motivation consistently across all contexts. Abundant 
recent research has started pointing out the crucial impact of context on social 
cognition, by referring to “situated” social cognition (Reis, 2008; E. R. Smith & 
Semin, 2007), and this perspective is becoming evident in studies of emotion. For
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instance, Cowie, Douglas-Cowie and Cox (2005) analyzed conversations rich in 
genuine emotion. They found that social situations like watching a football match, 
chairing a meeting, and standing waiting for a friend provide different contexts for the 
perception and expression of emotions. The sense of emotionality was mainly derived 
from the present surrounding, its association with other situations remembered, and 
the anticipation of the outcome from the situation. Building on these findings, Cowie, 
Douglas-Cowie, and Cox developed a list of contexts that researchers could specify 
when describing or inducing an emotion. The list incorporates factors such as the 
overall communication goal (e.g., to claim, to sway, to share a feeling), the intended 
audience (e.g., kin, colleagues, public), and social constraints (e.g., pressure to 
expressiveness, pressure to formality).
This variation between contexts is important partly because studies often use 
different contexts to induce the same emotion. Diverse contexts are easily discernible 
for three emotions that were the focus of the present research: sadness, disgust, and 
shame. Research often induces sadness by leading people to recall a sad experience.
In many instances, people end up recalling the death or illness of a friend or family 
member (Fishbach & Labroo, 2007; Lazarus, 1991). In other cases, they may 
remember a personal failure, entailing the potential loss o f positive regard of another 
person (Fishbach & Labroo, 2007; Lazarus, 1991). These contexts involve a different 
initial bearer of the suffering (e.g., being an onlooker or a victim).
Similarly, disgust is a response to both moral transgressions and physical objects 
associated with toxicity and disease (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009; 
Haidt, 2003; Rozin, Haidt, & Fincher, 2009; Rozin, Haidt, & MaCauley, 2000). These 
contexts involve a violation of different social norms (i.e., justice violation vs. purity 
violation).
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Also, common antecedents of shame are personal violations o f social rules or 
standards (D. Lewis, 2004) and performance failures (Keltner & Buswell, 1996; 
Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). When a social rule or standard is violated 
(e.g., lying or breaching a pledge), the harm is done to others, whereas performance 
failure involves harm done to the self (through the visibility of self-incompetence). 
The different contexts o f these emotions may have divergent implications for 
motivation, action, and values. For instance, when the context makes people aware of 
other people’s feelings (e.g., when there is another’s sadness from death or another’s 
anger upon failure), people may adjust their own demands and goals accordingly. In a 
negotiation, when an opponent displays sadness, the perceiver either shows 
compassion or interprets the emotion as a sign of weakness and becomes less likely to 
concede (Li & Roloff, 2006; Tiedens, 2001). When an opponent displays anger, the 
perceiver will become more likely to concede (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 
2004a, 2004b). The particular individuals who are brought to mind might also matter. 
Whitesell and Harter (1996) found that anger induced by close friends and casual 
acquaintances activated different coping mechanisms related to relationship 
preservation. Together, this evidence fits the hypothesis that the interpersonal context 
of emotions may also be pivotal for shaping their effects on values. This issue will be 
the focus of the second stream of research described within this thesis.
1.8 The Current Research
This chapter has reviewed properties of values and provided background 
information for understanding the effects of priming values on behaviours and the 
effects of emotions on values. Taken together, there are two research questions to be 
addressed.
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The novel and provocative findings obtained by Maio et al..(2009, Experiment 
5) focused on one of the dimensions in the circular model of values, from self­
transcendence values to self-enhancement values. Hence, the first question to be 
addressed is whether systemic effects of values on behaviours occur for the second 
dimension in this model, from conservation values to openness to change values. 
Chapter 2, “Motivational Dynamics and Behavioural Changes in Conservation Values 
and Openness to change Values” describes three experiments that examined this issue. 
I predicted that priming conservation values and openness values would cause 
systemic changes in value-relevant behaviour that fit the motivational relations 
described by the circular model.
The second research question probed the effects of emotions on values. The 
function of emotions is often framed in motivational terms and there is evidence 
suggesting an important link between values and emotions (Nelissen, Dijker, & De 
Vries, 2007). However, the extant literature has not illuminated the causal effect of 
emotional experiences on the activation of values. Further, the context of emotions is 
often neglected in the understanding of the motivational functions of emotions. This 
Thesis addressed these issues by examining three specific negative emotions: sadness 
(Chapter 3), disgust (Chapter 4), and shame (Chapter 5). I predicted that each emotion 
would lead to (1) increased importance for values that share common goals with the 
emotion in its specific context, (2) decreased importance for values that share 
conflicting goals with the emotion in its specific context.
1.9 Chapter Summary
In sum, motivational conflicts and compatibilities are intrinsic to the 
contemporary understanding of values, but the ramifications of these links have not 
been fully explored. Research supporting Schwartz’s model of motivational
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interrelations between values has focused on relations between values, changes in 
values, and associations with other constructs. The purpose of this doctoral thesis is to 
explore important implications of the motivational interrelations for understanding 
action and emotion — two constructs most intimately connected to the construct of 
motivation. First, the thesis will provide a deeper understanding of how motivational 
dynamics of values lead to behavioural changes. Second, it will test whether emotions 
alter values in a manner that is congruent with the hypothesized motivational 
dynamics of values and with social-appraisal perspectives on emotion.
To this point, I have described the background for this research broadly. The 
two streams of research are not sequential progressions from one to another; instead, 
they deal with separate, but interrelated, aspects of the hypothesis that there are basic 
motivational interconnections between values. Together, the streams shed light on 
three important psychological constructs: values, emotion, and human behaviour. In 
subsequent chapters, I provide more specific information relevant to each stream of 
research, including information that explains the experimental methodologies.
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Chapter 2: Motivational Dynamics and Behaviour
2.1 Chapter Overview
As noted in the Introduction to this thesis, a prior experiment examining the 
effect of value priming on judgment and behaviour supported the circular model’s 
assumptions about motivational interconnections between self-enhancement values 
and self-transcendence values (Maio et al., 2009, Experiment 5). However, this 
experiment focused on only one of the dimensions in the circular model of values -  
the dimension from self-enhancement to self-transcendence values. The aim of this 
chapter is to test the circular model’s assumption about motivational interconnections 
along the other value dimension, from conservation values (tradition values and 
security values) to openness to change values (stimulation values and self-direction 
values).
This aim was achieved through three experiments. Experiment 1 examined the 
effects of priming tradition values (on the conservation end o f the continuum) and 
stimulation values (on the openness end of the continuum) on a self-evaluative 
judgment related to tradition values: being humble. Experiment 2 looked at the effects 
of priming security values (on the conservation end of the continuum) and self- 
direction values (on the openness end of the continuum) on a behaviour related to 
security values: cleanliness. By examining judgments and behaviours related to 
tradition and security values, Experiments 1 and 2 focused on actions that promoted 
conservation values. In contrast, Experiment 3 examined the effects of priming 
security values (on the conservation end of the continuum) and self-direction values 
(on the openness end of the continuum) on a behaviour related to self-direction 
values: curiosity. Together, these experiments provided the first systematic 
examination of implications of motivational conflict between conservation values and
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openness to change values for behaviour. In this way, they provide vital tests o f the 
motivational conflicts assumed by the circular model.
2.2 Conservation Values, Openness to Change Values and Behaviour
Schwartz’s (1992) circular model indicates that stimulation values (e.g., a varied 
life, daring) express a search for arousal that is sensationally or affectively pleasant, 
whereas tradition values (e.g., humble, accepting one’s portion in life) respect and 
accept the imposition of external limits. These two sets of values belong to different 
and opposing categories of the higher-order value types: stimulation values belong to 
the higher-order category of “openness to change” values, whereas tradition values 
reside in the higher-order category o f “conservation” values.
There is evidence supporting the connection between these two types o f values 
and behaviour. Bardi and Schwartz (2003) found that each of these values is 
associated to a set o f behaviours. For instance, people who attach more importance to 
tradition values are more likely to behave more modestly with regard to their 
achievements and talents. Also, people who attach more importance to self-direction 
values tend to examine the ideas behind rules and regulations before obeying them. 
More important, Bardi and Schwartz found that modelling these values-related 
behaviours and others relevant to different values forms a circular model like the 
Schwartz model o f values. This result provides initial evidence that these values- 
related behaviours exhibit the same motivational interconnections as their 
corresponding values.
However, Bardi and Schwartz assessed these behaviours using self-report scales. 
It remains uncertain whether values lead to actual behavioural changes compatible 
with the circular model’s assumptions about motivational interrelations between 
values. To consolidate the function o f values in real behaviour, Experiments 2 to 3
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examined the effect of value priming on actual behaviour. I predicted that the 
activation of openness values to decrease behaviour that affirms conservation values, 
whereas priming conservation values should of course increase behaviour that affirms 
these values.
2.2.1 Overview o f Experiments
In the following three experiments, I searched for systemic effects of priming 
conservation values and openness to change values on value-related judgments and 
behaviours. On one hand, I examined the effect of priming values on judgments and 
behaviours that are consistent with the target values. Similar to the extant literature on 
goal priming (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1996), I presented value-related words in 
order to prime the target values. This values priming procedure is not to be confused 
with other procedures that purely activate mental representation of concepts. Forster, 
Liberman and Friedman (2007) listed seven principles o f goal activation, two of 
which are that goal priming involves (positive or negative) value association and the 
inhibition of conflicting goals. In my values priming procedure, many of the value- 
related words were paired with positive associations. For instance, tradition values 
(restraining anger) were associated with the word “admirable” in one of the priming 
sentences. Hence, it matches the former goal activation criteria I listed above.
The latter principle of goal activation listed above was examined by testing the 
effect of priming values on judgments and behaviours that are consistent with the 
opposing values. This procedure examined the proposition that the presentation of a 
value prime can lead to an inhibition of a behaviour that is consistent with a value not 
presented in the priming procedure.
Experiment 1 tested whether or not priming tradition values promotes modest 
self-comparison, while priming stimulation values decreases it. Experiment 2 tested
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whether or not priming security values increases cleanliness, while priming self- 
direction values decreases it. Experiment 3 tested whether security values decreases 
curiosity-driven behaviour, while priming self-direction values increases it. These 
designs tested the hypothesis that the activation of one set of values would not only 
promote behaviour consistent with the primed values, but also diminish behaviour 
consistent with motivationally opposing values.
2.3 Experiment 1
Experiment 1 focused on the effect of priming tradition values and stimulation 
values on a judgment related to tradition values, being humble. Specifically, I 
examined the effect of priming these values on the better-than-average effect (Alicke, 
Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995), which is the tendency to express 
more superior evaluations of the self compared to others. This effect is relevant to 
tradition values because self-enhancement bias in general is fed by difficulties in 
recognizing one’s own “place” (Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman,
2006) and limitations (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Tradition values emphasize 
accepting such constraints in a manner that diminishes the personal self. This 
emphasis is best characterized by the tradition values of humble, accepting my portion 
in life, and moderate (see Table 1.1, pg. 7). People primed with these values should 
experience a stronger motivation to be modest, causing a lower better-than-average 
effect.
More novel, the circular model predicts that the motivational orientation served 
by tradition values competes with the motivational orientation served by stimulation 
values. Core examples o f the latter values are daring, a varied life, and an exciting 
life. These values promote excitement, novelty, and challenge. By emphasizing 
personal pursuits and satisfaction, they subtract from tradition values’ emphasis on the
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connections between self and others (e.g., Streib, 1999). Indeed, stimulation values 
are virtually adjacent to self-enhancement values in the circular model (because 
Schwartz indicates that the intervening, hedonism values can be considered to be self­
enhancement or openness values), and self-enhancement values directly involve this 
self-inflation. It is therefore plausible that stimulation values involve a motivational 
orientation that is antithetical to the self-effacing mindset that promotes modesty in 
the better-than-average effect. People primed with these values should experience less 
motivation to be modest, causing a higher better-than-average effect.
However, the better-than-average effect may occur through two different 
mechanisms: self-enhancement and denial (Paulhus, 2002). Self enhancement is about 
promoting positive attributes, and denial is about disavowing negative attributes 
(Paulhus & Reid, 1991). Both mechanisms serve to maintain relatively high levels of 
self-esteem (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; Taylor & 
Lobel, 1989), and it is conceivable that tradition values lead to lower self­
enhancement or less denial or both. To examine these possibilities, I included positive 
and negative traits in the measurement of the better-than-average effect.
2.3.1 Methods 
Participants
Participants were 116 Cardiff University undergraduate students who took part 
for course credit. The sample included 84 women and 32 men, with a mean age of
21.17 years (SD = 3.49). Participants were tested in a group setting with a maximum 
group size of six. They were informed that there were several tasks to complete. I 
presented the experimental manipulation, followed by two measures that were 
irrelevant to the better-than-average effect and then the task measuring the better-
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than-average effect. Participants also completed a funnel debriefing and thanked for 
their participation.
Procedure
Experimental Manipulation. Participants first completed the value priming 
manipulation, which presented tradition values, stimulation values, or neutral 
sentences (control condition). As in prior research (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996), the 
priming task involved unscrambling 15 sentences containing values or control items. 
The sentences included stimulation values (e.g., stimulation, an exciting life, a varied 
life), tradition values (e.g., moderate, tradition, humble), or the names of furniture 
items (e.g., table, drawer, armchair).
Tradition Judgment. To examine the better-than-average effect, participants 
rated the extent to which they possessed 20 positive traits (e.g., intelligent, respectful) 
and 20 negative traits (e.g., deceptive, disobedient) when compared to an average 
student in the same university, using the same traits as used in research by Alicke et 
al. (1995). Participants responded to each trait using a scale from 1 (much less than 
average university student) to 9 (much more than average university student). The 
scores o f the negative traits were reverse scored so that a higher value reflected a 
higher positive bias. There were 2 positive and 2 negative traits on each page, and the 
ten pages were given to the participants in a randomized order.
Finally, participants completed a funnel debriefing interview similar to the 
debriefing approach used in past research (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; G. M. 
Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003). This interview began with global questions about the 
session (e.g., “were there any hypotheses that you thought we should, could, or would 
test?”) to a more specific explanation of the experiment and pointed questions about 
their experience. No participants reported suspicions relevant to my hypotheses.
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2.3.2 Results
I conducted a 3 (stimulation vs. tradition vs. control) x 2 (trait valence) x 2 
(gender) mixed-model ANOVA on participants’ ratings of themselves relative to the 
average person.1 The results indicated a main effect of trait valence, F  (1,103) = 4.94, 
p  < .03, such that participants rated themselves as being more superior to the average 
person on negative traits (M — 115.86; SE=  1.63) than on positive traits (M= 112.45; 
SE = 1.57).
This effect was qualified by a significant interaction between the value priming 
manipulation and trait valence, F (2, 103) = 3.17,/? < .05. To interpret this interaction, 
I examined the effects of the value primes on the magnitude of the better-than-average 
effects for the positive traits and for the negative traits (see Figure 5). There were no 
significant differences in the magnitude of the better-than-average effects for the 
positive traits,ps > .20 (Ms = 111.10, 112.45, and 113.79, in the tradition, control, and 
stimulation conditions, respectively). In contrast, the better-than-average effect for the 
negative traits was significantly weaker after the tradition values were primed (M = 
109.56, SE -  2.83) than after the control primes (M =  116.62, SE  = 2.98), t (103) = 
2.97, p  < .01, and significantly stronger after the stimulation values were primed (M= 
121.39, SE = 2.67) than in the control condition, t (103) = 2.09, p < .05.
1 The sample in this experiment was large enough to control for a potential effect of 
gender on better-than-aVerage scores, which was important because of gender differences in 
self-effacement (e.g., Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997).
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Figure 5: Experiment 1: Tradition judgment (modesty in the better-than- 
average effect) for positive and negative traits in each value- 
priming condition.
2.3.3 Discussion
The results supported the hypothesis that priming tradition values causes more 
modesty in self-evaluative judgment. This modesty was significantly lowered when 
values that express an opposing motive (stimulation) were activated. Nevertheless, 
these effects occurred only when I examined personal ratings on negative traits, but 
not the ratings on positive traits. The negative trait ratings tap the denial component of 
the better-than-average effect, whereas the positive trait ratings tap the self­
enhancement component of the effect (Paulhus, 2002). The results indicate that value 
primes affect the extent to which the people deny negative attributes, whereas their 
tendency to self-enhance is relatively robust and resistant to interference. This 
observation converges with other evidence for relatively robust self-enhancement 
effects (Alicke, 1985; Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995):
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Self-enhancement may be too basic and powerful to be influenced by a very recent, 
brief priming event, whereas the denial effect may be more multiply determined and 
therefore amenable to influence. Future research is needed to discover why the 
mechanism underpinning self-enhancement is more robust in the face of brief value 
primes. This issue aside, the results clearly supported the hypotheses that priming 
with tradition and stimulation values causes opposing effects on modesty in self- 
evaluations, congruent with the circular model of values (Schwartz, 1992).
2.4 Experiment 2
While Experiment 1 examined a value-related judgment, Experiment 2 extended 
the investigation by examining changes in value-relevant behaviour. Experiment 2 
examined the effects of priming two different sets of values: security values (e.g., 
social order, clean) and self-direction values (e.g., creativity, curious). According to 
Schwartz’s (1992) model of values, security values help to avoid the threat of 
uncertainty and to conserve the existing order, whereas self-direction values promote 
exploration and independence. Like the tradition and stimulation values examined in 
Experiment 1, security and self-direction values lie in opposing positions on the 
dimension from conservation values to openness to change values (see Figure 4, 
p. 13). Thus, participants should demonstrate more behaviour affirming the primed 
values than participants who are primed with the opposing value, with the control 
group in between.
To examine this hypothesis, Experiment 2 tested whether the activation of 
security values increases behaviour that promotes security, whereas the activation of 
self-direction values decreases this behaviour. Experiment 2 tested this prediction 
using a measure of security promoting behaviour: cleanliness. As shown at the 
bottom of Table 1.1 (p. 12), cleanliness is one of the security-promoting values in
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Schwartz’s circular model. Cleanliness is a security-promoting value because it 
contributes to safety, harmony with others, and adherence to social norms. Thus, any 
task that primes security-oriented values should also increase concern with 
cleanliness.
More important, the circular model also predicts that this security orientation is 
opposed by self-direction values, which emphasize exploration and independence. 
Self-direction values entail a creative, exploratory mindset that is less concerned with 
prevailing social standards. Creativity itself entails following novel directions without 
rigid application of fixed rules and norms (Kuhnen, Hannover, & Schubert, 2001). 
Thus, although this pursuit can entail cleanliness (as in five-star restaurants and some 
art studios), it involves a mindset that can often be inimical to this behaviour. Indeed, 
people rate cleanliness and other security values as stronger reflections o f what they 
“ought to do” than of what they “ideally would do,” whereas the opposite occurs for 
creativity and other self-direction values (Rees & Maio, 2007). This competition 
should cause self-direction value primes to reduce behaviour that affirms security 
values, including cleanliness. Overall, then, I expected that security value primes 
would increase cleanliness, whereas self-direction value primes should reduce 
cleanliness.
2.4.1 Methods 
Participants
Participants were 58 Cardiff University undergraduate students who took 
participated for £3. The sample included 52 women and 6 men, with a mean age of 
19.83 years (SD = 4.01). Participants were tested individually and were informed that 
there were several tasks to complete.
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Procedure
Experimental Manipulation. Participants completed an experimental 
manipulation similar to the manipulation used in Experiment 1, except that 
participants rearranged scrambled sentences including self-direction values (e.g., 
choosing own goals, curiosity, freedom), security values (e.g., national security, 
social order, clean), or the names of clothing items (e.g., skirt, shoes, boots).
Security Behaviour. Participants were then given a slightly leaky pen to 
complete the remaining tasks (e.g., consumer preference ratings, problem solving). 
One of the tasks required that participants join broken lines in a picture of dolphin, 
before colouring it with old, used crayons that were messy and slightly sticky. 
Cleaning wipes and tissues were provided next to crayons on the desk at which the 
participants were seated for all of their tasks. I recorded the interval at which the 
participants requested another pen or used the cleaning wipes. This interval recording 
constituted the measure of cleanliness behaviour, such that higher scores were given 
for attempts to be clean in an earlier task. That is, participants received a "4" if they 
first used a new pen or the cleaning wipes while doing the initial consumer preference 
task, a score of "3" if the pen or wipes were first used while doing the drawing and 
colouring task, a score of “2” if the pen or wipes were used only after these tasks at 
the end of the experiment, and a score of “ 1” if the clean pen or wipes were not used. 
Participants were probed for suspicion and debriefed using the funnel debriefing 
procedure described in Experiment 1.
2.4.2 Results
To examine the effects of the manipulation of priming condition (self-direction 
vs. security vs. control) on cleanliness behaviour, a one-way ANOVA was conducted.
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The results revealed a main effect o f condition, F  (2, 55) = 4.35 , p  = .02, with 
participants in the security condition (A/=3.21, SE = .92) requesting another pen or 
using the cleaning wipes earlier than participants in the self-direction condition (M = 
2.30, SE = .87), t (55) = - 2.93,p =  .01 (see Figure 6). A planned pairwise comparison 
revealed that participants in the security condition tended to request another pen or 
use the wipes earlier than participants in the control condition ( M=  2.84, SE = 1.12), 
but this contrast did not reach conventional levels of significance, t (55) = 1.17,/? = 
.24. In contrast, participants primed with self-direction values delayed cleanliness to a 
marginally greater extent than participants in the control prime condition, t (55) = 
1.74,/? = .08. The direction of these contrasts was again consistent with the 
predictions derived from the circular model.
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Figure 6: Experiment 2: Security behaviour (cleanliness) in each value-
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2.4.3 Discussion
The results from Experiment 2 provided further evidence that priming one value 
not only promotes behaviour that fulfils the motive expressed by the value, it also 
decreases behaviour consistent with a motive expressed by opposing values. In this 
case, participants’ cleanliness decreased after being primed with self-direction values, 
relative to the effect of being primed with security values. Although the main effect 
was significant and consistent with the predictions, the specific comparisons with the 
control condition did not reach conventional levels of significance. Nonetheless, the 
tendency for the self-direction prime to decrease cleanliness was reliable using a one­
tailed test ip < .04), which is justified by the a priori hypotheses. This particular 
comparison is more central to the predictions (than the comparison between the 
security prime and control) because of its relevance to the latent motivation conflicts 
that I am attempting to illustrate. Nonetheless, it was useful to conduct another 
experiment testing the hypotheses regarding the security to self-direction dimension.
2.5 Experiment 3
By concentrating on a behaviour that affirmed security values, Experiment 2 
examined only one-half of the potential systemic effect of priming self-direction and 
security values. The other half of the systemic effect is that behaviour promoting self- 
direction values should increase following the activation of these values, but decrease 
after the activation of security values. Experiment 3 tested these predictions.
Experiment 3’s behavioural measure was based on the value of curiosity, which 
is one of the self-direction values identified in Schwartz’s (1992) circular model. I 
examined curiosity by giving participants an opportunity to request information about 
the answers to diverse quiz questions. Curiosity about the answers should be
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enhanced after the activation of curiosity and other self-direction values, which 
explicitly promote an exploratory, independent mindset. The circular model predicts 
that this mindset is negated by the uncertainty-avoiding mindset that underpins 
security values, which are more concerned with stability and avoidance of threat. 
Indeed, this view fits several major theoretical perspectives proposing that social 
order, commitment to groups, and positive group feeling serve partly to reduce 
psychological uncertainty (Lawler, Thye, & Yoon, 2000). This view also fits the 
frequent use of authoritarian belief scales (which tap pro-security motives, see 
Oesterreich, 2005) to help assess an aversion to uncertainty (Sorrentino et al., 2008). 
Thus, a confluence of perspectives supports the hypothesis that the activation of 
security values may reduce the strength of curiosity-driven behaviour.
2.5.1 Methods 
Participants
Participants were 60 Cardiff University undergraduate students who took part 
for course credit. The sample included 49 women and 11 men, with a mean age of
21.17 years (SD  = 4.22).Participants were tested either individually or in a group with 
a maximum number o f five. They were informed that there were several tasks to 
complete. These tasks included the experimental manipulation and a measure of self- 
direction behaviour. Then, the participants were probed for suspicion and debriefed 
using the funnel debriefing procedure described in Experiment 1.
Procedure
Experimental Manipulation. I attempted to conceptually replicate the effects 
obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 by using a different priming task. Specifically, I used 
a sorting task to activate values, as in prior research (Maio et al., 2009, Experiment 5). 
In each priming condition, participants were asked to complete a sequence of tasks.
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First, they were given a table including values (and near-synonyms of the values) 
from the primed value domain (e.g., self-direction) and the names of some items of 
clothing (e.g., boots). The values were printed adjacent to positive adjectives (e.g., 
happy, excellent, ideal, perfect, pretty), and the clothing items were printed adjacent 
to neutral adverbs (e.g., normal, usual, typical, ordinary, common). The values and 
items of furniture were located in a column labelled main terms, and the positive and 
neutral adjectives were located in an adjacent column labelled adjectives.
Participants were asked to memorize main terms and their adjectives and then, 
after 3 minutes, to recall and write down the main terms and their adjacent adjectives.
I asked participants whether or not they noticed any meaningful categories of main 
terms and their adjectives while trying to memorize them. I then explained that the 
main terms could be divided into clothing and social concept categories and that the 
adjectives could be divided into positive and neutral categories. Participants were then 
given another set of clothing items, values, and adjectives to memorize based on their 
categories, with the explanation that the experimenter wished to see whether they 
could memorize more terms after the categories were made known to them.
After three minutes, participants were again asked to recall and write down the 
main terms and their adjectives. Participants in the self-direction condition always 
received self-direction values (e.g., choosing own goals, curiosity, freedom) across the 
two memorization tasks, whereas participants in the security condition always 
received security values across the tasks (e.g., national security, social order, clean). 
Participants in the control group went through almost die same process as for the
2 This pairing with positive adjectives was used because the chosen values are all 
associated with high importance and positive feelings (Maio & Olson, 1998; Schwartz, 1992). 
Thus, the pairing reflects the natural affective associations that participants already possess 
for the values.
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priming conditions, except that they received names of colours as “categories” instead 
of values.
Self-direction behaviour. Next, I measured the promotion of self-direction by 
examining post-manipulation curiosity (i.e., openness and eagerness to acquire new 
information). Participants responded to 48 quiz questions about various topics, 
including history, movies, sports, music, science, geography, celebrities, politics, 
literature, myths, and legend. In each response, participants indicated whether they 
knew the answer and whether they would like to receive further information about the 
answer. To calculate curiosity from these responses, I calculated the ratio of the 
questions each participant wanted to know more about to the number o f questions for 
which they did not know the answer. Higher ratios thus indicated higher levels of 
curiosity (independent of actual knowledge).
2.5.2 Results
To examine the effects o f the priming manipulation (self-direction vs. security 
vs. control) on value-consistent behaviours, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. The 
results revealed a main effect of condition on curiosity behaviour, F ( 2, 57) = 4.92,/?
= .02, with the self-direction condition (M =  .46, SE = .28) showing higher curiosity 
than the security condition (M =  .24, SE = .18), t (57) = 3.13,/? < .01 (see Figure 7). 
Planned pairwise contrasts with the control condition revealed that participants who 
were primed with self-direction values tended to exhibit greater curiosity than 
participants in the control group (M =  .36, SE  = .21), t (57) = 1.35,/? = .18, but this 
contrast did not reach conventional levels o f significance. In contrast, participants 
primed with security values exhibited marginally less curiosity than participants in the 
control group, t (51) = 1.78,/? = .08. The direction of these planned comparisons was 
consistent with the predictions derived from the circular model.
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Figure 7: Experiment 3: Self-direction behaviour (curiosity) in each 
value-priming condition.
2.5.3 Discussion
The data from Experiment 3 provided novel evidence that priming a set of 
values both promotes behaviour that is consistent with the values and decreases 
behaviour consistent with opposing values. In this case, participants’ curiosity 
decreased after being primed with security values, relative to the effect of being 
primed with self-direction values. As in Experiment 2, the main effect was significant 
and consistent with the predictions, but the specific comparisons with the control 
condition did not reach conventional levels of significance. Nonetheless, the tendency 
for the security prime to decrease curiosity was reliable using a one-tailed test (p < 
.04), which is justified by the a priori hypotheses. This particular comparison is more 
central to my predictions (than the comparison between the self-direction prime and
control) because of its relevance to the latent motivation conflicts that I am attempting 
to illustrate.
Overall, the effects of the value primes on behaviour supporting opposing values 
were consistent across both of the experiments examining self-direction and security 
values (Experiments 2 and 3). In addition, the nonsignificant effects of value- 
consistent priming (i.e., security increasing cleanliness and self-direction increasing 
curiosity) should not be dismissed: these effect sizes were in the predicted direction, 
small-to-moderate in magnitude (r=  .16 in Experiment 2, r=  .18 in Experiment 3). 
Some weaker contrasts are to be expected across any large set o f experiments 
examining small-to-moderate effect sizes (Cohen, 1988).
2.6 Discussion
The results across three experiments revealed that priming conservation values 
or openness to change values increases judgment and behaviour that affirms the 
values, while decreasing judgment and behaviour that affirms a set o f opposing 
values. The consistent pattern across the measures of judgment and actual behaviour 
in the priming experiments provides additional support for the notion that values map 
onto latent motivational conflicts and compatibilities, as predicted by the circular 
model of values (Schwartz, 1992). These results consolidated the findings obtained by 
Maio et al.(2009, Experiment 5), which focused on the effects o f priming self- 
enhancement versus self-transcendence values on behaviour. Together, the two sets of 
experiments provide provocative support for the motivational compatibilities and 
conflicts predicted by the circular models. Such systemic effects provide a significant 
extension of prior studies that examined the effects of value priming on only value- 
congruent behaviour (e.g., Bargh et al., 2001; Macrae & Johnston, 1998). The
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experiments revealed a wider potential impact of values than has been revealed 
previously.
The results make clear that, when priming values with the purpose of altering 
value-relevant behaviour, researchers should consider indirect effects of prioritized 
values on non-targeted attitudes and behaviours. The importance of such indirect 
effects has also been suggested in research on attitude change (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1981), but this suggestion has not been accompanied by a model that can predict the 
nature of these indirect effects or methods of detecting indirect effects. The present 
research reveals a basis for predicting indirect effects. That is, when a procedure 
entails value change or mere value activation, indirect effects can be predicted by 
considering the motivational interconnections between values.
This evidence makes it compelling to also test whether indirect effects of other 
constructs that are linked to motives can be modelled in a similar way, including 
personal goals and aspirations. For instance, when a procedure entails change or 
activation of personal goals, it should be useful to know the motivational 
interconnections between them. Grouzet et al.’s model (2005) of conflicts and 
compatibilities between personal goals provides the most appropriate basis for 
examining the effects of latent motivational conflicts from personal goals. In theory, 
personal goal change and priming should increase the importance and pursuit of 
adjacent goals, diminish the importance and pursuit of opposing goals, and have no 
effect on orthogonal goals. These results would provide important support for the 
model’s claims about the motivational interconnections between personal goals. If 
these results occur, an intriguing and useful follow-up would examine the extent to 
which the motivational interconnections between values and between personal goals 
yield distinct contributions to behaviour. These aims were beyond the scope of the
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present investigation, but the evidence provides a provocative basis for expecting that 
these topics are worth investigating.
2.7 Chapter Summary
This research presented important evidence that values express systemic 
relations between latent motivations. As a result, priming a particular value has 
predictable effects on judgments and behaviours that express different values. The 
precise pattern of these effects can be predicted using the circular model of the 
motivational conflicts and compatibilities expressed by values. This evidence helps to 
enhance our ability to predict the effects of value priming on a range of behaviours, 
addressing a crucial issue in studies of goal priming more generally (Bargh et al., 
2001). In this manner, the evidence productively integrates research on values with 
basic theory and evidence about links between motives and behaviour.
Other than activating values through a cognitive route, the experience of 
emotions can also lead to the activation of values. This makes it interesting to 
investigate the connections between emotion and values and examine the subsequent 
systemic changes of values predicted by the circular model’s assumptions about 
motivational conflict between values. The next three chapters focus on this issue.
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Chapter 3: The effect of Contextualized Sadness on Values
3.1 Chapter Overview
Many causes attempt to solicit support by eliciting feelings within us. Charities 
helping victims of famine attempt to elicit sadness at the sight of others’ hunger. 
Environmental organizations attempt to elicit disgust at the sight of irresponsible 
businesses dumping toxic waste. Anti-war campaigners attempt to elicit feelings of 
shame over our nation’s war atrocities. The assumption is that the emotions are 
needed to stir people and get them to act, by invigorating our defence of values, like 
helpfulness, protection of the environment, and a world at peace.
Despite the pervasiveness of these emotional appeals, there are basic 
psychological questions about the role of emotion in the maintenance and expression 
of values. Values are abstract goals that are based heavily on emotional responses 
partly because of strong consensual support for them (Maio, 2010; Maio & Olson, 
1998). As a result, people maintain a dedication to values without it even being 
necessary to develop arguments in support of them. Instead, people can rely on strong 
affective support for the values. But how do values react to emotions? Do emotions 
like sadness, disgust, and shame facilitate the values that campaigners seek to 
motivate? The second stream of this thesis addressed these issues by considering not 
only the motivational tensions of values, but also the context of emotions.
The research described in this chapter provided the first examination of the 
effects of emotion on values, attempting to detect patterns of effect that fit the circular 
model’s assumptions about motivational conflict and compatibility between values. 
The research focused specifically on the effects of sadness on values. Despite the 
prevalence of research on the motivational function of sadness, the direct associations 
between sadness and values have not been empirically examined. Experiment 4 asked
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participants to recall any sadness experience they had. A post-experimental coding of 
participants’ report of their experience found two main themes: death-related sadness 
and personal failure sadness. The results showed that participants who experienced 
death-related sadness attached less importance to self-enhancement values and more 
importance to self-transcendence values than participants in a control condition. 
Experiment 5 ruled out the non-controlled differences in self-selection of emotion 
context as an alternative explanation of the effect by manipulating the emotion 
context. The results of Experiment 5 replicated the findings in Experiment 4. This 
research highlights the importance of context of sadness and the motivational 
interrelations between values in predicting the effects of sadness on values.
3.2 Reconciling the Contradicting Motivational Functions of Sadness
Previous research on sadness has revealed effects on motivation that appear 
inconsistent at first glance. On the one hand, some research has found that sadness 
interferes with self-improvement and decreases self-control (Fishbach & Labroo,
2007). Similarly, there is evidence that negative affect demotivates goal pursuit 
(Aarts, Custers, & Holland, 2007; Aarts, Custers, & Marien, 2008; Aarts, Custers, & 
Veltkamp, 2008). For instance, Aart, Custers, and Holland (2007) found that people 
became less motivated to party when the partying goal is coactivated with negative 
affect.
On the other hand, there is evidence showing that negative moods like sadness 
can motivate mood-repair mechanisms, which cause sad individuals to become more 
generous (Baumann, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 1981; Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973; 
Manucia, Baumann, & Cialdini, 1984). Small and Lemer (2008) found that, when 
sadness is associated with appraisals that external circumstances led to another 
person’s misfortune, sadness led to an increased in support for welfare assistance.
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Also, negative emotional reactions to pictures or videos of sad peers promoted pro­
social and helping behaviour (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Leiman, 1978; J. Solomon, 
1985; Weston & Main, 1980).
The former, motivational-damping effects could be reconciled with the latter, 
motivation-enhancing effects by considering the types o f goals involved. Research 
suggesting that sadness demotivates goal pursuit has focused on goals related to self- 
control, self-improvement, and pleasure seeking (partying). These goals and activities 
have a clear focus on the self and are related to self-enhancement values. On the other 
hand, research suggesting that sadness motivates goal pursuit often refers to goals that 
focus on the well-being of others. These goals include helping and caring for others, 
which are consistent with self-transcendence values.
The different focus on the self versus others embedded in goals may have 
important implication on its association with emotions. An emotion induced by a self­
focused or other-focused context is likely to activate a goal with a matching focus. 
Hence, sadness induced by a self-focused context may produce a motivational- 
damping effect and may not lead to any activation of values. On the other hand, an 
emotion induced by an other-focus context may produce motivation-enhancing effects 
and activate pro-social goals. According to Schwartz’s circular model of values 
(1992), the self-enhancement value domain and the self-transcendence value domain 
serve opposing motives. Consequently, sadness induced by an other-focused context 
might increase self-transcendence values, while decreasing self-enhancement values.
3.3 Contextualized Sadness and Values
There is evidence supporting that these self versus others contexts exist in the 
experience of sadness. Research often induces sadness by leading people to recall a 
sad experience. In many instances, people recall the death or illness of a friend or
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family member. In other cases, they may remember a personal failure, entailing the 
potential loss of positive regard of another person (Fishbach & Labroo, 2007; 
Lazarus, 1991). These contexts involve a different initial bearer of the suffering (e.g., 
being an onlooker or a victim). These different contexts may activate different 
amounts o f focus on others versus the self, with consequences for the importance 
attached to self-enhancement and self-transcendence values.
In order to take a closer look at whether the context of the recalled sadness 
changes its effects on values, Experiment 4 recorded the contexts that participants 
spontaneously included in recollections of sad events.
3.3.1 Overview o f  Experiments
In the following two experiments, I searched for evidence of distinct effect of 
contextualized sadness on values. Experiment 4 examined the effects of freely 
recalled sadness on values, while Experiment 5 controlled for the differences in the 
self-selection of emotion context by randomly determining whether participants 
recalled a sad experience related to one of the themes revealed in Experiment 4 or a 
control experience. As elaborated below, these designs tested the hypothesis that the 
experience o f sadness would lead to (1) increased importance for values that share 
common goals with sadness in its specific context, (2) decreased importance for 
values that share conflicting goals with sadness in its specific context.
3.4 Experiment 4
Participants in Experiment 4 were asked to recall a sad or a neutral experience 
prior to completing a measure o f values. I coded the content of the sad experiences to 
test whether the context of sadness determined its effects on values. For this initial 
experiment, I did not form predictions for the direction of the effects of sadness on 
values, because the variation in emotion context was not yet clear. The principal
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prediction was that any obtained effects on values (dependent on context) would 
reflect the motivational relations described by the circular model. Support for this 
prediction would provide a basis for a follow-up experiment manipulating emotion 
and emotion context.
3.4.1 Methods 
Participants
Participants were 54 Cardiff University undergraduate students who took part 
for course credit. The sample included 42 women and 12 men, with a mean age of 
20.13 years (SD = 2.00).
Procedure
Participants took part either individually or in groups of seven or less, seated 
approximately five feet apart. Participants were told that they would be taking part in 
several studies. Participants started with the emotion manipulation task, which was 
presented as a study of emotion recall. The manipulation asked participants to write a 
personal event associated with an intense emotion of sadness (Fishbach & Labroo, 
2007; Tangney, 1993). The control group was asked to write a description of an 
ordinary school day.
Next, participants completed the dependent measure, which was the Portrait 
Values Questionnaire (PVQ; Schwartz et al., 2001). The PVQ contains forty brief 
paragraphs that describe different individuals’ goals, aspirations, and wishes. These 
descriptions each point implicitly to the importance of particular values. For example, 
the importance of helpfulness is assessed using the following item: “It's very 
important to her to help the people around her. She wants to care for their well­
being.”
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Participants rated the extent to which they considered the person described in 
each item to be like them, using a 7-point scale from 1 (not like me at all) to 7 (very 
much like me). Male participants received a version of the PVQ containing items that 
referred to men (e.g., ““He thinks it is important to be ambitious. . .”), whereas female 
participants received a version that referred to women (e.g., “She thinks it is important 
to be ambitious. . .”). Each participant received seven to thirteen items for each of the 
four higher-order value domains, which included openness to change, conservation, 
self-enhancement, and self-transcendence. Each of the four higher-order value scales 
exhibited satisfactory internal consistency (as > .70). I therefore based the analyses on 
the four higher-order value domains.
After completing the PVQ, participants in the sadness condition rated how 
intensely they experienced sadness during their recall task, while participants in the 
control condition rated the intensity of any emotion they experienced during their 
recall task. Participants gave the emotion intensity rating using a scale from 1 (not at 
all) to 9 (very strongly). Finally, participants were asked to recall a happy event (in 
order to restore positive mood), probed for suspicion, and debriefed.
3.4.2 Results 
Manipulation Check
As expected, participants in the sadness condition reported a significantly higher 
intensity of emotion during the recall task (M =  4.73, SE = 1.66) than did participants 
in the control condition (M  = 3.18, SE = 1.66), t (52) = 3.43, p  = .001.
3 The lower-order values of the four higher-order value domains in study 4-9 also 
showed satisfactory internal consistency (os' > .70). I therefore based the analyses on the four 
higher-order value domains in all studies.
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Effects o f Sadness on Values
I conducted one-way ANCOVAs on each of the four higher-order value 
domains, with the experimental manipulation (sadness versus control) as the two-level 
independent variable. The average of each participant’s ratings of all of the values 
was entered as a covariate to control for individual differences in general value 
endorsement (Schwartz, 2007). Results revealed no significant differences between 
the sadness condition and control condition. The mean and standard errors of the 
values ratings are reported in Table 3.1.
 Experimental Group
Sad condition Control
Values - aggregated condition F Vp
4 . 1 1 a 4 . 3 4 a 2 . 3 2 . 0 4
Self-enhancement ( . 1 1 ) ( • 1 0 )
4 . 5 6 a 4 . 3 2 a 2 . 6 3 . 0 5
Self-transcendence ( . 1 1 ) ( - 1 0 )
4 . 3 4 a 4 . 4 5 a .4 3 . 0 0 8
Openness to Change ( . 1 3 ) ( . 1 2 )
Conservation 3 . 7 3 a 3 . 6 8 a .2 1 . 0 0 4
 00?) 008) ‘
Table 3.1
Experiment 4: Effect o f Sadness on Values
Note. Standard errors appear in parentheses below means. Means with differing 
subscripts within rows are significantly different at the p  < .05.
Two Contexts o f Sadness: Death-Related versus Personal Loss
As described earlier, the context o f the experienced emotions may have 
divergent implications for motivation and goals. Participants’ descriptions of a sad 
experience revealed two main themes: the passing away of family members or friends 
and personal failure. These are common themes in tasks that ask participants to recall 
sad events (Fishbach & Labroo, 2007; Lazarus, 1991).
Two independent judges exhibited perfect agreement in their coding of 
participants’ sadness experience into these two themes. Their coding revealed that
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fifteen participants (58%) wrote about death-related events, such as the loss of 
relatives. Eleven participants (42%) wrote about personal failure, such as poor 
examination results and failure on a driving test. One participant wrote about the loss 
of a football team in a match. This participant’s event was different from the two 
major themes and was therefore excluded from the analysis of the effects of emotion 
context.
The means and standard errors of the values ratings across the types o f sadness 
are listed in Table 3.2. To examine the effect of the two types of sadness on value 
ratings, I again conducted one-way ANCOVAs on the four higher-order value 
domains, but this time with the types of sadness (death-related sadness versus 
personal loss sadness versus control) as the independent variable.
Table 3.2
Experiment 4: Effect o f  Contextualized Sadness on Values
Experimental Group
VpValues
Sad condition 
- death related
Sad condition 
- personal failure
Control
condition F
3 . 9 3 z 4 . 3 5 z b 4 . 3 4 b 2 . 9 9 f .1 1
Self-enhancement ( . 1 4 ) ( . 1 6 ) ( . 1 0 )
Self­ 4 . 7 4 z 4 . 3 2 z b 4 . 3 2 b 3 . 2 8 * . 1 2
transcendence ( . 1 4 ) ( . 1 6 ) ( . 1 0 )
Openness to 4 . 4 1 a 4 . 2 4 a 4 . 4 5 a . 4 3 . 0 2
Change ( . 1 7 ) ( . 1 9 ) ( . 1 2 )
Conservation 3 . 6 9 a 3 . 7 9 a 3 . 6 8 a . 2 4 .0 1
( • 1 2 ) ( . 1 3 ) ( . 0 8 )
Note. * = p <  .05, t = /7 < .06. Standard errors appear in parentheses below means. 
Means with differing subscripts within rows are significantly different at the p  < .05 
based on Fisher’s LSD post hoc paired comparisons. Means sharing the subscript z 
within rows are marginally different at p  < .07.
The type of sadness had a marginal effect on the self-enhancement value 
domain, F  (2, 50) = 2.99, p  = .06, rjp2 = . 11. Participants who thought about death- 
related sadness (M =  3.93, SE  = .14) subsequently considered self-enhancement 
values to be marginally less important than did participants who thought about
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sadness related to personal failure (M=  4.35, SE  = .16), t (50) = 1.88,/? = .07 and 
significantly less important than did participants in the control condition (M= 4.34,
SE = .10), t (50) = 2.34,/? = .02. The importance of self-enhancement values did not 
significantly differ between participants who thought about personal failure sadness 
and participants in the control condition, / (50) = .02, p  = .99.
The type of sadness had a significant impact in the opposite direction on self- 
transcendence values, F  (2, 50) = 3.28,/? = .05, rjp2 = .12. Participants who thought 
about death-related sadness (M= 4.74, SE = .14) subsequently considered self­
transcendence values to be marginally more important than did participants who 
thought about sadness related to personal failure (M =  4.32, SE = .16), t (50) = 1.95,/? 
= .06, and significantly more important than control participants (M=  4.32, SE = .10), 
t (50) = 2.46,/? = .02. The importance of self-transcendence values did not 
significantly differ between participants who thought about personal failure sadness 
and participants in the control condition, t (50) = .02,/? = .98.
An additional test on the associations between sadness intensity and the changes 
in values among the participants who thought about death-related sadness was 
performed to consider the mechanisms underlying the changes in values. The 
correlations between the intensity of sadness and each of the four values were not 
significant, rs (15) < .26, ps > .05. Thus, the levels of sadness per se did not account 
for the effect of different sadness contexts on values.4
3.4.3 Discussion
The results of Experiment 4 indicated that death-related sadness led people to 
attach less importance to self-enhancement values and more importance to self­
4 Similar analyses were performed in Experiment 5-9, and the intensity of the emotion was not 
associated with any o f the changes in values. It may suggest that context alone elicited the changes in 
values, or that the combination o f specific emotion and the context produced the effect. These 
interpretations were further discussed in Chapter 6.
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transcendence values. These reciprocal effects fit the circular model’s prediction that 
self-enhancement and self-transcendence values serve opposing motives. Any 
variable that increases the importance of one of these two types of values should 
decrease the importance of the other type of value. Of importance, the context of 
sadness was critical to determining its effects on values. Death-related sadness makes 
people aware of an event that has ended the life of another person, promoting 
awareness of others. It then promotes self-transcendence values, which stresses 
benefits for other people. At the same time, the focus on self-benefit in self­
enhancement values is not compatible with death-related sadness and is suppressed.
There results may help to integrate a variety of prior findings. In addition to 
fitting the extant literature on emotion and motivation, the effects o f death-related 
sadness are consistent with the terror management theory (TMT), which proposes that 
self-esteem within the context of one’s culture provides protection from the fear of 
death (Becker, 1971, 1973; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; S. Solomon, 
Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). TMT research has demonstrated that mortality 
salience can lead to socially destructive consequences, such as prejudice and 
aggression (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990; McGregor et al., 1998), or socially 
constructive outcomes, such as benevolence to others (Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, & 
Pyszczynski, 2002). The type o f outcome depends on whether the salience of death is 
accompanied by the salience o f cultural values, such as egalitarianism (Gailliot, 
Stillman, Schmeichel, Maner, & Plant, 2008). In Experiment 4, remembering the 
experience o f a loved one’s death triggered sadness in association with the scenes of 
family members being together and offering help to each other. The feeling of sadness 
then induced the urge and motivation to endorse self-transcendence values.
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In contrast, similar changes in self-enhancement values and self-transcendence 
values did not occur when I examined sadness related to personal failure or sadness 
per se. Sadness related to personal failure should activate feelings of low self-efficacy 
and self-esteem (Brown & Mankowski, 1993; Brown & Marshall, 2001). These 
changes may temporarily cripple the mood recovery mechanism and hence prevent 
the activation of relevant values. This interpretation is consistent with the prevalent 
view of sadness as a de-motivator of goal pursuit (Aarts, Custers, & Holland, 2007; 
Aarts, Custers, & Marien, 2008; Aarts, Custers, & Veltkamp, 2008). For example, 
Fishbach and Labroo (2007) found that sad participants were less ready to adjust 
themselves and attain a salient (self-enhancement related) goal than happy 
participants. Also, sadness was found to decrease helping when the emotion focuses 
attention inwardly (Barnett, Howard, Melton, & Dino, 1982; Eisenberg & Fabes, 
1990). Integrating these findings with the results of Experiment 4, sadness may 
demotivate goal pursuit when the emotion has a self-oriented source, but not when it 
has an other-focused source.
3.5 Experiment 5
Experiment 4 relied on a post-experimental coding of participants’ report of 
their sadness experience to determine the effect of emotion context. This method 
leaves open the possibility that non-controlled differences in the self-selection of 
emotion context might explain its effects. To address this limitation, Experiment 5 
manipulated the emotion context. Specifically, this experiment randomly determined 
whether participants recalled a sad experience related to death, a sad experience 
related to personal failure, or a control experience.
In addition, this experiment checked whether the emotion priming procedure 
induced emotions other than sadness, by using the Positive Affect and Negative
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Affect scale (Watson & Clark, 1988). Because of their relevance to death-related 
experience, sympathy and affection were also measured.
If the findings of Experiment 4 reflect a causal effect of each contextualized 
emotion, participant primed with death-related sadness should subsequently consider 
self-enhancement values to be less important and self-transcendence values to be 
more important. In contrast, participants primed with sadness related to personal 
failure should not show any difference in value endorsement when compared to 
participants in the control condition.
3.5.1 Methods 
Participants
Participants were 101 Cardiff University undergraduate psychology students 
who took part for course credit. Five participants were excluded from the sample 
because their descriptions focused on emotions different from the one I requested. 
The remaining 96 participants included 81 women and 15 men, with mean age of 
19.44 (SD = 1.38).
Procedure
Participants took part either individually or in groups of seven or less, seated 
approximately five feet apart. Participants were told that they would be taking part in 
several studies. The manipulation was presented as a study of emotion recall. Some 
participants were asked to write about a death-related personal event associated with 
an intense feeling o f sadness. Other participants were asked to write about a personal 
failure associated with an intense feeling of sadness. The control group was asked to 
write a description of an ordinary school day.
Next, all participants completed the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ; 
Schwartz, 2001), as in Experiment 4. Participants then rated how intensely they
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experienced a list of emotions during the recall task. The list included sadness, 
affection, sympathy and 2 0  emotions from the PANAS (e.g., irritable, determined). 
Participants responded to each emotion using a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very 
strongly). Responses to the 1 0  positive emotions (e.g., determined, strong) and the 1 0  
negative emotions (e.g., distressed, ashamed) from the PANAS were averaged to form 
a positive affect (PA) score and a negative affect (NA) score, respectively (both as > 
. 7 4 ) .  Sympathy and affection were significantly correlated, r ( 9 4 )  =  . 5 0 , / ?  <  . 0 0 1  and 
were therefore averaged into one “sympathy-affection” score.
Finally, participants were asked to recall a happy event, probed for suspicion, 
and debriefed.
3 . 5 . 2  Results 
Manipulation Checks
Sadness intensity. A one-way (death-related sadness versus failure related 
sadness versus control) ANOVA revealed that participants in the three experimental 
conditions experienced sadness at different levels of intensity, F ( 2 ,  9 3 )  =  3 2 . 5 4 ,  p  < 
. 0 0 1 .  Post-hoc t-tests indicated that participants in both the death-related sadness 
condition and personal failure sadness condition reported a significantly higher 
intensity of sadness than did participants in the control condition (M=  1 . 2 2 ,  SE =
. 4 8 ) ,  t ( 9 3 )  =  7 . 8 1 , / ?  < . 0 0 1 ,  and t ( 9 3 )  =  5 . 5 7 , / ?  < . 0 0 1 ,  respectively. Participants in the 
death-related sadness condition experienced sadness more intensely (M= 3 . 5 2 ,  SE = 
1 . 3 6 )  than did participants in the personal failure sadness condition (M= 2 . 8 7 ,  SE = 
1 . 4 8 ) ,  t ( 9 3 )  =  2 . 1 6 , / ?  =  0 3 .
Positive and negative affect. Participants in the three experimental conditions 
did not experience different levels of positive affect, F  ( 2 ,  9 3 )  =  . 7 8 , / ?  =  . 4 6 .  On the 
other hand, participants experienced different levels of negative affect, F  ( 2 ,  9 3 )  =
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15.90,p <  .001. Participants in the death-related sadness condition (M=  1.99, SE = 
.90) and the personal failure condition (M = 2.26, SE  = .93) experienced more 
negative affect than did participants in the control condition (A/= 1.23, SE = .29), 
t (93) = 4.02,/? <.001, and t (93) = 5.41,p  < .001, respectively. The difference in 
intensity of negative affect experienced by the participants in the death-related 
sadness condition and the personal failure condition was not significant, t (93) = 1.41,
p  = .16.
A one-way ANOVA revealed that participants in the three manipulation 
condition experienced different levels of sympathy-affection, F {2, 93) = 23.09,/? < 
.001. As expected, participants in the death-related sadness condition felt sympathy- 
affection more intensely (M=  3.16, SE = 1.23) than did participants in the personal 
failure condition (M =  1.65, SE = 1.16), t (93) = 5.86,/? < .001, and the control 
condition (M =  1.66, SE = .58), t (93) = 5.91,/? < .001. The level of sympathy- 
affection did not significantly differ between participants who thought about personal 
failure sadness and participants in the control condition, t (93) =.04,/? = .97.
Taken together, the results showed that the manipulation was successful. The 
two sadness manipulations caused a higher intensity of sadness and negative affect 
than did the control condition. The death-related sadness manipulation also led to a 
higher level of other-focused emotions (sympathy and affection) than did the personal 
failure sadness condition and the control condition.
Effect o f Contextualized Sadness on Values
To examine the effect of the two types of sadness on values, I conducted one­
way ANCOVAs on each of the four higher-order values, with the experimental 
manipulation (death-related sadness versus personal failure sadness versus control) as 
the independent variable. The average o f each participant’s ratings of all of the values
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was entered as a covariate. The mean and standard errors of all dependent variables 
(values ratings) are reported in Table 3.3.
Emotion priming had a significant effect on self-enhancement values, F  (2, 92) 
= 4.42, p  =  .02, rjp 2  = .09. Death-related sadness caused self-enhancement values to 
become less important to participants (M=  3.84, SE = .11) than personal failure 
sadness (M= 4.27, SE = .11), t (92) = 2.79, p  = .007, and the no sadness control 
condition (M= 4.19, SE = .11), t (92) = 2.29, p  = .02. The importance of self­
enhancement values did not significantly differ between the personal failure sadness 
condition and the control condition, t (92) = .53,p =  .60.
Table 3.3
Experiment 5: Effects o f Contextualized Sadness on Values
Experimental Group
Vp2Values
Sad condition 
death related
Sad condition - 
personal 
failure
Control
condition F
3 . 8 4 a 4 . 2 7 b 4 . 1 9 b 4 . 4 2 * . 0 9
Se lf-enhancement ( 0 . 1 1 ) ( 0 . 1 1 ) ( 0 . 1 1 )
Self­ 4 . 5 5 a 4 . 2 8 b 4 . 3 3 b 3 . 2 7 * . 0 7
transcendence ( 0 . 0 8 ) ( 0 . 0 8 ) ( 0 . 0 8 )
Openness to 4 . 5 0 a 4 . 1 5 b 4 .3 4 a b
Change ( 0 . 1 1 ) ( 0 . 1 1 ) ( 0 . 1 1 ) 2 . 6 3 . 0 5
3 . 6 0 a 3 . 6 7 a 3 . 5 9 a . 1 9 . 0 0 4
Conservation ( 0 . 0 9 ) ( 0 . 0 9 ) ( 0 . 0 9 )
Note. *=p< .05. Standard errors appear in parentheses below means. Means with 
differing subscripts within rows are significantly different at the p  < .05 based on 
Fisher’s LSD post hoc paired comparisons.
In contrast, emotion priming had a significant effect in the opposite direction on 
self-transcendence values, F  (2, 92) = 3.27,p  = .04, tjp2 = .07. Death-related sadness 
caused the self-transcendence values to become significantly more important (M= 
4.55, SE = .08) than personal failure sadness (M=  4.28, SE = .08), t (92) = 2.37, p -  
.02, and no sadness (M=  4.33, SE = .08), t (92) = 2.04,/? = .05. On the other hand, the 
importance of self-transcendence values did not significantly differ between the
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personal failure sadness and control conditions, t (92) = .38,p  = .71. Taken together, 
when compared to the personal failure sadness and control condition, death-related 
sadness suppressed self-enhancement values and promoted self-transcendence values, 
replicating the effects revealed in Experiment 4.
Mediation: Death related Sadness, Sadness Intensity, and Sympathy
A series of regression analyses tested whether sadness intensity and sympathy- 
affection mediated the observed effects of death-related sadness on self-enhancement 
and self-transcendent values, in comparison to the control condition. As in the above 
analyses, the average of each participant’s ratings of all of the values was also entered 
in each of the analyses.
In order to examine this indirect effect, I used the product-of-coefficients 
strategy with bootstrapping proposed by Preacher and Hayes (2004; 2008). This 
strategy provides an estimate of indirect effect obtained from 10000 bootstrapped re­
samples, which overcomes problems with non-normally distributed variables such as 
power problems. The indirect effect was estimated by first regressing sadness 
intensity (mediator) on death-related sadness priming (independent variable), and then 
regressing self-transcendence values or self-enhancement values (dependent variable) 
on sadness intensity (mediator) and death-related sadness priming (independent 
variable). I also controlled for the average of each participant’s ratings o f all of their 
values. These analyses produced two mean bootstrapped sample estimates of the 
regression coefficients and the product of these estimates revealed the strength of the 
indirect effect. The estimated standard error of the mean indirect effect was derived 
from the standard deviation o f the estimate of the indirect effect (Preacher & Hayes, 
2004). This provided the bootstrap confidence intervals for the indirect effect.
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Results from the regression analysis revealed no direct effect of sadness 
intensity on self-enhancement values and self-transcendence values, /? = -.06, t (62) = 
-.80,p  = .43, and /? =.05, t (62) = .88,p  = .38, respectively. Thus, higher levels of 
sadness intensity experienced by the participants who recalled death-related sadness 
did not account for the effect of different sadness contexts on values.
On the other hand, results from the regression analysis revealed a direct effect of 
sympathy-affection on self-enhancement values, /? = -.20, t (62) = -2.1 A, p  = .008. 
Results from bootstrapping yielded a significant mean indirect effect of death-related 
sadness on self-enhancement values through sympathy-affection of p  -  -.31 (SE =
.12), with a 95%-confidence interval from -.55 to -.08. Similar analyses testing the 
mediation role of sympathy-affection on self-transcendence values revealed a 
marginally direct effect of sympathy-affection, /? =. 11, t (62) = 1.76, p  = .08. The 
mean indirect effect of death-related sadness on self-transcendence values through 
sympathy-affection was significant, /? = .16 (SE = .08), with a 95%-confidence 
interval from .0005 to .33.
Together, these results indicate that the effects of death-related sadness on 
values were driven by changes in felt sympathy after the sadness manipulation. These 
changes in sympathy led to the decrease in focus on the self and the enhanced 
prioritization of others through values.
3.5.3 Discussion
Experiment 5 once again showed that death-related sadness causes people to 
attach less importance to self-enhancement values and more importance to self­
transcendence values. By manipulating the context in the emotion induction, I ruled 
out the possibility that non-controlled prior differences in context salience elicited the 
effects. Hence, the changes in values occur both when people spontaneously thought
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about sadness in the two contexts and when people were asked to think about sadness 
in the two contexts.
To further disentangle the differences between the two contexts o f sadness, I 
examined other emotional reactions that may be associated with the contexts. I found 
that death-related sadness did not differ from personal failure sadness by the level of 
positive affect and negative affect experienced. Although death-related sadness 
caused participants to experience a higher intensity of sadness than did personal 
failure sadness, the mediational analyses showed that the intensity of sadness per se 
did not elicit the changes in values. In contrast, death-related sadness caused 
participants to experience higher intensity of sympathy, which then mediated the 
effect o f contextualized sadness on values.
The mediating role of sympathy supports the hypothesis that death-related 
sadness induced a greater focus on others’ well-being than personal failure sadness 
and that this effect was responsible for the effect of death-related sadness on self­
enhancement and self-transcendence values. Being able to feel for the suffering of 
others is a part of human nature (de Waal, 1996). Sympathy is a emotional response to 
others’ suffering and it is considered to be a part of the “other suffering emotions” 
(Haidt, 2003). These emotional responses motivate attempts to help the sufferer 
(Harris, 1989; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, & King, 1979).
Crucially, the evidence goes beyond the past evidence by showing that 
sympathy affects much more than helpfulness per se. This emotional response inspires 
greater importance to a broad set o f self-transcendence values. Not only does 
sympathy make people place more importance on helpfulness, it makes them place 
more importance on maintaining justice, equality, being broad-minded, and caring for 
the environment. At the same time, the manipulation decreased the importance
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attached to a broad set of values that focuses on self-interest (e.g., gaining social 
recognition, being wealth, successful, and influential). These reciprocal effects are 
consistent with Schwartz’s cross-cultural model of values. By incorporating this 
model into the experimental design, the data showed that the effects of sadness in a 
sympathetic context extend far beyond effects on a helping orientation alone. The 
elicitation of sadness in a sympathetic context may increase desire to promote a 
variety of self-transcending, social justice motives. Moreover, the effects occur in a 
manner that is consistent with prior theory and evidence about motivational conflict 
and compatibility between values.
3.6 Chapter Summary
The research in this chapter focused on the effect of contextualized sadness on 
values. The findings shed light on a puzzle in past evidence, wherein sadness was 
sometimes found to be motivational-damping, and, at other times, motivational- 
enhancing. The results revealed no effects of personal failure sadness on values, and 
this null effect is potentially consistent with evidence suggesting that sadness is a 
demotivator of goals (Aarts, Custers, & Holland, 2007; Aarts, Custers, & Marien, 
2008; Aarts, Custers, & Veltkamp, 2008; Fishbach & Labroo, 2007). In contrast, 
death-related sadness led to an increased importance in self-transcendence values. 
This finding matches evidence that sadness motivates mood-repair mechanisms, 
which cause sad individuals to become more generous (Baumann, Cialdini, & 
Kenrick, 1981; Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973; Manucia, Baumann, & Cialdini, 
1984).
Overall, then, I was able to detect these differences in effect on values by 
examining sadness in two contexts. These effects may help to explain divergent 
effects of sadness on other judgments and behaviour. However, the next step in my
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doctoral research was to test whether other contextualized emotions affect values in a 
similar way, congruent with the circular model’s assumptions about motivational 
conflict and compatibility between values.
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Chapter 4: The Effect of Disgust on Values
4.1 Chapter Overview
This Chapter moved on from the focus on sadness to disgust. Disgust is a 
negative emotion like sadness, but has a higher activation level (Watson & Clark, 
1988). Across the two experiments, I investigated the impact of contextualized disgust 
on values. Experiment 6 asked participants to recall a disgust experience. A post- 
experimental coding of participants’ experiences revealed two main themes: moral 
disgust and hygiene disgust. The results showed that participants who experienced 
moral disgust attached less importance to self-enhancement values and more 
importance to self-transcendence values. Also, participants who experienced hygiene 
disgust attached less importance to openness to change values and more importance to 
conservation values. Experiment 7 manipulated the emotion context and replicated 
part of the findings in Experiment 6. Moral disgust again led to the changes in self­
enhancement values and self-transcendence values, but the effect of hygiene disgust 
was not found. This research highlights the importance of the context of disgust and 
motivational interrelations between values in predicting the effects of disgust 
experiences on values.
4.2 Context of Disgust
Rozin et al. (2000) suggest that disgust possesses different functions in different 
contexts. According to Rozin et al., these functions reflect evolutionary processes, 
culture, and individual development. In the initial stages of development, disgust 
elicitors like bad taste and bodily waste help people to stay away from poison, 
disease, and infection. In later stages of development, the disgust elicitors can be sex, 
death, and hygiene. By denying these aspects of animal nature, disgust partly 
functions as a denial of mortality. The role of disgust then expands on an
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interpersonal and moral level. Through avoiding direct or indirect contact with 
strangers, undesirables, and some moral offences, the feeling of disgust protects both 
the body and the social order. At this stage, physical contaminants and morally 
equivocal behaviour can both elicit disgust reactions. Disgust in a physical context 
helps distance the self from the physical environment, whereas disgust in a social or 
moral context helps consolidate moral standards.
Rozin et al.’s (2000) perspective is consistent with the hypothesis that the effects 
of disgust on values should depend on the context of disgust. Moral disgust is an 
other-condemning emotion that focuses on the characterological flaws of others 
(Giner-Sorolla, Bosson, Caswell, & Hettinger, 2010; Haidt, 2003; Roseman,
Antoniou, & Jose, 1996; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). The negative feeling 
of disgust attached to the moral transgression of the others should trigger a downward 
contrastive response (R. H Smith, 2000). This type of response should motivate an 
individual to distinguish his or her own behaviour from the person who performed the 
immoral acts. Similarly, evolutionary theorists connect the function of moral disgust 
to the maintenance of reciprocal altruism, which concerns the motivation to cooperate 
with those who have cooperated in the past, and the motivation to avoid or to actively 
punish people who have tried to cheat or exploit them (see Haidt, 2003). Taken 
together, the experience o f moral disgust should induce the urge to help and cooperate 
with others, and to maintain social justice.
The motivations induced by moral disgust are closely related to self­
enhancement and self-transcendence values. These values are often in conflict within 
moral dilemmas, as illustrated by abundant theory and research on collective good 
problems (e.g., Van Lange, 1999) and numerous moral dilemmas (e.g., Greene, 2009). 
When participants relate feelings of disgust to a moral context, but not a hygiene
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context, they should be motivated to consider the well-being of others. Therefore, the 
moral context should lead people to place less importance on (the motivationally 
inconsistent) self-enhancement values (e.g., achievement) and greater emphasis on 
self-transcendence (e.g., benevolence) values.
In addition, conservation and openness to change values may be influenced by 
hygiene or bodily disgust. Disgust in the hygiene context acts to protect health and 
safety, which are among the needs served by conservation values. Thus, the hygiene 
context should lead people to place less importance on (the motivationally 
inconsistent) openness values and greater emphasis on conservation values.
This reasoning has not been tested directly in past research. The most relevant 
evidence indicates that people who are highly sensitive to physical disgust are more 
likely to be politically conservative, rather than liberal (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 
2009). This finding is consistent with the predicted effects on contextualized values 
because political shifts are observed more strongly on issues ostensibly related to 
moral judgments of purity and divinity (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Inbar,
Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009). However, it is not possible to map the political 
issues studied in past research onto self-enhancement, self-transcendence, openness, 
and conservation values in a simple, one-to-one manner. The issues tend to be linked 
to many of these values at once. By examining value shifts directly, I can gain more 
information about the precise motivational shifts elicited by the different types of 
disgust.
To begin to address this aim, Experiment 6 used a method similar to Experiment 
4. Participants were asked to recall an experience of disgust and then complete a 
measure of values. I subsequently coded the occurrence of moral and hygiene themes
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(among others) and tested whether the recalled context determined the impact of 
disgust on values.
4.2.1 Overview o f  Experiments
The following two experiments focused on the distinct effect o f contextualized 
disgust on values. Experiment 6 examined the effects of freely recalled disgust on 
values, while Experiment 7 controlled for potential differences in the self-selection of 
emotion context by randomly determining whether participants recalled a disgusting 
experience related to morality, a disgust experience related to hygiene, or a control 
experience. These designs tested the hypothesis that the experience o f moral disgust 
leads to (1) decreased importance o f self-enhancement values and (2) increased 
importance of self-transcendence values. The designs also tested whether the 
experience o f hygiene disgust leads to (1) decreased importance o f openness to 
change values and (2) increased importance of conservation values.
4.3 Experiment 6
Participants in Experiment 6 were asked to recall a disgust experience or a 
neutral experience prior to completing a measure of values. I coded the content of the 
disgust experiences to test whether the context of disgust determined its effects on 
values. I based on previous research that examined the motivational function of 
disgust to predict the direction of the effects of disgust on values. Support for these 
predictions would provide a basis for a follow-up experiment manipulating emotion 
and emotion context.
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4.3.1 Methods 
Participants
Participants were 56 Cardiff University undergraduate psychology students who 
took part for course credit or for £2 reimbursement. The sample included 52 women 
and 4 men, with a mean age of 19.8 (SD = 2.10).
Procedure
Participants took part either individually or in groups of four or less, seated 
approximately five feet apart. Participants were told that they would be taking part in 
several studies. The experimental manipulation was presented as a study of emotion 
recall. This manipulation asked participants to write about a personal event associated 
with an intense feeling of disgust (Fishbach & Labroo, 2007; Tangney, 1993). The 
control group was asked to write a description about an ordinary school day.
Next, participants completed the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ; Schwartz, 
2001), as in Experiment 4. Participants in the disgust condition then rated how 
intensely they experienced the feeling of disgust during the recall task, while 
participants in the control condition rated the intensity of any emotion they 
experienced during the writing task. Participants responded using a scale from 1 (not 
at all) to 9 (very strongly). Finally, participants were asked to recall a happy event, 
probed for suspicion, and debriefed.
4.3.2 Results 
Manipulation Check
As expected, participants in the disgust condition reported a significantly higher 
intensity of emotion (M= 4.69, SE  = 1.20) than did participants in the control 
condition (M= 1.69, SE = 3.02), t (53) = 3.19,/? < .001.
71
Effect o f  Disgust on Values
I used two-level (disgust vs control) one-way ANCOVAs to examine the effect 
of the experimental manipulation on the importance of each higher-order value type. 
The average of each participant’s ratings of all of the values was entered as a 
covariate to control for individual differences in general value endorsement 
(Schwartz, 2007). The means and standard errors of the dependent variables (values 
ratings) are reported in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1
Experiment 6: Effects o f  Disgust on Values____________________________________
 Experimental Group_____
Disgust
condition Control
Values________ - aggregated_____ condition________ F___________ rjp2
4 . 0 2 a 4 . 5 1 b 1 2 . 4 5 * * *
. 1 9Self-enhancement ( 0 . 1 0 ) ( 0 . 1 0 )
Self­ 4 . 6 7 z 4 . 4 3 z 3 . 9 3 * . 0 7
transcendence ( 0 . 0 9 ) ( 0 . 0 9 )
Openness to 4 . 5 2 a 4 . 5 9 a . 1 8 . 0 0 3
Change ( 0 . 1 1 ) ( 0 . 1 2 )
Conservation 3 . 9 2 z
( 0 . 0 9 )
3 . 6 9 z
( 0 . 0 9 )
3 . 4 7 * . 0 6
Note. *** = /?<  .001,* = /? < .07. Standard errors appear in parentheses below means. 
Means with differing subscripts within rows are significantly different at the p  < .05 
based on Fisher’s LSD post hoc paired comparisons. Means sharing the subscript z 
within rows are marginally different a tp <  .07.
Results indicated that disgust priming affected self-enhancement values, self- 
transcendence values, and conservation values. Specifically, the recollection of 
feelings o f disgust condition caused self-enhancement values to become significantly 
less important (M =  4.02, SE  = .10) than did the control task (M = 4.51, SE = .10), F  
(1, 53) = 12.45,p  = .001, rjp2= .19. In contrast, disgust caused self-transcendence 
values to become significantly more important (M=  4.67, SE = .09) than the control 
task (M = 4.42, SE  = .09), F ( l ,  53) = 3.93,p  = .05, tjp2= .07. Disgust priming also 
exerted a marginal effect on conservation values, with the disgust condition eliciting
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stronger conservation values { M -  3.92 SE  = .09) than the control condition (M=
3.69, SE = .09), F ( l ,  53) = 3.47,/? = .07, tjp2= .06.
Moral Disgust versus Hygiene Disgust
As in past research asking people to recollect disgust experiences (Chapman, 
Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009; Haidt, 2003; Rozin, Haidt, & MaCauley, 2000), 
participants’ descriptions of a disgust experience revealed two main themes: moral 
transgressions of other people (e.g., terrorists, health carer that didn’t help an old lady 
in the hospital) and low standards of hygiene (e.g., stinky work environment, strong 
bodily odor). Consequently, two independent judges coded whether participant’s 
recollections matched one of these themes, and they exhibited perfect agreement in 
their coding. Twenty out of twenty-nine participants (69 percent) in the disgust 
condition recalled an incident related to the moral transgression of other people, and 
nine out of twenty-nine participants (31 percent) recalled an incident related to poor 
hygiene standards or filthy environment.
The means and standard errors of the value ratings are reported in Table 4.2. To 
examine the effect of the different types of disgust on values, I conducted one-way 
ANCOVAs on each of the four higher-order value types, but this time with the type of 
disgust (moral disgust versus hygiene disgust versus control) as the three-level 
independent variable. The average o f each participant’s ratings of all of the values 
was entered as a covariate.
Emotion context had a significant effect on self-enhancement values, F  (2, 52) = 
6.54,p  = .003, rjp2= .20. Participants who thought about moral disgust (M= 3.96, SE 
= .12) subsequently considered self-enhancement values to be less important than did 
participants in the control condition (M=  4.51, SE = .10), t (52) = 3.55, p  = .001. 
Participants who thought about hygiene disgust (M=  4.14, SE = .18) exhibited a
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marginal tendency to consider self-enhancement values to be less important than 
control participants, t (52) = 1.87,/? = .07. The importance o f self-enhancement values 
did not significantly differ between participants who thought about moral disgust and 
participants who thought about hygiene disgust, t (52) = .84, p  = .41.
Table 4.2
Experiment 6: Effects o f  Contextualized Disgust on Values
Experimental Group
npValues
Disgust 
condition 
- moral
Disgust 
condition 
- hygiene
Control
condition F
3 . 9 6 a 4 . 14az 4 . 5 1 z c . C A * * on
Self-enhancement ( 0 . 1 2 ) ( 0 . 1 8 ) ( 0 . 1 0 ) 0.34 .zu
Self­ 4 . 7 5 a 4 . 4 8 a 4 . 4 3 b a 3 . 1 0 + .1 1
transcendence ( 0 . 1 0 ) ( 0 . 1 5 ) ( 0 . 0 9 )
Openness to 4 . 6 9 a 4 . 1 5 z 4 . 5 9 a z 2 .7 5 + . 1 0
Change ( 0 . 1 3 ) ( 0 . 2 0 ) ( 0 . 1 2 )
Conservation 3 . 8 1 a 4 . 1 7 b 3 . 6 9 a 3 . 8 2 * . 1 3
( 0 . 1 0 ) ( 0 . 1 5 ) ( 0 . 0 9 )
Note. ** — p  < .01, * —p  < .05 ,f = p < .08. Standard errors appear in parentheses below 
means. Means with differing subscripts within rows are significantly different at the p  
< .05 based on Fisher’s LSD post hoc paired comparisons. Means sharing the 
subscript z within rows are marginally different a tp <  .08.
Emotion context had a significant effect in the opposite direction on self­
transcendence values, F  (2, 52) = 3.10,/? = .05, r/p2= .11. Participants who thought 
about moral disgust subsequently considered self-transcendence values to be 
significantly more important (M =  4.75, SE  = .10) than did control participants (M=  
4.43, SE = .09), t (52) = 2.44,/? = .02. In contrast, participants who thought about 
hygiene disgust did not rate self-transcendence values (M=  4.48, SE  = .15) 
differently from participants who thought about moral disgust, t (52) = 1.48,/? = .15, 
or about the control event, t (52) = 0.33,/? = .74. Thus, when compared to the control 
condition, moral disgust tended to suppress self-enhancement values and promote 
self-transcendence values.
74
The effect of emotion context on openness to change values was marginally 
significant, F  ( 2 ,  5 2 )  =  2.15, p  =  . 0 7 ,  rjp2= . 1 0 .  The importance of openness values did 
not significantly differ between participants who recalled moral disgust ( M =  4 . 6 9 ,  SE 
=  . 1 3 )  and those who recalled a mundane event ( M = 4 . 5 9 ,  SE =  . 1 2 ) ,  t ( 5 2 )  =  . 5 6 ,  p  = 
. 5 8 .  Participants who recalled hygiene disgust subsequently rated openness values as 
less important (.M= 4 . 1 5 ,  SE =  . 2 0 )  than did participants in the control condition, t 
( 5 2 )  =  1 . 9 7 , / ?  =  . 0 5 5 .  Also, participants who experienced moral disgust subsequently 
considered openness values to be more important than did participants who 
experienced hygiene disgust, t ( 5 2 )  =  2 . 3 1  p  = . 0 3 .
Emotion context had a significant effect on conservation values, F  ( 2 ,  5 2 )  = 
3 . 8 2 , / ?  = . 0 3 ,  rip2= . 1 3 .  The importance of conservation values did not significantly 
differ between participants who experienced moral disgust ( M = 3 . 8 1 ,  SE = . 1 0 )  and 
participants in the control condition (M=  3 . 6 9 ,  SE  =  . 0 9 ) ,  t ( 5 2 )  =  0 . 9 0 , / ?  = . 3 7 .  In 
contrast, participants who recalled hygiene disgust subsequently considered 
conservation values to be more important (M=  4 . 1 7 ,  SE = . 1 5 )  than did participants 
in the control condition, t ( 5 2 )  = 2 . 7 7 ,  p  — . 0 0 8 .  Also, participants who recalled moral 
disgust subsequently considered conservation values to be less important than did 
participants who experienced hygiene disgust, t ( 5 2 )  =  2 . 0 0 , / ?  = . 0 5 .
4 . 3 . 3  Discussion
The results revealed that feelings of disgust cause people to attach less 
importance to self-enhancement values and greater importance to self-transcendence 
and conservation values. This finding extends understanding of the effects of disgust 
on moral judgment by showing a systematic pattern of effects on the values we 
prioritize. Moreover, the pattern fits the circular model of values to a large degree. As 
self-enhancement values weakened in importance, self-transcendence values gained in
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importance. Contrary to the model, the marginal effect on conservation values was not 
met with an opposing effect on openness values, but this lack of opposing effects may 
be attributable to the weaker (i.e., marginal) effect on conservation values in the first 
place.
More relevant to the predictions regarding the importance of emotion context, 
analyses o f the context o f disgust revealed that the effects on self-enhancement and 
self-transcendence values were carried largely by participants’ focus on moral disgust. 
Moral disgust, but not hygiene disgust, led participants to attach lower importance to 
self-enhancement values and greater importance to self-transcendence values. In some 
respects moral disgust resembles anger(Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007), emerging 
because other people’s morally disgusting acts appear to reflect an extreme level of 
self-indulgence. People therefore distance themselves from these acts by dampening 
their own egotistical, self-enhancing values and reinforcing their self-transcendence 
values.
In contrast, hygiene disgust helps the individual adapt to the dirty environment 
through avoiding the body from touching the elicitors of disgust and emphasising the 
importance o f safety and security (Rozin, Haidt, & MaCauley, 2000), which are 
important among the needs served by conservation values. Indeed, hygiene disgust led 
to an increased importance o f conservation values (e.g., cleanliness) and a decreased 
importance o f openness values (e.g., daring, independence).
Together, these findings extend the understanding of the effects of disgust by 
showing a systematic pattern in its effects on values. When each type of disgust was 
considered separately, the value oppositions predicted by the circular model emerged. 
Once again, emotion priming led to reciprocal effects of values, depending on the 
context in which the emotion was experienced.
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4.4 Experiment 7
Experiment 6 relied on a post-experimental coding of participants’ report of a 
disgust experience to determine the effect of emotion context. This method leaves 
open the possibility that individual differences related to the self-selection of emotion 
context might explain its effects. To address this limitation, Experiment 7 
manipulated the emotion context by randomly determining whether participants 
recalled an experience or moral disgust, an experience of hygiene disgust, or a 
mundane event.
If the findings of Experiment 6 reflect a causal effect of each contextualized 
emotion, participants primed with moral disgust should subsequently consider self­
enhancement values to be less important and self-transcendence values to be more 
important than participants in the control condition. In contrast, participants primed 
with hygiene disgust should subsequently consider openness to change values (e.g., 
daring) to be less important and conservation values (e.g., security) to be more 
important than participants in the control condition.
4.4.1 Methods 
Participants
Participants were 163 Cardiff University undergraduate psychology students 
who took part for course credit or for £2 reimbursement. Seven participants were 
excluded from the sample because their descriptions focused on emotions different 
from the one I requested. The remaining 156 participants included 125 women and 31 
men, with a mean age of 20.49 (SD = 3.53).
Procedure
Participants took part either individually or in groups of seven or less, seated 
approximately five feet apart. Participants were told that they would be taking part in
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several studies. The experimental manipulation was presented as a study of emotion 
recall. Some participants were asked to write about a personal event associated with 
an intense feeling o f disgust at someone else’s immorality. Other participants were 
asked to write about an event associated with an intense feeling of disgust at someone 
else’s poor hygiene. The control group was asked to write about an ordinary school 
day.
Next, all participants completed the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ; 
Schwartz, 2001). Participants then rated how intensely they experienced a list of 
emotions during the recall task, using the same response scale as in Experiment 5. The 
list included the PANAS emotions (e.g., irritable, determined) and disgust. Both the 
PA and NA scales exhibited good internal consistency (as > .85). Finally, participants 
were asked to recall a happy event, probed for suspicion, and debriefed.
4.4.2 Results 
Manipulation Checks
Disgust. A oneway (moral disgust versus hygiene disgust versus control) 
ANOVA revealed that participants in the three experimental conditions experienced 
feelings of disgust in different levels of intensity, F ( 2 ,  1 5 3 )  =  7 5 . 4 8 , / ?  <  . 0 0 1 .  
Participants in the moral disgust condition (M =  3 . 5 8 ,S E  =  1 . 2 3 )  and the hygiene 
disgust condition { M -  3 . 0 2 ,  SE = 1 . 4 9 )  reported a higher intensity of disgust than did 
participants in the control condition (M = 1 . 0 2 ,  SE  =  . 1 4 ) ,  t ( 1 5 3 )  =  1 1 . 6 8 , / ?  =  < . 0 0 1 ,  
and t ( 1 5 3 )  = 9 . 1 3 , / ?  < . 0 0 1 ,  respectively. Participants in the moral disgust condition 
experienced a higher intensity of disgust than did participants in the hygiene disgust 
condition,  ^( 1 5 3 )  =  2 . 5 5 , / ?  = . 0 1 .
Positive and negative affect. A oneway (moral disgust versus hygiene disgust 
versus control) ANOVA revealed that participants in the three experimental
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conditions experienced different levels of positive affect, F  (2, 153) = 10.40, p  <.001. 
Participants in both the moral disgust condition (M=  1.81, SE = .57) and the hygiene 
disgust condition (M= 2.09, SE = .76) experienced less positive affect than 
participants in the control condition (M=  2.47, SE = .87), t (153) = 4.53, p  <.001, and 
t (153) = 2.62, p  = .009, respectively. Participants in the moral disgust condition 
experienced marginally less positive affect than did the participants in the hygiene 
disgust condition, t (153) = 1.91,/? = .06.
Participants in the three conditions also experienced different amounts of 
negative affect, F  (2, 153) = 22.62,p <  .001. Participants in the both the moral disgust 
condition (M= 2.12, SE = .81) and the hygiene disgust condition (M= 1.73, SE =
.75) experienced negative affect more strongly than participants in the control 
condition (M= 1.24, SE = .30), / (153) = 6.88,/? < .001, and t (153) = 3.84,/? < .001, 
respectively. The difference between the intensity of NA experienced by the 
participants in the moral disgust condition and in the hygiene disgust condition was 
also significant, t (153) = 3.04,/? = .003.
Taken together, the results showed that the manipulation was successful. The 
two disgust manipulations caused a higher intensity of disgust, less positive affect, 
and more negative affect than did the control condition.
Effect o f Contextualized Disgust on Values
To examine the effect of the different types of disgust on values, I conducted 
one-way (moral disgust versus hygiene disgust versus control) ANCOVAs on each of 
the four higher-order values. The average of each participant’s ratings of all of the 
values was entered as a covariate. The means and standard errors of the values ratings 
are reported in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3
Experiment 7: Effects o f  Contextualized Disgust on Values
Values
Experimental Group
F nP2
Disgust 
condition 
- moral
Disgust
condition Control 
- hygiene condition
3 . 9 5 a 4 . 1 3 a 4 . 2 6 b a 3.03* . 0 4
Self-enhancement ( 0 . 0 9 ) ( 0 . 0 9 ) ( 0 . 0 9 )
Self­ 4 . 6 7 z 4 . 4 5 b 4 . 4 9 z b 2 . 5 5 t . 0 3
transcendence ( 0 . 0 7 ) ( 0 . 0 7 ) ( 0 . 0 7 )
Openness to 4 . 4 6 a 4 . 4 4 a 4 . 5 1 a .2 1 . 0 0 3
Change ( 0 . 0 8 ) ( 0 . 0 8 ) ( 0 . 0 8 )
Conservation 3 . 8 1 a 3 .8 5 a z 3 . 6 9 a z 1 . 6 9 . 0 2
( 0 . 0 7 ) ( 0 . 0 7 ) ( 0 . 0 7 )
Note. * = p  < .0 5 ,1=p  < .09. Standard errors appear in parentheses below means. 
Means with differing subscripts within rows are significantly different at the p  < .05 
based on Fisher’s LSD post hoc paired comparisons. Means sharing the subscript z 
within rows are marginally different at p <  .09.
Contextualized disgust had a significant effect on self-enhancement values, F  (2, 
152) = 3.03,p  = .05, rjp2= .04. Moral disgust caused self-enhancement values to 
become less important (M = 3.95, SE  = .09) than did the control task {M= 4.26, SE = 
.09), t (152) = 2.45, p  = .02. Self-enhancement values did not significantly differ 
between the moral disgust and hygiene disgust conditions (M=  4.13, SE = .09), t 
(152) = 1.44,/? = .15, and between the hygiene disgust condition and the control 
condition, t (152) = 1.00, p  = .32.
In contrast, contextualized disgust had a marginal effect in the opposite direction 
on self-transcendence values, F ( 2, 152) = 2.55,p  = .08, tjp2= .03. Moral disgust 
caused self-transcendence values to become marginally more important (M =  4.67, SE 
= .07) than the control task (M =  4.49, SE = .07), t (152) = 1.13, p  = .09, and 
significantly more important than hygiene disgust (M -  4.45, SE = .07), t (152) = 
2.13,/? = .04. Self-transcendence values did not significantly differ between the 
hygiene disgust and control conditions, t (152) = .40,/? = .69. Thus, when compared
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to the control condition, moral disgust tended to suppress self-enhancement values 
and promote self-transcendence values.
Unlike in Experiment 6, contextualized disgust did not affect openness to 
change values, F {2, 152) = .21,;? = .81, tjp = .003, and conservation values, F  (2,
152) = 1.69, p  = .19, rjp2= .02. Table 4.3 shows that the mean differences were in the 
expected directions, but failed to achieve conventional levels of statistical 
significance.
Mediation: Moral Disgust, Disgust Intensity, and Negative Affect
A series of regression analyses tested whether disgust intensity and negative 
affect mediated the observed effects of moral disgust on self-enhancement and self­
transcendent values, in comparison to the control condition. As in the above analyses, 
the average of each participant’s ratings of all of the values was also entered in each 
of the analyses.
I used the product-of-coefflcients strategy with bootstrapping (Preacher and 
Hayes, 2004; 2008) as described in section 3.5.2. Results from the regression analysis 
revealed no direct effect of disgust intensity on self-enhancement values and self­
transcendence values, f  =.06, t (100) = .93,/? = .35, and f  =.006, t (100) = .11,/? =
.91, respectively. Thus, higher levels of disgust intensity experienced by the 
participants who recalled moral disgust did not account for the effect of different 
disgust contexts on values.
Similarly, results from the regression analysis revealed no direct effect of NA on 
self-enhancement values and self-transcendence values, j.3 = -.03, t (100) = -.34,/? = 
.73, and f  =.08, t (100) = .99, p  = .32, respectively. Thus, higher levels of NA 
experienced by the participants who recalled moral disgust did not account for the 
effect of different disgust contexts on values.
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4.4.3 Discussion
The results of Experiment 7 showed that moral disgust causes people to attach 
less importance to self-enhancement values and marginally more importance to self­
transcendence values. By manipulating the context in the emotion induction, I ruled 
out the possibility that individual differences in context selection are necessary to 
elicit these effects. The changes in values occur both when people spontaneously 
think about disgust in the two contexts and when people were asked to think about 
disgust in the two contexts.
To further disentangle the differences between the two contexts o f disgust, I 
examined other emotional reactions that may be associated with the contexts. I found 
that moral disgust did not differ from hygiene disgust by the level of positive affect 
experienced. Although moral disgust caused participants to experience a higher 
intensity o f disgust and NA than did hygiene disgust, the mediational analyses 
showed that the intensity of disgust and NA per se did not elicit the changes in values.
Nonetheless, Experiment 7 did not replicate the effect of moral and hygiene 
disgust on openness values and conservation values. Thus, I cannot rule out the 
possibility that some individual differences in predilection to recall each type of 
disgust contributed to the value changes observed in Experiment 6. Indeed, there is 
evidence that people’s sensitivity to their own visceral reactions plays a role in the 
association between disgust and moral judgment (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 
2008). Only people who score high on the Private Body Consciousness scale (PBC) 
(L. C. Miller, Murphy, & Buss, 1981) react to a dirty and disgusting environment by 
forming harsher moral judgments. Hence, if individuals high in this sensitivity are 
more likely to spontaneously recall hygiene disgust experiences, this sensitivity might 
explain the differences in values. This hypothesis fits other evidence that examined
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the connections between political conservatism and sensitivity to physical disgust 
(Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009).
4.5 Chapter Summary
The research in this chapter focused on the effect of contextualized disgust on 
values. These effects of moral disgust on self-enhancement and self-transcendence 
values help show a broad pattern in the effects of moral disgust on moral judgment, 
complementing prior evidence that bodily disgust triggers harsher moral judgment 
(Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). Considering the nature and function of bodily 
disgust, it may not have an impact on all domains of morality. Indeed, Horberg,
Oveis, Keltner and Cohen (2009) suggested that bodily disgust only amplifies the 
moral significance of the purity domain. The purity domain concerns the purity and 
contamination of the body, and it extends to concerns about physically and mentally 
pure lifestyles. The findings of Experiments 6 and 7 suggest that there is a broader 
impact of moral disgust on values and moral judgment. Disgust induced by moral 
transgressions is likely to amplify the moral significance of other domains of morality 
related to justice, harm or care. Moreover, it is likely to shape these judgments in a 
manner that reflects the motivational opposition between self-enhancement and self­
transcendence values.
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Chapter 5: The Effect of Shame on Values
5.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter focuses on the emotion of shame. It presents data testing whether 
this emotion affects values in a manner congruent with the prior evidence for the 
importance of emotion context and the motivational relations between values. In 
addition, it considered the role o f individual differences in the response to emotion. 
Individual differences are pertinent to shame because of evidence that individual 
differences in prior social value orientation affect responses to shame (Van Lange, 
Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). Hence, I examined potential interactions 
between the emotion context and social value orientation in determining the effects of 
shame on values. In addition, this chapter also extended the investigation by 
examining changes in value-relevant behaviour.
Experiment 8 asked participants to recall an experience of shame, and a post- 
experimental coding of participants’ experiences revealed two main themes: moral 
shame and poor performance shame. The results indicated that participants who 
experienced moral shame attached less importance to openness to change values and 
more importance to conservation values.
Experiment 9 measured social value orientation, manipulated the emotion 
context, and replicated part o f the findings in Experiment 8. Moral shame again led to 
the changes in openness values and conservation values, but only among pro-self 
individuals. Unexpectedly, both moral shame and performance shame led to a 
decrease in self-transcendence values among pro-self individuals. Moral shame also 
led to the increase of conformity behaviour, and this effect was mediated by the 
changes in both conservation values and openness values.
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Together, both experiments highlight the importance of the context of shame, 
individual differences in the response to this emotion, and the motivational 
interrelations between values as determinants of the effects on values. Moreover, 
Experiment 9 helps to illustrate the potential relevance of these effects for predicting 
value-relevant behaviour.
5.2 Context of Shame
Shame is a concern that one has not lived up to other people’s expectations 
(Bagozzi, Verbeke, & Gavino, 2003; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). 
Shame is also a response to a personal failure attributed to a flaw in the self (e.g.,M. 
Lewis, 1992; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). Hence, shame is 
conceptualized as both a “moral emotion” that helps regulate behaviour (Baumeister, 
Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Eisenberg, 2000) and as a self-conscious emotion 
(e.g.,Kitayama, Markus, & Matsumoto, 1995; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow,
1996) that creates a need for approval and acceptance from others (Bagozzi, Verbeke, 
& Gavino, 2003), leading to self-restorative behaviours (e.g., performing an 
achievement task) and self-protective behaviours (e.g., avoiding an achievement task) 
(De Hooge et al., 2009). The experience of shame triggers the need to belong to 
groups, leading people to navigate their behaviour to fit into groups without triggering 
the contempt, anger, and disgust o f others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Haidt, 2003). 
Subsequently, shame activates action tendencies to hide, or make movement and 
speech more difficult and less likely (Asendorpf, 1990; Keltner & Buswell, 1997; M. 
Lewis, 1993; R. S. Miller, 1996). These changes reassure the others that the individual 
will behave in a timid, non-assertive manner, so as to reduce the chances of receiving 
attack or further punishment from the others (Haidt, 2003).
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At the same time, shame is associated with narcissism (Gramzow & Tangney,
1992), and its concomitant self-focus interferes with empathic concern for others 
(Tangney, Marschall, Rosenberg, Barlow, & Wagner, 1994). The experience of shame 
sometimes leads to the failing to help another (see Tangney, 1996). This may be due 
to the feeling of worthlessness, the sense of control by others, and the perception of 
social interaction as sources of threat (Gilbert & Procter, 2006).
The seemingly contradictory descriptions of the motivational function of shame 
could be reconciled by considering the context associated with the emotion.
Congruent with the hypotheses about the effects of other emotions, I expect that the 
effects of shame on values and social judgment differ in different contexts. The 
common antecedents of shame are violations to social rules or standards and poor 
performance (de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2010; T. J. Ferguson, Stegge, & 
Damhuis, 1991; Keltner & Buswell, 1996; D. Lewis, 2004; Sabini & Silver, 1997;
R.H Smith, Webster, Parrot, & Eyre, 2002; R. H Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 
2002; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). Both types of shame involve a 
negative self-evaluation, but the cause of the emotion involves a different focus of 
awareness. Shame related to the violation of social or moral norms (moral shame) 
involves bringing harm to others, whereas performance shame involves the 
experience of pain from the awareness of self-incompetence.
Moral shame functions as an emotional moral barameter, providing instant 
feedback on the social and moral acceptability of our behaviour (Tangney, Stuewig, & 
Mashek, 2007). Also, moral shame has a stronger other-focus, involves a concern 
with others’ evaluation o f the self, and hence should induce an urge to fit in with a 
group and comply with social norms. These needs are expressed in conservation 
values (e.g., obedient, conformity), but opposed by openness values (e.g., freedom,
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independence), which encourage open expression of the self through independence 
and curiosity.
In contrast, performance shame has a self-focus and it comes with a negative 
judgment on the self. The sense of worthlessness, lack of control and fear of social 
interactions should interfere the ability to perform altruistic behaviour (Tangney et al., 
1994). The experience of performance shame may therefore lead to a decrease in the 
importance of self-transcendence values and, following from the circular model 
(Schwartz, 1992) an increase in the importance in self-enhancement values.
5.2.1 Social Value Orientation and Shame
The consistent effects of emotion context in the prior chapters allowed me to 
raise the level of ambition for the research described in this chapter. One important 
reason for examining shame was that it provided an opportunity to detect potential 
interactions between the emotion context and individual differences. This possibility 
is pertinent because of evidence that individual differences in prior social value 
orientation affect responses to shame (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman,
1997). Social value orientation reflects behavioural tendencies in hypothetical 
resource dilemmas wherein people can prioritize their own wishes or consider 
themselves and others (Messick & McClintock, 1968). Thus, in these hypothetical 
dilemmas, social value orientation is assessed by examining the extent to which 
people chose to allocate resources to themselves, others, or both themselves and 
others. Of importance, pro-self individuals tend to act competitively in actual social 
dilemmas, whereas pro-social individuals are more co-operative and tend to prefer 
equality of outcomes and reciprocate others’ behaviour (Perugini & Gallucci, 2001).
There are also significant links between social value orientation and ratings of 
the importance of different values. People with a pro-self orientation rate self-
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enhancement values as being higher in importance than people without this 
orientation, whereas people with a pro-social orientation rate self-transcendence 
values as being more important than do people without this orientation (Nelissen, 
Dijker, & De Vries, 2007).
Most relevant to this chapter, prior research has shown that the helping 
behaviour of the pro-socials is less affected by relevant feelings of shame than is the 
helping behaviour of pro-self individuals (de Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 
2008). Hence, any changes in values caused by the experience of shame may be more 
likely to arise among pro-self individual rather than pro-social individuals.
5.2.2 Shame and Value-Relevant Behaviour
In addition to examining the potential moderating effects o f emotion context and 
individual differences in social value orientation on shame-induced changes in values, 
this Chapter extended my investigation by examining changes in value-relevant 
behaviour. Evidence for an effect on behaviour would help to show that the effects on 
values have broad implications. An effect on behaviour would show that 
contextualized emotion affects more than mere feelings about the importance of 
values; contextualized emotion should also shape opinions and actions that express 
the values. To address this issue, Experiment 9 examined the extent to which 
participants conformed to others’ opinions about a debate on a controversial topic, 
rather than express a unique opinion reflecting their own independent points of view 
(Ashton et al., 2005). This measure reflected the extent to which the changes in values 
lead to behavioural changes.
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5.2.3 Overview o f Experiments
Two experiments focused on the effects of contextualized shame on values. 
Experiment 8 examined the effects of freely recalled shame on values. Experiment 9 
measured social value orientation and randomly determined whether participants 
recalled a shameful experience related to moral, poor performance, or a control 
experience prior to rating their values. In addition, Experiment 9 measured the effects 
of shame on value-related behaviour. These designs tested the hypothesis that the 
experience of moral shame would lead to (1) increased importance of conservation 
values and (2) decreased importance o f openness to change values. Also, the 
experience of performance shame would lead to (1) increased importance of self­
enhancement values and (2) decreased importance of self-transcendence values. These 
effects of moral shame and performance shame should occur primarily among pro­
self individuals. The changes in value caused by moral shame and performance shame 
should also increase conformity to consensus information.
5.3 Experiment 8
Participants in Experiment 8 were asked to recall a shame or a neutral 
experience prior to completing a measure of values. I coded the content of the shame 
experiences to test whether the context o f shame determined its effects on values. I 
based on previous research that examined the motivational function of shame to 
predict the direction of the effects of shame on values. Support for these predictions 
would provide a basis for a follow-up experiment manipulating emotion and emotion 
context.
5.3.1 Methods 
Participants
Participants were 63 Cardiff University undergraduate psychology students who 
received course credit for participation. The sample included 44 women and 19 men, 
with a mean age of 19.63 years (SD = 2.81). Three other participants were excluded 
from the analysis because their descriptions focused on emotions different from the 
one I requested.
Procedure
Participants took part either individually or in groups of ten or less, seated 
approximately five feet apart. As in the prior experiments, participants were told that 
they would be taking part in several studies, and the manipulation was presented as a 
study of emotion recall. This manipulation asked participants to write a personal event 
associated with an intense feeling o f shame (Fishbach & Labroo, 2007; Tangney,
1993). The control group was asked to write a description of an ordinary school day.
Next, participants completed the dependent measure, which was the Portrait 
Values Questionnaire (PVQ; Schwartz, 2001). After completing the PVQ, participants 
were asked to recall a happy event, probed for suspicion, and debriefed.
5.3.2 Results
Effect o f  Shame on Values
I conducted one-way ANCOVAs on each of the four higher-order value types, 
with the experimental manipulation (shame versus control) as the independent 
variable. The average o f each participant’s ratings of all o f the values was entered as a 
covariate to control for individual differences in general value endorsement 
(Schwartz, 2007). The mean and standard errors of the value ratings are reported in 
Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1
Experiment 8: Effects o f  Shame on Values
Values
Experimental Group
Shame condition Control 
- aggregated condition F rip2
4 . 0 9 3 . 9 6 1 .0 1
Self-enhancement ( 0 . 0 9 ) ( 0 . 0 9 ) •UZ
Self­ 4 . 5 2 4 . 6 4 1 . 1 8 . 0 2
transcendence ( 0 . 0 9 ) ( 0 . 0 8 )
Openness to 4 . 2 2 a 4 . 6 3 b 7 . 8 4 * * . 1 2
Change ( 0 . 1 1 ) ( 0 . 1 0 )
Conservation 3 . 7 8 z 3 . 5 7 z 3 .7 3 * . 0 6
( 0 . 0 8 ) ( 0 . 0 8 )
Note. **=/?< .01, * = /?< .06. Standard errors appear in parentheses below means. 
Means with differing subscripts within rows are significantly different at the p  < .05 
based on Fisher’s LSD post hoc paired comparisons. Means sharing the subscript z 
within rows are marginally different at/? < .06.
Shame priming exerted a significant effect on the openness to change values, F  
(1, 60) = 7.84,/? = .007, rjp2 = .12. Participants who thought about shame subsequently 
considered openness values (M=  4.22, SE = .11) to be less important than 
participants in the control condition (M = 4.63, SE = .10).
Shame priming also exerted a marginal effect in the opposite direction on the 
conservation values, F ( l ,  60) = 3.73,/? = .06, tjp2 = .08. As expected, participants who 
thought about shame considered conservation values to be more important (M= 3.78, 
SE = .08) than participants in the control condition (M =  3.57, SE = .08).
In contrast, shame priming did not have any effect on self-transcendence values 
and self-enhancement values, F ( l ,  60) = 1.18,/? = .28, rjp = .02, and F (  1, 60) = 1.01, 
p  = .32, tjp = .02, respectively.
Moral Shame versus Performance Shame
Two independent judges who were unaware of each participant’s experimental 
condition coded their descriptions of the shame event. They identified two main
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themes in each participant’s description of experiences of shame: breaching social 
norms (e.g., lying to friends, not attending grandmother’s funeral), and poor 
performance (e.g., failed an exam, done badly in a cricket game). There were 
disagreements between the judges in the coding of two descriptions, and these 
disagreements were resolved after discussion.
Twenty out o f thirty participants (67 percent) in the shame condition recalled an 
incident related to breaching social norms (moral shame) and ten out of thirty 
participants (33 percent) recalled an incident related to poor performance 
(performance shame). The means and standard errors of all dependent variables 
(values ratings) are reported in Table 5.2.
To examine the effects of each type of shame on values, I conducted one-way 
AN CO V As on each of the four higher-order values, with the experimental 
manipulation (moral shame versus performance shame versus control) as the three- 
level independent variable. The average of each participant’s ratings of all of the 
values was entered as a covariate.
Table 5.2
Experiment 8: Effects o f  Contextualized Shame on Values
Experimental Group
noValues
Shame 
condition 
- moral
Shame 
condition 
- performance
Control
condition F
4 . 1 6 3 . 9 5 3 . 9 6
Self-enhancement ( 0 . 1 2 ) ( 0 . 1 6 ) ( 0 . 0 9 ) 1.04 .03
Self­ 4 . 4 8 4 . 5 9 4 . 6 5 . 7 5 . 0 3
transcendence ( 0 . 1 1 ) ( 0 . 1 5 ) ( 0 . 0 8 )
Openness to 4 . 1 2 a 4 . 4 2 a 4 . 6 3 b a 4 . 8 2 * . 1 4
Change ( 0 . 1 3 ) ( 0 . 1 8 ) ( 0 . 1 0 )
Conservation 3 . 8 1  za 3 . 7 3 a 3 . 5 7 z a 1 . 9 4 . 0 6
( 0 . 1 0 ) ( 0 . 1 4 ) ( 0 . 0 8 )
Note. * = p  < .05. Standard errors appear in parentheses below means. Means with 
differing subscripts within rows are significantly different at the p  < .05 based on 
Fisher’s LSD post hoc paired comparisons. Means sharing the subscript z within rows 
are marginally different a tp  < .07.
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Contextualized shame exerted a significant effect on the openness to change 
values, F (2, 59) = 4.82,/? = .01 ,tjp = .14. Participants who recalled an experience of 
moral shame subsequently considered openness values (M=  4.12, SE = .13) to be less 
important than participants in the control condition (.M =  4.62, SE = .10), t (59) =
3.95,/? = .003. Participants who recalled performance shame did not rate openness 
values (M= 4.42, SE = .18) differently from participants who recalled moral shame, t 
(59) = 1.35,/? = .20, or participants in the control condition, t (59) = .1.03,/? = .31.
Contextualized shame exerted a nonsignificant effect in the opposite direction 
on conservation values, F  (2, 59) = 1.94, p=A5, t f p = .06. Given my a priori 
hypotheses, I conducted more specific planned comparisons. These analyses revealed 
that participants who thought about moral shame tended to consider conservation 
values to be more important (M=  3.81, SE  = .10) than did participants in the control 
condition (.M= 3.57, SE = .08), t (59) = 2.39,/? = .06. Participants who thought about 
performance shame did not rate conservation values {M= 3.73, SE = .15) differently 
from participants who recalled moral shame, t (59) = .47,/? = .65, and participants in 
the control condition, t (59) = 1.02, p -  .32.
Unexpectedly, shame priming did not have any effect on self-transcendence 
values and self-enhancement values, F (  1, 59) = .745,/? = .48, riP = .03, and F ( l ,  59)
y
= 1.04,/? = .36, rjp = .03, respectively.
5.3.3 Discussion
The results indicated that shame inhibits openness to change values. Openness 
to change values promote independent thought, direction of own action, and facing 
challenges in life. The notions o f being independent and exposing oneself to 
uncertainty are incompatible with the needs of someone feeling ashamed. The
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experience of shame involves a feeling of self-consciousness and a fear o f rejection or 
negative evaluations from others (R. H Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002; 
Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). As such, a reduction in openness to 
change values may help protect a person who is experiencing shame by protecting the 
self from standing out and receiving condemnation from others.
At the same time, shame weakly promoted conservation values. These values 
help attain acceptance o f others by adhering to social norms. Conservation values 
restrain actions and inclinations likely to upset others and violate social expectations. 
According to Schwartz, conservation values involve maintaining social order, being 
obedient, and showing respect for tradition. The endorsement of these values helps 
gain the acceptance of the other people and blur the salience of the self.
As expected, analyses o f the context of shame revealed that the effects on 
openness values and conservation values depended on the focus o f shame. Moral 
shame, but not performance shame, led participants to attach lower importance to 
openness values and (somewhat) greater importance to conservation values. This 
effect again supported the hypothesis that the effects of emotion on values depend on 
the context of emotion.
Nonetheless, shame did not have any effect on self-transcendence values and 
self-enhancement values. This may indicate that the experience o f shame does not 
activate concern for the welfare of others or concern for self-interest. Another 
plausible explanation is that there are some individual differences in predilection to 
recall each type o f shame. Indeed, there is evidence that individual differences in prior 
social value orientation affect responses to shame (de Hooge, Breugelmans, & 
Zeelenberg, 2008; Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). I sought to 
examine the effect of shame on self-transcendence values and self-enhancement
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values again with a more stringent design in Experiment 9, which included a measure 
of social value orientation.
5.4 Experiment 9
Experiment 8 relied on a post-experimental coding of participants’ descriptions 
of a shame experience to determine the effect of emotion context. In contrast, 
Experiment 9 manipulated the emotion context by randomly determining whether 
participants recalled an experience of moral shame, an experience of performance 
shame, or a mundane event.
Experiment 9 also incorporated recent evidence that individual differences in 
prior social value orientation affect responses to shame (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, 
& Joireman, 1997). Prior research has shown that situational activation of a goal only 
elicits goal striving in people who do not already chronically strive for that goal 
( Higgins, 1996). It explains why the helping behaviour of the pro-social individuals 
is less affected by relevant feelings of shame than is the helping behaviour of pro-self 
individuals (de Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008). Hence, if performance 
shame changes the importance o f self-enhancement values and self-transcendence 
values, this effect may be more likely to arise among pro-self individuals than pro­
social individuals. In addition, despite a lack of evidence suggesting any link between 
social value orientation and values on the conservation versus openness to change 
dimension (Nelissen, Dijker, & De Vries, 2007), proself individuals are less 
concerned about the norm of social responsibility and the norm of reciprocity (De 
Cremer & Van Lange, 2001). Hence, if moral shame changes the importance of 
conservation values and openness values, this effect may also be more likely to arise 
among pro-self individuals than pro-social individuals.
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In addition to examining the potential moderating effects of emotion context and 
individual differences in social value orientation on shame-induced changes in values, 
Experiment 9 extended the investigation by examining changes in value-relevant 
behaviour. Evidence for an effect on behaviour would help to show that the effects on 
values have broad implications. An effect on behaviour would show that 
contextualized emotion affects more than mere feelings about the importance of 
values; contextualized emotion should also shape opinions and actions that express 
the values. To address this issue, I examined the extent to which participants 
conformed to others’ opinions about a debate on a controversial topic, rather than 
express a unique opinion reflecting their own independent points of view (Ashton et 
al., 2005). This measure reflected the extent to which participants were motivated by 
conservation rather than openness motives.
Taken together, I predicted that participants who are induced to experience 
moral shame should subsequently attach more importance to conservation values 
(e.g., conformity) and less importance to openness values (e.g., freedom). On the 
other hand, participants who are induced to experience performance shame should 
subsequently attach more importance to self-enhancement values (e.g., achievement) 
and less importance to self-transcendence values (e.g., benevolence). These effects of 
moral shame and performance shame should occur primarily among pro-self 
individuals.
The effects of shame priming on conformity behaviour were somewhat more 
difficult to prefigure. Although it was clear that moral shame should increase 
conformity to consensus information, the potential effects of performance shame on 
conformity behaviour should depend on whether conformity promotes self­
enhancement motives (by increasing personal chances of success through following
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the view of the majority) in addition to conservation motives. If so, then performance 
shame could increase conformity behaviour, but primarily among those individuals 
whose self-enhancement values increase after shame (i.e., pro-self individuals).
5.4.1 Methods 
Participants
Participants were 158 Cardiff University undergraduate psychology students 
who took part as a partial course requirement or for £2 reimbursement. Twenty-four 
participants were excluded because they could not be classified as either pro-social or 
pro-self using the measure described below. The remaining sample included 100 
women and 34 men, with a mean age of 20.13 (SD = 2.46). 80 participants possessed 
a pro-social orientation, and 54 participants possessed a pro-self orientation.
Procedure
Participants took part either individually or in groups of up to three people, 
seated approximately five feet apart. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were 
told that the experimental session would comprise separate studies related to debate 
evaluations, values, and emotions. The experimenter then presented (a) the Social 
Values Orientation measure, (b) initial attitude measures on a controversial topic, (c) a 
debate on the controversial topic, (d) the shame priming task, (e) the Portrait Values 
Questionnaire, (f) consensus information on the controversial topic, (g) a post- 
experimental measure of attitude toward the controversial topic (the measure of 
conservation behaviour), and (h) emotion manipulation checks. Finally, participants 
were asked to recall a happy event in order to restore positive mood, probed for 
suspicion, and debriefed.
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Social Value Orientations
The first study measured the pro-social or pro-self tendency using the Triple 
Dominance Measure of Social Value Orientations (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & 
Joireman, 1997). This 9-item measure asks participants to choose among different 
options of distributing points between the participant and an unknown other. The 
divisions include choices that are pro-social (equal points distribution) and pro-self 
(maximizing points for oneself). Participants who made six or more consistent choices 
were classified as either pro-social or pro-self. I followed the standard procedure (de 
Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008; Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman,
1997) and excluded participants who could not be classified.
Initial Attitude Measures
The second task assessed initial attitudes toward two topics relevant to the 
measure of conformity versus openness behaviour: wind power and public 
surveillance. Participants rated their attitudes using a thermometer-like scale ranging 
from 0 (extremely unfavourable) to 100 (extremely favourable) (Esses, Haddock, & 
Zanna, 1993).
These two topics were selected because each one corresponds to a dimension in 
Schwartz’s (1992) circular model o f values. Support for wind power is consistent with 
the self-transcendences values, which concern the protection o f environment and 
being in unity with nature. On the other hand, the setting up of public surveillance 
promotes social order, national security, and personal safety. These issues are 
consistent with the motives served by conservation values. I included these two 
themes in the measure of conservation behaviour to verify that the effect of shame on 
conformity behaviour is independent of topic issue itself.
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Initial Debate Evaluations
The participants then read debate arguments related to either wind power or 
public surveillance. In the wind power condition, there were two arguments in favour 
of wind power and two arguments against it. Similarly, in the public surveillance 
condition, there were two arguments supporting public surveillance and two 
arguments opposing it. After reading the debate arguments, participants indicated 
their opinions about which side won the debate, using a thermometer-like scale 
ranging from -50 (anti-wind-power or anti-surveillance won by an extremely large 
amount) to +50 (pro-wind-power or pro-surveillance won by an extremely large 
amount).
Shame Priming
The manipulation was presented as a study of emotion recall. Some participants 
were asked to write a personal event associated with an intense feeling of shame from 
breaching moral or social norms. Other participants were asked to write an event 
associated with an intense feeling of shame from personal poor performance. The 
control group was asked to write a description of an ordinary school day.
Values
All participants completed the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ; Schwartz, 
2001), as in Experiment 4.
Conformity
The measure of conformity versus openness closely followed a procedure used 
to assess these motives in prior research (Hodson, Maio, & Esses, 2001). The 
experimenter stated that other participants had also read the debate arguments and that 
the researchers were compiling a summary of participants’ responses for another 
research unit. The response summary contained a 7-point rating scale ranging from -3
99
{the pro-side arguments won definitely) to +3 (the anti-side arguments won 
definitely). The experimenter asked participants to add their opinion o f the debate at 
the appropriate place in the booklet. At this point, the experimenter exposed 
participants to the consensus information by running her finger down the first two 
pages of a three-page booklet, supposedly looking for the next available place for the 
participants to place his or her own response. On these pages, the circled responses of 
24 alleged participants suggested that the majority of previous participants favored 
either the pro-side (M  = 1.29, SE = 1.43) or (in a counter-balanced condition) the 
anti-side (M =  -1.29, SE = 1.43). The absolute difference between the participants’ 
rating and the consensus rating (conformity score) revealed how closely participants 
adhere to the opinion of the majority. Smaller values therefore indicated closer 
adherence to the consensus information and hence a higher degree o f conformity. 
Participants were given privacy for their response, assured of confidentiality, and 
instructed to close the booklet before returning it to the experimenter.
Manipulation Checks
By the end o f the experiment, participants rated how intensely they experienced 
a list of emotions from the PANAS during the recall task, as in the prior experiments. 
Participants responded using a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly). The PA 
and NA scales again exhibited good internal consistency (as > .89). The NA scale 
included a rating of shame, which enabled me to examine this emotion separately.
5.4.2 Results 
Manipulation Checks
The experimental manipulation significantly influenced feelings of shame, F  (2, 
131) = 44.18,/? < .001. Higher levels of shame were felt in the moral shame { M -
2.96, SE = 1.40) and performance shame (M =  2.88, SE = 1.17) conditions than in the
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control condition (M= 1.18, SE = .53), / (131) =7.58 ,/? < .001, and t (131) =7.21,/? < 
.001, respectively. The intensity of shame did not significantly differ between the 
moral shame condition and the performance shame condition, t (131) = .33,/? = .74.
A one-way ANOVA revealed that the experimental manipulation significantly 
influenced levels of PA, F (2, 1 3 1 )  = 5 . 3 8 , / ?  = . 0 0 6 .  The moral shame condition (M = 
2 . 0 0 ,  SE = . 7 4 )  and performance shame condition ( M =  1 . 8 2 ,  SE = . 7 2 )  caused 
significantly lower PA than the control condition (M  = 2 . 3 1 ,  SE = . 6 7 ) ,  / ( 1 3 1 )  = 2 . 0 4 ,  
p  = . 0 4 ,  and / ( 1 3 1 )  = 3 . 2 5 , / ?  = . 0 0 1 ,  respectively. The intensity of PA did not 
significantly differ between the moral shame condition and the performance shame 
condition, t ( 1 3 1 )  = 1 . 2 8 , / ?  = . 2 2 .
The three experimental manipulation also influenced NA, F (2, 131) = 19.25,/? 
<.001. Levels of NA were significantly higher in the moral shame condition (M= 
2.04, SE = .83) and performance shame condition (M =  1.92, SE = .74) than in the 
control condition (M= 1.19, SE = .43), t (131) = 5.74,/? < .001, and t (131) = 4.97,p  
< .001, respectively. NA did not significantly differ between the moral shame 
condition and the performance shame condition, t (131) = .76,/? = .45.
As expected, there were no pre-manipulation differences in responses to the pre­
manipulation measures of attitudes toward wind power or public surveillance, F  (2, 
131) = .18,/? =.84. Similarly, participants in the three experimental conditions did not 
show any prior difference in their initial evaluations of the debate arguments, F  (2, 
131) = .45,/? = 64.
Finally, there was no difference in the distribution of pro-selfs and pro-socials in 
the three experimental conditions that were created after the measurement of social 
value orientation,^2(2, N = 134) = .33,/? = .85. Thus, random assignment succeeded 
at avoiding confounds on this dimension.
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Values
To examine the effect of the different types o f shame on values, I conducted 
two-way ANCOVAs on each of the four higher-order values, with the experimental 
manipulation (moral shame versus performance shame versus control) and social 
value orientations (pro-self versus pro-social) as the independent variables. The 
average of each participant’s ratings of all of the values was entered as a covariate. 
The means and standard errors of the values ratings are reported in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3
Experiment 9: Effects o f  Shame on Values in Proself and Prosocial individuals
Experimental Group
FValues
Shame
condition
moral
Shame 
condition - 
performance
Control
condition
Prosocials
Self-enhancement 4 . 0 2 a 3 . 7 8 a 3 . 9 9 a 1 . 2 3
( . 1 2 ) ( . 1 2 ) ( . 1 3 )
Self-transcendence 4 . 6 6 a 4 . 7 9 a 4 . 5 8 a 1 . 2 6
( . 0 9 ) ( . 0 9 ) ( . 1 0 )
Openness to Change 4 . 7 0 z a 4 . 5 7 a 4 . 4 4 z a 1 . 5 4
( . 1 0 ) ( . 1 1 ) ( . 1 1 )
Conservation 3 . 5 4 a 3 . 7 0 a 3 . 7 7 a 1 . 5 3
( . 0 9 ) ( . 1 0 ) ( . 1 0 )
Proselfs
Self-enhancement 4 . 3 2 a 4 . 4 4 a 4 . 2 0 a . 6 8
( . 1 5 ) ( . 1 4 ) ( . 1 5 )
Self-transcendence 4 . 4 2 a 4 . 2 1 a 4 . 7 4 b 5 . 7 6
( . 1 2 ) ( . 1 1 ) ( . 1 1 ) **
Openness to Change 4 . 3  l z 4 .6 4 z a 4 . 7 7 a 3 . 2 5
( . 1 3 ) ( . 1 3 ) ( . 1 3 ) *
Conservation 3 . 7 0 a 3 . 6 0 a z 3 . 3 1 z 2 . 9 9
( . 1 2 ) ( . 1 2 ) ( . 1 2 ) *
Note. ** = p<  .01 ,* = />< .05. Standard errors appear in parentheses below means. 
Means with differing subscripts within rows are significantly different at the p  < .05 
based on Fisher’s LSD post hoc paired comparisons. Means sharing the subscript z 
within rows are marginally different at/? < .10.
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Significant effects were obtained for each of the four higher-order values. For 
conservation values, there was a significant interaction between shame priming and 
social value orientation, F  ( 2 ,  1 2 7 )  = 4 .1 6 ,  p  = . 0 2 ,  r\p = . 0 6 .  Simple effects tests 
showed that contextualized shame priming had no effect on conservation values 
among participants with a pro-social orientation, F  ( 2 ,  1 2 7 )  = 1 . 5 3 , p  = . 2 2 .  In 
contrast, contextualized shame priming had a significant effect on conservation values 
among participants with a pro-self orientation, F  ( 2 ,  1 2 7 )  = 2 . 9 9 ,  p  = . 0 5 .  In this 
group, moral shame caused higher subsequent importance of conservation values (M  
= 3 . 7 0 ,  SE = . 1 2 )  than did the control task ( M =  3 . 3 1 ,  SE = . 1 2 ) ,  F ( l ,  1 2 7 )  = 5 . 6 0 , ; ?  =  
. 0 2 .  Performance shame caused marginally higher importance of conservation values 
(M=  3 . 6 0 ,  SE =  . 1 2 )  than did the control task, F ( l ,  1 2 7 )  = 3 . 1 0 , / ?  =  . 0 8 .
Conservation values did not significantly differ between the moral shame condition 
and the performance shame condition, F ( l ,  127) = .44,p  = .51. The main effects of 
shame priming and social value orientation were not significant, F  (2, 127) = .57, p  
=.57, rjp2= .009, and, F{\ ,  127) = 2.11, p  =.15, rjp2= .02, respectively. Overall, then, 
this pattern of effects indicated that moral shame and performance shame increased 
conservation values among pro-self individuals, but not among pro-social individuals.
For openness to change values, the interaction between shame priming and 
social value orientation was significant, F {2, 127) = 4.73,p  = .01, tjp = .10. As 
expected, simple effects tests showed that contextualized shame priming had no effect 
on openness values among participants with a pro-social orientation, F (2, 127) =
1.54,p  -  .22. In contrast, contextualized shame priming had a significant effect on 
openness values among participants with a pro-self orientation, F  (2, 127) = 3.25, p  = 
.04. In this group, moral shame caused lower subsequent importance of openness 
values (M= 4.31, SE = .13) than did the control task (M= 4.77, SE = .13), F( \ ,  127)
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= 3.25, p  = .04, and marginally lower importance of openness values than did 
performance shame (M =  4.64, SE  = .13), F ( l ,  127) = 3.13,/? = .08. Openness values 
did not significantly differ between the performance condition and the control 
condition, F ( l ,  127) = .58,/? = .45. The main effects of shame priming and social 
value orientation were not significant, F (2, 127) = .45,/? = .64, rjp — .007, and, F ( l ,
127) = .001 , p  = .98, r\p< .001, respectively. Overall, then, this pattern o f effects 
indicated that moral shame, but not performance shame, decreased openness to 
change values among pro-self individuals, but not among pro-social individuals.
For self-enhancement values, the main effect of social value orientation was 
significant, F  (1, 127) = 11.96,/? = .001, rjp2= .09, with proself individuals attaching 
more importance to self-enhancement values (M — 4.32, SE = .09) than did prosocial 
individuals (M = 3.93, SE = .07). The main effect of shame priming was not 
significant, F  (2, 127) = .20,/? = .82, tjp2= .003. Unexpectedly, the interaction between 
shame priming and social value orientation was also not significant, F (  1, 127) = 1.60,
p =  .21 , rip — .02 .
For self-transcendence values, the main effect of social value orientation was 
significant, F  {1, 127) = 6.87,/? =.01, r]p2= .05, with pro-self individuals attaching less 
importance to self-transcendence values {M — 4.45, SE = .07) than did pro-social 
individuals (M = 4.68, SE  = .05). In addition, the interaction between shame priming 
and social value orientation was significant, F (2, 127) = 6.46,/? = .002, rjp2= .09. As 
expected, simple effects tests revealed no significant effect of contextualized shame 
priming on self-transcendence values among participants with a pro-social orientation, 
F  (2, 127) = 1.26,/? = .29. In contrast, contextualized shame priming exerted a 
significant effect on self-transcendence values among participants with a pro-self 
orientation, F  (2, 127) = 5.76,/? = .004. In this group, performance shame resulted in
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self-transcendence values being rated as lower in importance (M= 4.21, SE = .11) 
than did the control task (M= 4.74, SE = .11), F ( l ,  127) = 11.71,p  = .001. 
Unexpectedly, moral shame also caused participants to attach lower importance to 
self-transcendence values (M=  4.42, SE = .12) than did the control task, F ( \ ,  127) = 
3.78,p  = .05. Self-transcendence values did not significantly differ between the 
performance shame condition and the moral shame condition, F ( 1, 127) = 1.97,/? = 
.16. This pattern of effects indicated that both moral shame and performance shame 
decreased self-transcendence values among pro-self individuals, but not among pro­
social individuals.
Conformity
Conformity scores were subjected to a 3 (moral shame versus performance 
shame versus control) x 2 (proself versus prosocial) ANOVA. Results indicated a 
significant main effect of shame on conformity, F  (2, 128) = 4.97, p  = .008, rjp2 = .07. 
Conformity was higher after recalling moral shame (M=1.38, SE = .17) and 
performance shame (M=1.46, SE  = .17) than after the control condition (M= 2.08, SE 
= .17), t (128) = 2.8%,p= .005, and t (128) = 2.57, p  = .01, respectively. Conformity 
did not differ between the moral shame condition and the performance shame 
condition, t (128) = .33, p  = .74.
In addition, there was a significant main effect of social value orientation, F ( l ,
128) = 11.60,p  = .001, rjp2 = .08. Participants with a prosocial orientation (M=1.30, 
SE = .13) conformed more than did participants with a proself orientation (M =1.97, 
SE = . 15). The interaction between shame priming and social value orientation was 
not significant, F (2, 128) = .90,/?= .41, tjp2= .01.
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Mediation o f  Conformity Behaviour: Conservation and Openness Values
The above results show that moral shame increased the importance of 
conservation values and decreased the importance of openness values among proself 
individuals. Further, moral shame increased conformity. I carried out additional tests 
to see whether the effect of moral shame on conformity in proself individuals was 
mediated by the decreased importance of openness values and the increased 
importance of conservative values. (The self-transcendence values of pro-self 
individuals after experiencing moral shame were not associated with conformity 
behaviour, /? = -.20, t (33) = .52,p  = .61, and recall that self-enhancement values were 
not affected by shame priming.)
In order to examine this indirect effect, I used the product-of-coefficients 
strategy as described in section 3.5.2. Results from the regression analysis revealed a 
direct effect o f openness values on conformity, /? = .64, t (33) = 2.21,/? = .04. Results 
from bootstrapping yielded a significant mean indirect effect o f moral shame on 
conformity through openness values of/? = -.31 (SE = .19) with a 95%-confidence 
interval from -.79 to -.04. Similar analyses testing the mediating role of conservation 
values revealed a direct effect of conservation values on conformity, /? = -.68, t (33) = 
2.08,p  = .05. The mean indirect effect of moral shame on conformity through 
openness values was close to significant, /? = -.27 (SE = .19) with a 95%-confidence 
interval from -.72 to .002. Thus, the effect of moral shame on conformity was 
statistically mediated by the impact o f moral shame on conservation values and 
openness values.
For those who recalled an incident of performance shame, there were no 
significant associations between the pro-self individuals’ conformity behaviour and 
their values, all ps > .35. Consequently, there was no basis for testing whether the
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effect of performance shame on conformity among pro-self individuals was mediated 
by changes in their values. Thus, the results indicated a mediating role of value 
change among pro-self individuals after experiencing moral shame, but left the effect 
of performance shame on these individuals unexplained.
5.4.3 Discussion
Experiment 9 revealed different effects of moral shame and performance shame. 
As expected, moral shame caused pro-self individuals to attach less importance to 
openness to change values and more importance to conservation values. In other 
words, moral shame caused pro-self individuals’ values to shift closer toward the 
chronic goals of pro-social individuals. Indeed, as expected, these value changes were 
detected only among participants with a proself orientation, but not among individuals 
with a pro-social orientation. This result is consistent with a number of studies 
showing that proselfs and prosocials respond differently to emotions like shame, guilt, 
and fear (de Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008; de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & 
Breugelmans, 2007; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Nelissen, Dijker, & De Vries, 2007). For 
instance, pro-self individuals are more cooperative in social bargaining games 
(Ketelaar & Au, 2003) and dyadic social dilemma games (de Hooge, Zeelenberg, 
Breugelmans, 2007) after experiencing guilt. The pattern of value change fits 
suggestions that proselves’ chronic goals are less other-focused than prosocials’ 
chronic goals (Cameron, Brown, & Chapman, 1998; De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001; 
Tangney, 1991). Consequently, proselves’ chronic goals are more labile in response to 
emotions that activate the salience of social norms.
At the same time, both moral shame and performance shame caused pro-self 
individuals to attach less importance to self-transcendence values. This pattern 
suggests that a threat to self-transcendence values exists across the two contexts for
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experiencing shame, and it fits ample research showing that shame is a painful 
experience that causes preoccupation with the self, making people less other-oriented, 
empathic, and aware o f others’ needs (Hoffman, 1984; Konstam, Chemoff, & 
Deveney, 2001; Tangney, 1991; Tangney, Marschall, Rosenberg, Barlow, & Wagner, 
1994). Contrary to the circular model of values, however, the effect on self­
transcendence values was not met with an opposing effect on self-enhancement 
values. In retrospect, this lack of opposing effects may be attributable to the sense of 
worthlessness and powerlessness produced by the experience o f both moral shame 
and performance shame (Tangney, 1989; Tangney, 1991; Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 
1983). If shame induces a feeling of low personal efficacy, then shame may make it 
seem subjectively impossible to meet values that promote personal goals. The self­
preoccupation induced by shame may undercut orientation to others, but not facilitate 
a compensatory focus on personal goals. This effect may explain why shame is 
reported as a crippling emotion (R. S. Miller, 1995; Orth, Berking, & Burkhardt,
2006; Tangney, 1991): it decreases the ability to transcend the self and focus on 
others, while failing to compensate by increasing the promotion of the self.
These effects on value changes are consistent with the hypothesis that the effects 
of shame on values depend on the context of the emotion and on individual 
differences in chronic goals beforehand. Experiment 9 also went further by examining 
effects on overt behaviour. Results indicated that moral shame and performance 
shame both led participants to conform more to consensus information about a 
controversial topic. However, only moral shame caused the change in openness values 
and conservation values, which mediated the effect of moral shame on conformity 
behaviour. The extension o f the effect of moral shame to conformity behaviour shows 
that its effect on values has repercussions for overt action.
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Surprisingly, performance shame affected conformity in a manner not explained 
by changes in values. As described above, performance shame activated a self-focus 
orientation and caused pro-self individuals to attach less importance to self­
transcendence values. Performance shame also led to an increased in conformity 
behaviour, but this change in behaviour was not associated with the change in self­
transcendence values. In retrospect, this change in behaviour may have been driven by 
the same sense of worthlessness and self-doubt that helps to explain the lack of effect 
of performance shame on self-enhancement values. As beings that have relied on 
group connections to promote survival, the salience of personal helplessness may 
foster a need to be closer to our in-groups, in order to compensate for our own 
weaknesses and self-doubts. This desire for closeness may not be expressed through 
changes in values because moral norms are not salient, but it may be experienced 
nonetheless.
This speculation raises an important point about the reasoning behind the 
hypotheses: I am not suggesting that every change in behaviour is driven by changes 
in values. Value changes should contribute to behaviour change, but value changes 
are not the only source of behaviour change. Similarly, I am not suggesting that every 
effect of emotion on social judgement and behaviour is driven by changes in values. 
There is ample potential for emotions to direct judgment and behaviour in ways that 
are nonconscious, automatic, and unrelated to conscious changes in values and goals. 
In this case, an effect of performance shame on conformity that is mediated by effects 
on low personal potency is commensurate with past research and the present pattern 
of value change.
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5.5 Chapter Summary
The research in this chapter focused on (1) the effect of contextualized shame on 
values and (2) the moderating effect of individual differences in social value 
orientation on shame-induced changes in values, and (3) effects of contextualized 
shame and social value orientation on value-related behaviour. Across the two 
experiments, moral shame led to the same changes in openness values and 
conservation values.
Experiment 9 further showed that these effects of moral shame occurred 
primarily among individuals with a pro-self orientation. In addition, the impact of 
moral shame on conformity among pro-self individuals was mediated by the effects 
on openness values and conservation values, providing a broader picture o f how these 
constructs are connected. The meditational analyses yielded provocative evidence that 
effects from emotions through values to behaviour are tenable.
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Chapter 6: General Discussion
6.1 Chapter Overview
The aim of this chapter is to review the research presented in this thesis and to 
discuss the implications of the findings. In the following sections, I summarize the 
results of the nine experiments and discuss their implications for current 
understanding of values, motivational functions of emotions, and methodology. I also 
discuss limitations of this research and outline some potential directions for future 
research.
6.2 Review of the Main Findings
Chapter 1 described basic properties of values and emotions. It also reviewed 
evidence for systemic effects of values on behaviours and evidence attempting to 
connect values and emotions. I argued that the extant literature has not thoroughly 
explored the ramifications of the circular model’s argument that there are systemic 
motivational conflicts and compatibilities between values (Schwartz, 1992). To 
capture motivational processes, it is imperative that influences on actual behaviour 
and on emotion be examined. Chapter 1 noted the need for further research testing 
whether effects of values on behaviour reflect the motivational interconnections 
between values as postulated by Schwartz. This chapter also raised the need for 
research examining effects of emotions on values and vice-versa. I noted that this 
thesis would focus on the effects o f emotion on values, attempting to detect whether 
these effects reveal the motivational conflicts and compatibilities predicted by 
Schwartz.
The subsequent experimental chapters (Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5) elaborated these 
points, highlighting additional areas where basic progress can be made. For example, 
Chapter 3 explained how emotion context may moderate the effect of emotion on
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values and may help to explain inconsistent effects of some emotions (esp. sadness) in 
past research. Each chapter then presented evidence that addressed the aims of the 
thesis. They each provided a deeper insight into how values are interconnected, and 
how contextualized sadness, disgust and shame lead to changes in values in a 
systemic manner.
6.2.1 Systemic Properties o f  Values
In Chapter 2 , 1 provided evidence that the circular model’s description of 
motivational interconnections between values provides a useful complement to theory 
and research on the processes that guide action. The results across Experiment 1 to 3 
revealed that priming  conservation values or openness to change values increases 
behaviour that affirms the values, while decreasing behaviour that affirms a set o f 
opposing values. The consistent pattern across the measures of actual behaviour in the 
priming experiments provides additional support for the notion that values map onto 
latent motivational conflicts and compatibilities, as predicted by the circular model of 
values (Schwartz, 1992). These results consolidated the findings obtained in the fifth 
experiment reported by Maio et al. (2009), which focused on the effects of priming 
self-enhancement values and self-transcendence values. Together, the two sets of 
experiments provide provocative support for the motivational compatibilities and 
conflicts predicted by the circular models by showing their ability to predict systemic 
changes in actual behaviour. Such systemic effects provide a significant extension of 
prior studies that examined the effects of value priming on only in the targeted values 
(Rokeach, 1973) or value-congruent behaviour (e.g., Bargh et al., 2001; Macrae & 
Johnston, 1998). The experiments revealed a wider potential impact of values than has 
been revealed previously.
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6.2.2 From Emotions to Values
Past theory has indicated that there are strong latent connections between values 
and emotion (Feather, 1995), while past research has revealed associations between 
values and chronic emotions (Nelissen, Dijker, & De Vries, 2007). Yet, these 
correlations cannot reveal whether specific emotions have a causal influence on 
values or vice-versa. The results across Experiment 4 to 9 indicated that the 
experience of contextualized emotions leads to a systematic change in values. These 
changes are predictable from the motivational interconnections between values, as 
predicted by Schwartz’s (1992) circular model. Experiments 4 and 5 revealed that 
priming death-related sadness, but not personal failure sadness, decreases the 
importance of self-enhancement values and increases the importance of self­
transcendence values. Similarly, Experiments 6 and 7 showed that priming moral 
disgust, but not hygiene disgust, decreases the importance of self-enhancement values 
and increases the importance of self-transcendence values. Experiment 8 showed that 
priming moral shame, but not performance shame, decreases the importance of 
openness values and increases the importance of conservation values. Experiment 9 
replicated the findings of Experiment 8, but only among pro-self, but not pro-social 
individuals. Together, the experiments show that emotions can shape values in a very 
broad and systematic manner.
This consistent pattern across experiments also showed that the context of 
emotion is pivotal for predicting effects on values. These effects provide an important 
extension of prior studies that examined the motivational functions of emotions as 
isolated from its context (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Lazarus, 1991; 
Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). Although I do not deny that specific emotions can 
possess core features that are consistent across contexts, their effects on values require
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an analysis that goes beyond their core features. Consistent with emotion appraisal 
theory, the effects on values rely on an understanding of the context producing the 
emotion in the first place.
It should be noted that context alone may not be sufficient to elicit the changes 
in values. Recall that a similar personal failure-related context was identified in 
sadness and shame experiences in Experiment 4 and Experiment 8 respectively. While 
personal failure sadness did not lead to any changes in values, performance shame 
caused proself individuals to attach less importance to self-transcendence values than 
the no shame condition. These differences point to the possibility that some emotions 
respond sensitively to context in the process of emotion regulation and response 
preparation. Hence, emotion is not simply a by-product o f the context present in an 
emotion episode, but an active ingredient in generating motivational influences.
6.2.3 Summary
The research presented in this thesis has revealed that priming a set of values 
has predictable implications via their motivational interconnections with other values. 
Further, the induction of contextualized emotions leads to a systematic change in 
values. Overall, the causal links between values, behaviour, and emotions are 
consistent with the circular model’s predictions about the motivational conflicts and 
compatibilities between values. This support for the motivational relations between 
values has broad relevance for understanding social judgment and behaviour. The 
next section will address some of the broader theoretical, applied, and methodological 
implications o f the research findings, limitations of the experiments, and potential 
directions for future research.
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6.3 Research Implications
The studies that primed values (Experiment 1-3) offer a unique perspective on 
diverse applied issues that are connected to values. For instance, many theories 
suggest that conflict between values causes prejudice and discrimination toward 
diverse groups, including people with disabilities (Soder, 1990), homosexuals (Herek, 
2000), obese people (Crandall et al., 2001), and Blacks (Katz & Hass, 1988). The 
attribution-value model of prejudice (Crandall et al., 2001; Crandall & Martinez, 
1996), the aversive racism model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986, 2005), and the 
ambivalence model of prejudice (Katz & Hass, 1988) all stress conflict between 
benevolence-oriented and achievement-oriented cultural values as sources of 
prejudice toward people or groups. The results of the three experiments complement 
these insights by revealing that behaviour can be affected not only by increasing the 
activation of values promoting that behaviour, but also by decreasing the activation of 
opposing values. Given these results, discrimination may be reduced by increasing the 
perceived importance of values promoting benevolence or by decreasing the 
perceived importance of values promoting achievement, because changes in either set 
of values have reciprocal effects on the opposing values. This speculation is a 
straightforward extension of the evidence described in this thesis.
Other attitudes and behaviours may be made difficult because of latent conflict 
between relevant values. People wish to protect the environment, but actions often fail 
to match this value; people also wish to be healthy, but find themselves failing to eat 
right and exercise (see Maio et al., 2007, for a review). In each case, people may 
underestimate the effect of situational constraints on them, but they may also 
underestimate competing motives. If the circular model of values is correct in 
suggesting that protection of the environment is viewed in a way that requires
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transcending one’s own interests, then actions pursuing this value may seem 
subjectively more difficult following activation of competing, self-enhancing motives. 
This may occur even when there is no real tension between the environmental 
behaviour o f interest and self-enhancing motives. For instance, many energy-saving 
measures are more cost-effective, even if they are automatically seen as an altruistic 
sacrifice for the welfare of humanity. The latent motivational assumptions may 
occasionally get in the way of reframing behaviours to reflect a lack o f conflict. Thus, 
these effects may be a hindrance to campaigns that attempt to elicit behavioural 
change, making it important for campaigners to examine ways to address the latent 
motivational assumptions.
The studies that primed emotions (Experiment 4-9) provide a powerful 
argument for considering alternative methods for emotion priming in research that 
examines the effects of emotions on social judgment and action. The most common 
procedure induces emotions by asking people to recall an event that powerfully led to 
the general emotion (de Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008; de Hooge, 
Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2010; Fishbach & Labroo, 2007; Keltner, Ellsworth, & 
Edwards, 1993; D.A Small & Lemer, 2008). The context of emotional incident is 
often ignored, probably because it is assumed to be irrelevant to the key theoretical 
assumptions (e.g.,Burns, Kubilus, & Bruehl, 2003; Damasio et al., 2000; Fitzgeraldd 
et al., 2004). In some cases, contextual variation is reported, but treated as an 
exploratory factor for which critical analyses are not conducted. For instance, 
participants who completed a negative mood induction task in one study reported 
sadness related to failures, the suffering or death of family members, breakups with 
relationship partners, and so forth (Fishbach & Labroo, 2007). Although it can be 
difficult to examine every specific context when many contexts are listed, important
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effects may be missed if there is no evidence- and theory-based partitioning of 
contexts. Merely aggregating all participants who thought about different contexts of 
the target emotion as one group may wipe out the distinct effects of each nuanced 
emotion. I therefore recommend that researchers code the emotion contexts so that 
they can examine the effects across the contexts and differences between contexts. 
This approach should replicate the principal conclusions being drawn without the 
context coding, while revealing the extent to which contextual factors are critical. It 
may matter a great deal if the effect of a particular emotion (e.g., shame) emerges 
across several contexts, but is robust in one of them and negligible in the others.
This issue is also relevant to other common procedures of emotion induction, 
such as methods that present a specific emotional story or video (Forgas, 2002, 2007; 
Hills, Hill, Mamone, & Dickerson, 2001; Josephson, Singer, & Salovey, 1996; 
Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Palfai & Salovey, 1993). For instance, Keltner, 
Ellsworth, and Edwards (1993) asked participants to imagine the death of their mother 
in a sadness induction task. The present findings show that the effects of this type of 
task may differ greatly from a sadness induction procedure that focuses on a different 
common source of sadness, such as personal failure. By considering the context of 
emotions, its applied motivational function can be more clearly revealed.
At the same time, it is worth stating again that the findings do not dispel the 
value of viewing emotions as possessing common properties in the abstract. Indeed, 
the findings reinforce the notion that emotions possess approach and avoidance 
elements. These elements are revealed by the opposing effects of each emotion on 
different values. For instance, shame is often described as an emotion with a strong 
avoidance orientation (R. S. Miller, 1995; Orth, Berking, & Burkhardt, 2006;
Tangney, 1991; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; Wicker, Payne, &
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Morgan, 1983). This avoidance tendency is demonstrated by Experiment 8 and 9’s 
evidence that moral shame decreases the pursuit of independence and stimulation, by 
decreasing the importance o f openness values. However, this effect o f moral shame 
was only half o f the picture. The results also indicated that people who experience 
moral shame attach more importance to conservation values (e.g., respect for 
tradition). Put simply, moral shame leads to an avoidance tendency for goals that 
involve uncertainty, but also to an approach tendency for goals that help to create 
certainty. Similarly, Experiments 4 through 7 revealed that the same emotion (e.g., 
moral disgust) can simultaneously increase pursuit of values that promote others’ 
well-being, while decreasing the pursuit of values that promote personal well-being. 
Thus, each emotion causes people to approach some aims, while avoiding others.
O f course, the effects on values are important partly because of how these 
effects may shape behaviour. This potential ramification was highlighted in 
Experiment 9, where shame increased conformity behaviour. Among pro-self- 
individuals, the effect o f moral shame in particular was mediated by changes in 
conservation and openness values. In theory, the effects of death-related sadness and 
moral disgust on self-transcendence and self-enhancement values should also have 
repercussions for diverse social judgments and actions. For instance, both emotions 
may induce an increase in subsequent helping behaviour and a decrease in 
achievement behaviour through their effects on self-transcendence and self­
enhancement values. These possibilities are likely given Experiment 9’s meditational 
evidence and prior evidence of associations between values and behaviour (see Maio, 
2010).
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6.4 Limitations
Although the present research yielded consistent evidence for systemic effects 
of values and contextualized emotions leading to a systematic change in values, the 
limitations of the designs should be noted. For instance, the participant samples were 
always UK undergraduates, thus limiting the generalizability of the findings. In 
addition, I did not include conditions that primed orthogonal values in the studies of 
value priming in Chapter 2. Results in these conditions should have been more or less 
the same as those found in the control conditions, but it would be ideal to test this 
prediction.
Also, in the studies of priming values (Experiment 1-3), the dependent measure 
of behaviour may reflect constructs other than those that were primed (e.g., different 
goals, scripts). In the experiments, the dependent measures of behaviour could be 
plausibly linked to other values beyond those that were primed. The lack of value- 
behaviour specificity makes it important that a consistent pattern was revealed across 
experiments, but it is nonetheless important for future research to investigate methods 
for more closely tuning the measures of behaviour to the values that are primed.
In the studies of priming emotions (Experiment 4-9), the main focus was on the 
effect of emotions on values importance changes. I only looked at the effect of values 
on behaviour in Experiment 9. The inclusion of behavioural measures in the sadness 
and disgust experiments would have helped assess the extent of these emotions bring 
about changes in both cognitive and behavioural terms. For instance, both death- 
related sadness and moral disgust increased the importance of self-transcendence 
values and decreased the importance of self-enhancement values. It would be 
interesting to find out if the same pattern of values changes bring about parallel 
behavioural changes (e.g., changes in helping and achievement) based on the inherent
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differences between the two emotions (D.A Small & Lemer, 2008; D. A Small, 
Lemer, & Fischhoff, 2006).
6.5 Future Research
Some interesting questions remain about the mechanisms that explain the effects 
of value priming. My research was guided by the circular model’s prediction that 
values express specific motivational orientations, which conflict with other specific 
motivational orientations. For example, self-direction values reflect a desire to quest 
for uncertainty and independence, which conflicts with the desire to protect the status 
quo. In Experiment 3, priming self-direction values led to an increased desire to see 
the answers to quiz questions, while priming security values led to a decreased desire 
to see the answers. Extant evidence indicates that activation of a motive affects the 
way in which we construe situations, such that we are quicker to detect ways in which 
current actions, objects, and people can be used to fulfill our motives (e.g., M. J. 
Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; G. Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008). Consistent with this 
evidence, the desire to face uncertainty and attain independence should make us 
consider acquiring answers to quiz questions as an opportunity to fulfil the sense of 
curiosity, rather than see it merely as a boring task. Thus, if the activation of self- 
direction values increases the desire for independence and reduces the concomitant 
desire to protect the status quo (similar to Experiment 3), then people who have been 
primed with self-direction values should be both more likely to see the acquisition of 
answers to a quiz as a chance to affirm independence, and less likely to construe a 
chance to remain clean as a chance to be safe and secure.
Although the behavioural measures consistently fit the assumed mechanism, 
they cannot rule out all other possibilities. For instance, Kruglanski et al. (2002) 
articulate how goals can be arranged hierarchically, such that some goals are
120
subsumed by other goals. It is possible that the effects predicted by the circular model 
of relations occur partly because values that serve opposing goals are less likely to 
promote the same higher-order goal than are values that serve the same goal or an 
adjacent goal. For instance, it may generally be more difficult to view the values 
wealth and helpfulness as promoting the same goal than it is to view wealth and 
power as promoting the same goal (e.g., achievement). This mechanistic prediction is 
important because it is possible that the ease of mapping onto higher-order goals 
changes in different contexts. To continue the previous example, prior recitation of a 
list of philanthropists might make it easier to regard wealth and helpfulness as 
expressions of a compatible higher-order goal (e.g., benevolence) than prior recitation 
of a list of corporate leaders. Indeed, this speculation is consistent with other evidence 
indicating that the effects of value activation on subsequent action depend on the 
content of prior value instantiations (Maio, Hahn, Frost, & Cheung, 2009; Maio, 
Olson, & Bernard, 2001). In the long run, research should evaluate multiple 
perspectives on the mechanisms that mediate the effects of value priming.
Future research would also be useful for tackling three other questions of strong 
basic and applied importance. First, it would be interesting to examine the effects of 
contextualized positive emotions, such as hope and joy, on values and social 
judgment. For instance, women expect to have more rewards and fewer costs when 
they express positive emotion toward another person than when they express self­
directed positive emotions (Stoppard & Gunn Gruchy, 1993). Similarly, researchers 
have distinguished elevation from other positive emotions, such as joy, interest, and 
contentment (Haidt, 2000; Haidt et al., 2000). Elevation is a warm, uplifting feeling 
and it occurs when people are inspired by others’ acts of goodness, kindness and 
compassion (Haidt et al., 2000). Similar to death-related sadness and moral disgust,
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elevation makes people aware o f other people’s feeling. This may explain why 
elevation generates the desires to help others and to become a better person. Together, 
these findings strongly suggest that the effects of context extend beyond the negative 
emotions studied in my research. The effects of positive emotions may also depend 
greatly on context.
Second, it would be useful to examine additional individual differences in the 
use of contextualized emotion. Experiment 9 revealed that the effect of contextualized 
shame on values occurs mainly in proself individuals, but social value orientation is 
one of many relevant individual differences. For instance, some individual differences 
are relevant to the experience of sadness, including level of depression (Beck, Steer, 
Ball, & Ranieri, 1996). Other individual differences are relevant to the experience of 
disgust, including sensitivity to disgust and bodily sensations (Haidt, McCauley, & 
Rozin, 1994; Olatunji, Haidt, McKay, & David, 2008). The results of Experiment 9 
provide a provocative indication that such individual differences may be important. At 
the very least, research on the roles of these individual differences would help us to 
understand the interplay between chronic and short-term emotional experiences in 
effects on social judgments and actions more generally.
Finally, it remains an open question whether or not the associations between 
emotion and values are bidirectional. As noted in the Introduction, Nelissen et al. 
(2007) found important correlations between emotions and values, but these 
correlations could not reveal the causal mechanisms responsible for the associations. 
The present experiments took an important step forward by showing that sadness, 
disgust, and shame can influence values in specific contexts. However, the 
experiments did not test whether values can influence the emotions that people 
experience in specific contexts. For instance, the experience of death-related sadness
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increases self-transcendence values, but does an increase in the importance of self­
transcendence values increase the tendency to experience sadness from death? 
Similarly, the experience of moral disgust elicits stronger self-transcendence values, 
but does activation of self-transcendence values increase the proclivity toward 
experiencing moral disgust? These questions could be addressed through paradigms 
that manipulate value importance (Maio et al., 2009) or measure value changes across 
time (Bardi, Lee, Hofmann-Towfigh, & Soutar, 2009).
6.6 Conclusion
This thesis presented important new evidence that values express systemic 
relations between latent motivations. As a result, priming a particular value has 
predictable effects on behaviours that express different values. The precise pattern of 
these effects can be predicted with the circular model of the motivational conflicts and 
compatibilities expressed by values. Also, by considering the social contexts of 
emotion and the motivational interconnections between values, this thesis has 
revealed a systematic pattern in the way that emotions affect broad social judgment 
and action.
This systematic pattern has been missing from previous research, which has 
focused on particular social judgments or actions. Recall that values are not any old 
construct; they are central to many theories of the functions of attitudes and behaviour 
(Grunerta & Juhl, 1995; Kahle, 1996; Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996; Maio & Olson,
1995; Murray, Haddock, & Zanna, 1996; Olson & Zanna, 1993; Sagiv & Schwartz, 
1995; Schwartz, 1996). They have repercussions for diverse attitudes and behaviours. 
These repercussions appear to be implicit assumptions within social campaigns that 
attempt to solicit support by eliciting feelings within us through diverse images and 
stories. Images of others’ dying of hunger should induce death-related sadness, the
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sight o f irresponsible businesses dumping toxic waste should induce moral disgust, 
and the stories of poverty caused by our quest for cheap goods made in destitute 
nations should induce moral shame. Campaigners seem to be hoping that these 
feelings will lead to a concern for others and for social justice. The evidence suggests 
that these intuitions may be justified, while also making clear that there can be effects 
on values not directly relevant to the campaigns (e.g., self-enhancement values, 
openness values, conservation values) and that the effects may depend on individual 
differences relevant to the emotion. The identification of specific motivational 
functions o f contextual ized emotions provides a useful reference point for framing 
social causes aimed at promoting values that guide action.
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Appendix
Appendix A - Experiment 1
(Tradition Values Priming Condition)
Task la:
Scrambled sentence
Below are ten scrambled sentences. Please rearrange the words or phrase to 
produce a complete sentence.
1. would rather / in life. / She / accept her / portion
2. views. / political / He / moderate / holds
3. that he / You can / tradition. / tell / respects
4. devoutly / is / My/ religious. / neighbour
5. detached from / He / worldly / is / concerns.
6. about / very humble / She's / success. / her
7. he / Admirably, / restrained / anger. / his
8. dedicated / He / scientific research./ to / his life/
9. part of / my / Coffee is / ritual, morning
10. was self-effacing / asked about / The captain / the team's successes. / when
Task lb:
Anagrams
Below are 10 anagrams. Please rearrange each set of the letters to produce a word.
1. sfcar
2. modtes
3. trdaitino
4. elmno
5. hmubel
6. inwdwo
7. oondel
8. reilgiuos
9. poilet
10. pneicl
After finishing the above tasks, please report and return the materials to the
experimenter.
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(Stimulation Values Priming Condition)
Task la:
Scrambled sentence
Below are ten scrambled sentences. Please rearrange the words or phrase to 
produce a complete sentence.
1. to go / would be / It / exciting / to Africa!
2. new / film. /This / a daring/ is
3. varied life./ He / a / to live / has chosen
4. the courses / students / The new / very stimulating./ find
5. and fearless / a / She is / climber./ bold
6. own business. / It was / her / to start / brave
7. courage to / have the / People should / for their beliefs. / stand up
8. city. / diverse / London / very / is a
9. other people's / It is / point of view. / to hear / interesting
10. the club / attractive. / to make/ We need / more
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Task lb:
Anagrams
Below are 10 anagrams. Please rearrange each set of the letters to produce a word.
11. sfcar
12. inivgortaing
13. fsacniatign
14. elmno
15. exhliaartnig
16. wnidwo
17. oondel
18. exicteemnt
19. exlpoimg
20. pneicl
After finishing the above tasks, please report and return the materials to the
experimenter.
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(Control Condition)
Task la :
Scrambled sentence
Below are ten scrambled sentences. Please rearrange the words or phrase to 
produce a complete sentence.
1. the table / She is / behind us. / on / sitting
2. for / kept / 1 have / ten years. / this chair
3. the bottom / in / The socks / drawer. / are
4. several books / There / the shelves./ on / are
5. her new / She / me / wardrobes./ showed
6. is sleeping / sofa./ The cat / the / on
7. away / just now./1 / the footstool / threw
8. asleep / on the / He / armchair. / fell
9. need to / bookcases./ We / the / repaint
10. in / the plates / She / a cabinet./ keeps
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Task lb:
Anagrams
Below are 10 anagrams. Please rearrange each set of the letters to produce a word.
21. sfcar
2 2 .edb
23. tbale
24. elmno
25. slehf
26. wnidwo
27. oondel
28. crutian
29. dvuet
30. pneicl
After finishing the above tasks, please report and return the materials to the
experimenter.
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Task 2:
Below are 16 questions concerning 8 pairs of trait dimensions. In the following 9- 
point scales, please rate yourself and an average college on the trait dimensions that 
you believe most accurately characterized yourself and the average college student.
1. Where do you think you fall into each of the categories below on the trait 
dimension Immature - Mature?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely extremely
immature mature
2. Where do you think an average college student falls into each of the categories 
below on the trait dimension Immature - Mature?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely extremely
immature mature
3. Where do you think you fall into each of the categories below on the trait 
dimension Irresponsible - Responsible?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely extremely
irresponsible responsible
4. Where do you think an average college student falls into each of the categories 
below on the trait dimension Irresponsible - Responsible?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
extremely extremely
irresponsible responsible
5. Where do you think you fall into each of the categories below on the trait 
dimension Maladjusted -  Adjusted?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely extremely
maladjusted adjusted
6. Where do you think an average college student falls into each of the categories 
below on the trait dimension Maladjusted -  Adjusted?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely extremely
maladjusted adjusted
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7. Where do you think you fall into each o f  the categories below  on the trait
dim ension Unintelligent -  Intelligent?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely extremely
unintelligent intelligent
8. Where do you think an average college student falls into each of the categories 
below on the trait dimension Unintelligent -  Intelligent?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely extremely
unintelligent intelligent
9. Where do you think you fall into each of the categories below on the trait 
dimension Cold -  Warm?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely extremely
cold warm
10. Where do you think an average college student falls into each o f the categories 
below on the trait dimension Cold -  Warm?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely extremely
cold warm
11. Where do you think you fall into each of the categories below on the trait 
dimension Incompetent — Competent?
1 2 3  4 5 6 7 8 9
extremely extremely
incompetent competent
12. Where do you think an average college student falls into each of the categories 
below on the trait dimension Incompetent -  Competent?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely extremely
incompetent competent
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13. Where do you think you fall into each o f  the categories below  on the trait
dimension Humorless -  Humorous?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
extremely extremely
humorless humorous
14. Where do you think an average college student falls into each of the categories 
below on the trait dimension Humorless -  Humorous?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely extremely
humorless humorous
15. Where do you think you fall into each of the categories below on the trait 
dimension Unimaginative - Imaginative?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely extremely
unimaginative imaginative
16. Where do you think an average college student falls into each o f the categories 
below on the trait dimension Unimaginative - Imaginative?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely extremely
unimaginative imaginative
Appendix B - Experiment 2
(Self-direction Values Priming Condition)
Task 1:
Scrambled sentence
Below are fifteen scrambled sentences. Please rearrange the words or phrase to 
produce a complete sentence.
1. self-respect. / He is / with a high / someone / sense of
2. her / decided to / own goals. / She / choose / has
3. suggest / enhances / Findings / that creativity / day dreaming.
4. is curious / Peter / about / around him. / everything
5. is essential / in a / Freedom / society./ democratic
6. its independence /1821. / in / from Spain/ Mexico gained
7. a very / has / My brother / imagination./ vivid
8. of / impressed by / We were /his work. / the originality
9. from the windows./ looking out / see / inquisitive faces / She could
10. their autonomy / preserved / from / The universities / the government.
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11. the stars. / had / interest in / an/ I've always
12. the freedom of speech / For most citizens, / with liberty. / in a country / is 
essential
13. book / her new / found / very inspiring./ She
14. look. / a questioning / She / me/ gave
15. right to / the / All peoples / self-determination. / have
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(Security Values Priming Condition)
Task 1:
Scrambled sentence
Below are fifteen scrambled sentences. Please rearrange the words or phrase to 
produce a complete sentence.
1. to ensure / the government / One role of / is / national security.
2. an important issue / of social order / in the city. / is / The maintenance
3. deepened / welcome / has / my sense of belonging. / His warm
4. maintained by / reciprocation of favors. / are / Mutual relationships
5. her / glow./ had given / The walk / a healthy
6. security / in the family. / to / Tom wants / ensure
7. clean. / are / Make / hands / sure your
8. you drive. / before / fasten/ your safety belt / Remember to
9. necessary / stability. / to ensure / It is / political
10. can prevent / of hygiene / the spread/ High standards/ of disease.
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11. keep us / exercises / can / fit and w ell. /  Regular
12. to maintain / She always / environment. / a dirt free / tries
13. myself. / Karate / defend / me to/ helps
14. mind comes / along / A strong / a strong body. / with
15. at / wear suits / to / It's regulation / the office.
(Control Condition)
Task 1:
Scrambled sentence
Below are fifteen scrambled sentences. Please rearrange the words or phrase to 
produce a complete sentence.
1. matched / The dress / with / the necklace. / well
2. for the / She has / the gloves / whole day. / put on
3. authentic / are / His shoes / leather. / made of
4. loves / She / skirt./ silky / her
5. funny / is a / print on / There / his shirt.
6. are / waterproof / These boots / made of / materials.
7. in all / He / this hat / occasions. / wears
8. to keep / a thick jacket / Please wear / warm. / yourself
9. her sleep. / to wear / She used / during / socks
10. of jeans. / He has / twenty / at least / pairs
11. trainers. / new pair / a / 1 need / of
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12. with/ very beautiful / her gown. / The bride / is
13. occasionally. / wears / trousers / He only / these
14. that shorts / pass me / Please / in front / of you.
15. Dinner suit? / new / like / Do you / my
Task 2:
The following tasks are related to a consumer decision study. You need to 
evaluate a new product called “Excite”. There will be two tasks and after that, you 
will have time to try the product. Part 1 is an information’ acquiring stage, and part 2 
involves consumer decision scenarios that ask you to make some choices.
Before the start o f part 1, you need to indicate what kind of information you 
would like to acquire for the evaluation of Excite and two other brands. In the 
following, you will see a 3 (brands) x 10 (attributes) matrix. You need to put numbers 
into the boxes to indicate the items you would like to receive and the order of 
acquiring them.
For each item of information, there will be a 2-minute audio recording. You 
can choose as many items of information as you wish. The total time needed for part 1 
and 2 will be the same, regardless of how many pieces o f information you chose to 
acquire. The more time spent on part 1, the less time there will be for part 2.
Matrix for Excite evaluation
Excite Brand C Brand S
Functions
Price
Benefits
Ingredients
Product Design
Target consumer
Medical testing report
Product’s country of origin
Possible allergic effect
Comments from current user
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Task 3:
t y  o  
0  o  < b
\  O a O
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Task 4:
In the following five minutes, please describe any possible uses of a brick.
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Appendix C - Experiment 3 
(Self-direction Values Priming Condition)
Task 1:
Main Terms Adjectives
Self-respect Lucky
Table Normal
Choosing own goal Great
Settee Ordinary
Creativity Ideal
Bed Average
Freedom Fantastic
Stool Satisfactory
Imagination Terrific
Bath Neutral
Main Terms Adjectives
Independent Happy
Cupboard Usual
Curiosity Pretty
Sofa Moderate
Originality Brilliant
Desk Typical
Inquisitive Attractive
Chair Okay
Autonomy Perfect
Chest of drawers Common
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Main Terms Adjectives
Concept Adjectives Furniture Adjectives
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*■
(Security Values Priming Condition)
Task 1:
Main Terms Adjectives
National security Lucky
Table Normal
Social order Great
Settee Ordinary
Clean Ideal
Bed Average
Healthy Fantastic
Stool Satisfactory
Fit Terrific
Bath Neutral
Main Terms Adjectives
Reciprocation of favours Happy
Cupboard Usual
Sense of belonging Pretty
Sofa Moderate
Hygiene Brilliant
Desk Typical
Stability Attractive
Chair Okay
Family Security Perfect
Chest of drawers Common
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Main Terms A djectives
Concept Adjectives Furniture Adjectives
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(Control Condition)
Task 1:
Main Terms Adjectives
Rabbit Lucky
Table Normal
Buffalo Great
Settee Ordinary
Chicken Ideal
Bed Average
Cat Fantastic
Stool Satisfactory
Kangaroo Terrific
Bath Neutral
Main Terms Adjectives
Fox Happy
Cupboard Usual
Panda Pretty
Sofa Moderate
Bird Brilliant
Desk Typical
Sheep Attractive
Chair Okay
Elephant Perfect
Chest of drawers Common
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Main Terms A djectives
Animals Adjectives Furniture Adjectives
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Task 2:
In the following, please mark a X on questions that you have already known the 
answer; or a V if you want to know the answer. Please also write a F next to box 
if you’re familiar to the topic issue (but not necessarily the questions in 
particular). For example, if you know history quite well in general, you can 
write down a F next to the box with a question related to history. If all cases 
don’t apply, you can leave the item blank.
□  The sinking of which famous German battleship was portrayed in the title 
of a 1960 film?
□  Which historical figure is reputed to have laid his cloak over a muddy 
puddle so that Queen Elizabeth I would not get her feet dirty?
□  In the Bible, by what name was Saul of Tarsus known following his 
conversion on the road to Damascus?
□  What was the Christian name of Mr Smirnoff, the man behind the popular 
brand of vodka?
□  Which car company manufactured models including the Maestro, Allegro 
and Cambridge?
□  At which famous golf course is the US Masters played each year?
□  The Statue of Zeus, one of the Seven Wonders of the World, was built in 
which ancient Greek town?
□  After the break-up of the Beatles, which of their songs did John Lennon
claim was the first ever heavy metal song, and is also the song on which
Paul McCartney played lead guitar for the first time?
C ] Which chemical element has a symbol in the periodic table that is derived 
from the Latin name Aurum?
□  Who led the first successful expedition to the South Pole?
I d  Under what name did Roman Emperor Gaius Octavius become best 
known, which a month of the year was later named after?
□  Bom in 1960, which TV and radio presenter was named the "most 
powerful man on the radio" by Radio Times in 2005?
□  In a game of snooker, what colour ball is worth 3 points?
□  What name is given to a baby marsupial?
□  Which 21 year old model did Rod Stewart marry in 1990?
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□  Bom in Israel, who was the first celebrity voted off the first series of "I'm 
A Celebrity, Get Me Out Of Here"?
□  Which actress famously stripped off her bikini top in slow motion in the 
1982 film "Fast Times At Ridgemont High"?
□  Which female tennis player won the French Open and U.S. Open in both 
1991 and 1992, but didn't compete in either o f these events in 1993 or 
1994?
□  Who dated actress Elizabeth Hurley between 2000 and 2001 and denied he 
was the father of her son bom in 2002 before a DNA test proved 
otherwise?
□  By surface area, what is the largest loch in Scotland?
□  Which U.S. President abolished slavery?
□  Which girls name was extremely uncommon when the book 'Peter Pan' 
was first published, but soon became popular because of the book?
□  Fray Bentos is a town in which South American country?
□  Who committed the first murder in the Bible?
□  Alfred Nobel, the man after whom the Nobel Prizes are named, was 
originally well known for inventing what?
Cl] On a standard dart board, what is the lowest number that cannot be scored 
with a single dart?
□  Which politician was once replaced by a tub of lard on the TV show Have 
I Got News For You?
□  What is the most common colour that appears in the flags of the world?
□  In movies, who directed the Godfather trilogy?
□  What is the name of the parliament of the Isle of Man?
□  Which American state is known as the Sunshine State?
□  What was the name of Elvis Presley’s manager?
□  In what year was the Bank of England founded?
□  Which British footballer has the most number of International caps?
CZI Father Ted Crilly and Father Dougal McGuire lived on Craggy Island with
which other priest?
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□  Which is the only X rated film to win an Oscar for Best Picture?
□  Eye for eye, tooth for tooth. According to Exodus what comes next?
□  What is the capital city of Belarus?
□  Ganymede is the largest moon in the solar system, around which planet 
does it orbit?
□  What was the nationality of Georges Bizet, composer of opera ’'Carmen"?
□  What is the most frequently sung song in the language of English?
□  What colour is the cross on the Swedish flag?
□  Which famous book features the character of Bob Cratchit?
□  In Greek legend, what is the name given to the creature that is half man 
and half bull?
□  According to legend, who rode through the streets of Coventry naked and 
was seen by someone called Tom, leading to the phrase "Peeping Tom"?
□  In which capital city is the largest museum in the world?
EH Who painted "Portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer I" which reportedly sold for a 
record 135 million dollars in June 2006?
EH In a 2004 poll run by the BBC, which TV show won the title of "Best 
British Sitcom"?
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Appendix D - Experiment 4 
Task 1:
Task 1 (Sad Priming Condition)
Please write a vivid description of an event that you can recall from your life when 
you experienced very intensely the following emotion:
Sad and distressed
Please include in the description what happened on that day, how you felt, and 
whether the event elicited thoughts or imagery that intensified your emotion.
Task 1 (Control Condition)
Please write a vivid description of an ordinary school day.
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Task 2
Person Profiles IVM
Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and think about how much each 
person is
or is not like you. Put an X in the box to the right that shows how much the person in the description is 
like you.
HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS PERSON?
Very
much
like like
some­
what
like
a
little
like
not
like
not 
like 
me at
1. Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to 
him. He likes to do things in his own original way.
me
□
me
□
me
□
me
□
me
□
all
□
2. It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of 
money and expensive things. □ □ □ □ □ □
3. He thinks it is important that every person in the world be 
treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal 
opportunities in life.
□ □ □ □ □ □
4. It's very important to him to show his abilities. He wants 
people to admire what he does. □ □ □ □ □ □
5. It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He 
avoids anything that might endanger his safety. □ □ □ □ □ □
6. He thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life. 
He always looks for new things to try. □ □ □ □ □ □
7. He believes that people should do what they're told. He 
thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no- 
one is watching.
□ □ □ □ □ □
8. It is important to him to listen to people who are different 
from him. Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to 
understand them.
□ □ □ □ □ □
9. He thinks it's important not to ask for more than what you 
have. He believes that people should be satisfied with what 
they have.
□ □ □ □ □ □
10. He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important 
to him to do things that give him pleasure. □ □ □ □ □ □
11. It is important to him to make his own decisions about 
what he does. He likes to be free to plan and to choose his 
activities for himself.
□ □ □ □ □ □
12. It's very important to him to help the people around him. 
He wants to care for their well-being. □ □ □ □ □ □
13. Being very successful is important to him. He likes to 
impress other people. □ □ □ □ □ □
14. It is very important to him that his country be safe. He 
thinks the state must be on watch against threats from within 
and without.
□ □ □ □ □ □
15. He likes to take risks. He is always looking for adventures. □ □ □ □ □ □
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HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS PERSON
Very some­ a not
much what little not like
like like like like like me at
me me me me me all
16. It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants □ □ □ □ n □to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.
17. It is important to him to be in charge and tell others what □ □ □ □ n □to do. He wants people to do what he says. W-J
18. It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to □ n □ □ n ndevote himself to people close to him. LJ LJ LJ
19. He strongly believes that people should care for nature. □ □ □ □ n □Looking after the environment is important to him. LJ
20. Religious belief is important to him. He tries hard to do □ □ □ □ □ □what his religion requires.
21. It is important to him that things be organized and clean. □ □ □ □ □ □He really does not like things to be a mess.
22. He thinks it's important to be interested in things. He likes □ □ □ □ □ □to be curious and to try to understand all sorts of things.
23 .He believes all the worlds’ people should live in harmony. □ □ □ □ □ □Promoting peace among all groups in the world is important to
him.
24. He thinks it is important to be ambitious. He wants to show □ □ □ □ □ □how capable he is.
25. He thinks it is best to do things in traditional ways. It is □ □ □ □ n □important to him to keep up the customs he has learned. L_J
26. Enjoying life’s pleasures is important to him. He likes to □ □ □ □ □ □‘spoil’ himself.
27. It is important to him to respond to the needs of others. He □ □ □ □ □ □tries to support those he knows.
28. He believes he should always show respect to his parents □ □ □ □ □ □and to older people. It is important to him to be obedient.
29. He wants everyone to be treated justly, even people he □ □ □ □ □ □doesn’t know. It is important to him to protect the weak in
society.
30. He likes surprises. It is important to him to have an □ □ □ □ □ □exciting life.
31. He tries hard to avoid getting sick. Staying healthy is very □ □ □ □ □ □important to him.
32. Getting ahead in life is important to him. He strives to do □ □ □ □ □ □better than others.
33. Forgiving people who have hurt him is important to him. □ □ □ □ □ □He tries to see what is good in them and not to hold a grudge. L 1
34. It is important to him to be independent. He likes to rely on 
himself. □ □ □ □ □ □
35. Having a stable government is important to him. He is □ □ □ □ □ □concerned that the social order be protected.
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36. It is important to him to be polite to other people all the 
time. He tries never to disturb or irritate others.
37. He really wants to enjoy life. Having a good time is very 
important to him.
38. It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries 
not to draw attention to himself.
39. He always wants to be the one who makes the decisions. 
He likes to be the leader.
40. It is important to him to adapt to nature and to fit into it. 
He believes that people should not change nature.
HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS PERSON?
Very some­ a not
much what little not like
like like like like like me at
me me me me me all
□ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □
Thank you for your cooperation!
Person Profiles IVF
Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and think about how much each 
person is
or is not like you. Put an X in the box to die right that shows how much the person in the description is 
like you.
HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS PERSON
Very some­ a not
much what little not like
like like like like like me at
me me me me me all
1. Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to n n □ □ □ nher. She likes to do things in her own original way. LJ LJ LJ
2. It is important to her to be rich. She wants to have a lot of 
money and expensive things. □ □ □ □ □ □
3. She thinks it is important that every person in the world be □ □ □ □ □ □treated equally. She believes everyone should have equal
opportunities in life.
4. It's very important to her to show her abilities. She wants n n □ □ n □people to admire what she does. LJ LJ LJ
5. It is important to her to live in secure surroundings. She n n n n n n
avoids anything that might endanger her safety. i_1 1_i i_i LJ i_i LJ
6. She thinks it is important to do lots of different things in n n n □ n nlife. She always looks for new things to try. i_i i_i i_i i_1 LJ
7. She believes that people should do what they're told. She i—i i—i i—i i—i i—i n
thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no- LJ LJ LJ LJ LJ LJ
one is watching.
8. It is important to her to listen to people who are different n n □ □ n □from her. Even when she disagrees with them, she still wants i_i LJ 1_i
to understand them.
9. She thinks it's important not to ask for more than what you n n n □ □ nhave. She believes that people should be satisfied with what i_i i_1 i_i LJ
they have.
10. She seeks every chance she can to have fun. It is important □ n n n □ nto her to do things that give her pleasure. 1_i i_i LJ LJ
11. It is important to her to make her own decisions about i—i □ □ □ n □what she does. She likes to be free to plan and to choose her LJ LJ
activities for herself.
12. It's very important to her to help the people around her. □ n n □ □ nShe wants to care for their well-being. LJ LJ LJ
13. Being very successful is important to her. She likes to 
impress other people. □ □ □ □ □ □
14. It is very important to her that her country be safe. She n n n n □ nthinks the state must be on watch against threats from within LJ LJ i_i 1_i LJ
and without.
15. She likes to take risks. She is always looking for adventures. □ □ □ □ □ □
16. It is important to her always to behave properly. She wants n □ □ □ n nto avoid doing anything people would say is wrong. 1_1 LJ l—l
170
HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS PERSON?
17. It is important to her to be in charge and tell others what to 
do. She wants people to do what she says.
Very
much
like
me
□
like
me
□
some­
what
like
me
□
a
little
like
me
□
not
like
me
□
not 
like 
me at 
all
□
18. It is important to her to be loyal to her friends. She wants 
to devote herself to people close to her. □ □ □ □ □ □
19. She strongly believes that people should care for nature. 
Looking after the environment is important to her. □ □ □ □ □ □
20. Religious belief is important to her. She tries hard to do 
what her religion requires. □ □ □ □ □ □
21. It is important to her that things be organized and clean. 
She really does not like things to be a mess. □ □ □ □ □ □
22. She thinks it's important to be interested in things. She 
likes to be curious and to try to understand all sorts of things. □ □ □ □ □ □
23. She believes all the worlds’ people should live in harmony. 
Promoting peace among all groups in the world is important to 
her.
□ □ □ □ □ □
24. She thinks it is important to be ambitious. She wants to 
show how capable she is. □ □ □ □ □ □
25. She thinks it is best to do things in traditional ways. It is 
important to her to keep up the customs she has learned. □ □ □ □ □ □
26. Enjoying life’s pleasures is important to her. She likes to 
‘spoil’ herself. □ □ □ □ □ □
27. It is important to her to respond to the needs of others. She 
tries to support those she knows. □ □ □ □ □ □
28. She believes she should always show respect to her parents 
and to older people. It is important to her to be obedient. □ □ □ □ □ □
29. She wants everyone to be treated justly, even people she 
doesn’t know. It is important to her to protect the weak in 
society.
□ □ □ □ □ □
30. She likes surprises. It is important to her to have an 
exciting life. □ □ □ □ □ □
31. She tries hard to avoid getting sick. Staying healthy is very 
important to her. □ □ □ □ □ □
32. Getting ahead in life is important to her. She strives to do 
better than others. □ □ □ □ □ □
33. Forgiving people who have hurt her is important to her. 
She tries to see what is good in them and not to hold a grudge. □ □ □ □ □ □
34. It is important to her to be independent. She likes to rely 
on herself. □ □ □ □ □ □
35. Having a stable government is important to her. She is 
concerned that the social order be protected. □ □ □ □ □ □
36. It is important to her to be polite to other people all the 
time. She tries never to disturb or irritate others. □ □ □ □ □ □
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HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS PERSOIN
37. She really wants to enjoy life. Having a good time is very 
important to her.
38. It is important to her to be humble and modest. She tries 
not to draw attention to herself.
39. She always wants to be the one who makes the decisions. 
She likes to be the leader.
40. It is important to her to adapt to nature and to fit into it. 
She believes that people should not change nature.
Very some­ a not
much what little not like
like like like like like me at
me me me me me all
□ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □
Thank you for your cooperation!
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Appendix E - Experiment 5
Task 1 (Death-related Sadness Condition)
Please write a vivid description of an event that you can recall from your life when 
you experienced very intensely the following emotion:
Sadness from a death-related event
Please describe what happened on that day, how you felt, and whether the event 
elicited thoughts or imagery that intensified your emotion.
Task 1 (Personal Failure Sadness Condition)
Please write a vivid description o f an event that you can recall from your life when 
you experienced very intensely the following emotion:
Sadness from personal failure
Please describe what happened on that day, how you felt, and whether the event 
elicited thoughts or imagery that intensified your emotion.
Task 1 (Control Condition)
Please write a vivid description o f an ordinary school day.
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Appendix F - Experiment 6
Task 1 (Disgust Priming Condition)
Please write a vivid description o f an event that you can recall from your life when 
you experienced very intensely the following emotion:
Disgust
Please include in the description what happened on that day, how you felt, and 
whether the event elicited thoughts or imagery that intensified your emotion.
Task 1 (Control Condition)
Please write a vivid description of an ordinary school day.
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Appendix G - Experiment 7 
Task 1 (Moral Disgust Condition)
Please write a vivid description of an event that you can recall from your life when 
you experienced very intensely the following emotion:
Disgust at someone else’s immorality
Please describe what happened on that day, how you felt, and whether the event 
elicited thoughts or imagery that intensified your emotion.
Task 1 (Hygiene Disgust Condition)
Please write a vivid description of an event that you can recall from your life when 
you experienced very intensely the following emotion:
Disgust at someone else’s poor hygiene
Please describe what happened on that day, how you felt, and whether the event 
elicited thoughts or imagery that intensified your emotion.
Task 1 (Control Condition)
Please write a vivid description o f an ordinary school day.
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Appendix H - Experiment 8
Task 1 (Shame Condition)
Please write a vivid description of an event that you can recall from your life when 
you experienced very intensely the following emotion:
Shame
Please include in the description what happened on that day, how you felt, and 
whether the event elicited thoughts or imagery that intensified your emotion.
Task 1 (Control Condition)
Please write a vivid description of an ordinary school day.
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Appendix I - Experiment 9
Task 1
In this task we ask you to imagine that you have been randomly paired with another 
person, whom we will refer to as the “Other”. This other person is someone you do 
not know and that you will not knowingly meet in the future. Both you and the 
“Other” person will be making choices by circling either the letter A, B, or C. Your 
own choices will produce points for both yourself and the “Other” person. Likewise, 
the other’s choice will produce points for him/her and for you. Every point has value: 
The more points you receive, the better for you, and the more points the “Other” 
receives, the better for him/her.
Here’s an example for how this task works:
A B C
You get 500 500 550
Other gets 100 500 300
In this example, if you chose A you would receive 500 points and the other would 
receive 100 points; if you chose B, you would receive 500 points and the other 500; 
and if you chose C, you would receive 550 points and the other 300. So, you see that 
your choice influences both the number o f points you receive and the number of 
points the other receives.
Before you begin making choices, please keep in mind that there are no right,or 
wrong answer -  choose the option that you, for whatever reason, prefer most. Also, 
remember that the points have value: The more of them you accumulate, the better for 
you. Likewise, from the “other’s” point of view, the more points s/he accumulates, the 
better for him /her.
For each of the nine choice situations, circle A, B, or C, depending on which column 
you prefer most:
A B C
0 ) You get 480 540 480
Other gets 80 280 480
A B C
(2) You get 560 500 500
Other gets 300 500 100
A B c
(3) You get 520 520 580
Other gets 520 120 320
(4) A B C
You get 500 560 490
Other gets 100 300 490
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(5) A B C
You get 560 500 490
Other gets 300 500 90
(6) A B C
You get 500 500 570
Other gets 500 100 300
(7) A B C
You get 510 560 510
Other gets 510 300 110
(8) A B c
You get 550 500 500
Other gets 300 100 500
(9) A B C
You get 480 490 540
Other gets 100 490 300
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Task 2: Debate Arguments Evaluations
Please read the following debate arguments related to wind power.
Introduction:
While the development of wind power may benefit both the society and the 
environment, some people are concerned about the changes created for people living 
close to the turbines. Listed below are the typical arguments from the Pro-wind-power 
side and the Anti-wind-power side.
Pro-wind-power side argument 1:
“Wind is a free source of energy. With modem technology, it can be captured 
efficiently with wind turbines. Although wind turbines can be very tall, each one takes 
up only a small plot of land. This means that the land below can still be used. This is 
especially the case in agricultural areas, where turbines can exist side-by-side with 
normal farming operations. In addition, wind turbines are available in a range of sizes 
which means a vast range of people and businesses can use them. Single households 
to small towns and villages can make good use of the range of wind turbines available 
today.
Anti-wind-power arguments 1:
“The strength of the wind is not constant and it varies from zero to storm force. This 
means that wind turbines do not produce the same amount of electricity all the time. 
There will be times when they produce no electricity at all. On top of that, large wind 
farms are needed to provide entire communities with enough electricity. For example, 
the largest single turbine available today can only provide enough electricity for 475 
homes, when running at full capacity. How many would be needed for a town of 100 
000 people?
Pro-wind-power argument 2:
“From an aesthetical point of view, many people find wind farms an interesting 
feature of the landscape. Also, remote areas that are not connected to the electricity 
power grid can use wind turbines to produce their own supply. The energy produced 
by wind turbines does not cause green house gases or other pollutants.”
Anti- wind-power side argument 2:
“Many people feel that the countryside should be left in its natural form, without these 
large structures being built. In fact, many people see large wind turbines as unsightly 
structures and not pleasant or interesting to look at. They disfigure the countryside 
and are generally ugly and noisy. Each one can generate the same level of noise as a 
family car travelling at 70 mph.”
179
On the scale below, please circle the number that corresponds to 
your overall evaluation o f  the debate. In other words, which side won and 
by how much?
+50 The PRO-wind-power position won by an extremely large amount
+40 The PRO-wind-power position won by a very large amount
+30 The PRO-wind-power position won by a large amount
+20 The PRO-wind-power position won by a quite large amount
+10 The PRO-wind-power position won by a slight amount
0 Neither side won -- it was even
-10 The ANTI-wind-power position won by a slight amount
-20 The ANTI-wind-power position won by a quite large amount
-30 The ANTI-wind-power position won by a large amount
-40 The ANTI-wind-power position won by a very large amount
-50 The ANTI-wind-power position won by an extremely large amount
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On the scale below, please circle the number that corresponds to your 
overall evaluation o f  the debate. In other words, which side won and by 
how much?
+50 The ANTI-wind-power position won by an extremely large amount
+40 The ANTI-wind-power position won by a very large amount
+30 The ANTI-wind-power position won by a large amount
+20 The ANTI-wind-power position won by a quite large amount
+10 The ANTI-wind-power position won by a slight amount
0 Neither side won — it was even
-10 The PRO-wind-power position won by a slight amount
-20 The PRO-wind-power position won by a quite large amount
-30 The PRO-wind-power position won by a large amount
-40 The PRO-wind-power position won by a very large amount
-50 The PRO-wind-power position won by an extremely large amount
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Task 3 (Moral Shame Condition)
Please write a vivid description of an event that you can recall from your life when 
you experienced very intensely the following emotion:
Shame from breaching moral or social norms
Please describe what happened on that day, how you felt, and whether the event 
elicited thoughts or imagery that intensified your emotion.
Task 3 (Performance Shame Condition)
Please write a vivid description of an event that you can recall from your life when 
you experienced very intensely the following emotion:
Shame from personal poor performance
Please describe what happened on that day, how you felt, and whether the event 
elicited thoughts or imagery that intensified your emotion.
Task 3 (Control Condition)
Please write a vivid description of an ordinary school day.
Task 4a
PVQ (see Appendix D)
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Task 5
(in a separate booklet)
Debate Evaluations
DATA SUMMATION SHEETS
PRO-wind-power side 
Won Definitely
-3 -2 -1
Neither Side 
Won 
0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side 
Won Definitely 
-3 -2 -1
Neither Side 
Won 
0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely 
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side 
Won Definitely 
-3 -2 -1
Neither Side 
Won 
0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side 
Won Definitely
-3 -2 -1
Neither Side 
Won 
0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side 
Won Definitely 
-3 -2 -1
Neither Side 
Won 
0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side 
Won Definitely 
-3 -2 -1
Neither Side 
Won 
0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely 
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side 
Won Definitely 
-3 -2 -1
Neither Side 
Won 
0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side 
Won Definitely 
-3 -2 -1
Neither Side 
Won 
0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side Neither Side
Won Definitely Won
-3 -2 -1 0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side Neither Side
Won Definitely Won
-3 -2 -1 0 +1
PRO-wind-power side Neither Side
Won Definitely Won
-3 -2 -1 0 +1
PRO-wind-power side Neither Side
Won Definitely Won
-3 -2 -1 0 +1
PRO-wind-power side Neither Side
Won Definitely Won
-3 -2 -1 0 +1
PRO-wind-power side Neither Side
Won Definitely Won
-3 -2 -1 0 +1
PRO-wind-power side Neither Side
Won Definitely Won
-3 -2 -1 0 +1
PRO-wind-power side Neither Side
Won Definitely Won
-3 -2 -1 0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely
+2 +3
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely 
+2 +3
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely
+2 +3
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely
+2 +3
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely
+2 +3
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely
+2 +3
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side Neither Side
Won Definitely Won
-3 -2 -1 0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side Neither Side
Won Definitely Won
-3 -2 -1 0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely 
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side 
Won Definitely
-3 -2 -1
Neither Side 
Won 
0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely 
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side 
Won Definitely 
-3 -2 -1
Neither Side 
Won 
0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side 
Won Definitely
-3 -2 -1
Neither Side 
Won 
0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely 
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side 
Won Definitely 
-3 -2 -1
Neither Side 
Won 
0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely 
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side 
Won Definitely 
-3 -2 -1
Neither Side 
Won 
0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely 
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side 
Won Definitely
-3 -2 -1
Neither Side 
Won 
0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely 
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side 
Won Definitely
-3 -2 -1
Neither Side 
Won 
0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side Neither Side
Won Definitely Won
-3 -2 -1 0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely
+2 +3
PRO-wind-power side 
Won Definitely 
-3 -2 -1
PRO-wind-power side 
Won Definitely 
-3 -2 -1
PRO-wind-power side 
Won Definitely 
-3 -2 -1
Neither Side ANTI-wind-power
Won Won definitely
0 +1 +2 +3
Neither Side ANTI-wind-power
Won Won definitely
0 +1 +2 +3
Neither Side ANTI-wind-power
Won Won definitely
0 +1 +2 +3
PRO-wind-power side Neither Side
Won Definitely Won
-3 -2 -1 0 +1
ANTI-wind-power 
Won definitely
+2 +3
